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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters. If there is a throughline, it is that each
chapter relates to the economics of partisan polarization or the media.
In the first, I show that a stylized fact on the decades-long stability in preferences
for income redistribution–which has surprised public economists, given the spike in
inequality–masks a divergence across parties. I then demonstrate that the widening divide
owes to preferences sorting rather than strengthening. Next, I return to survey experiments
on the elasticity of preferences to information treatments and, in contrast to previous
literature, I find a simple treatment that induces substantial support for taxation and
redistribution among conservatives. This treatment closes upwards of half the gap in
preferences between liberals and conservatives, a key finding amidst worsening polarization.
The second chapter evaluates how the news media choices of one generation affect the
formative environment and political preferences of the next. Focusing on the transition from
broadcast to cable television, I argue that while the shift from a low-choice to a high-choice
media regime benefits adults as consumers, it potentially comes at a civic cost to young
people, who do not choose the environment they inherit and are more likely to be raised
in polarized “epistemic bubbles” as their parents select into partisan news programs. I
explore this hypothesis in three steps. First, I field a novel survey to collect descriptive
evidence on the exposure of young people to partisan news media. Next, I present a simple
overlapping generations model which generates a testable prediction–more media choice for
parents will strengthen the transmission of beliefs from parents to children. Finally, I test
that prediction with the rollout of Fox News, finding suggestive evidence that children of
Republican parents raised in homes with more potential Fox News exposure are more likely
to become Republicans themselves.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Felix Koenig, we use a historic quasi-experiment
during the regulated U.S. rollout of television to estimate the impact of entertainment
technologies on the labor-leisure tradeoff. Using Social Security work histories and variation
in television exposure across local areas, we find that the launch of an additional channel
is associated with a decline in the probability of working on the order of 0.2-0.5 percentage
points. The estimates translate to an hour of TV viewing crowding out about three minutes
xi
of work–meaning most TV time substitutes for other leisure activities–and a long-run decline
in employment rates of around two percentage points. The effects are largest for older
workers and help explain post-war retirement trends. Our results also address the puzzle
that employment is declining while wages increase. Increasingly compelling outside options
to work can rationalize these trends without large income effects.
xii
CHAPTER I
How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? New
Results on Partisan Polarization




Has the shifting distribution of income in the U.S. changed preferences for redistribution?
Two broad findings emerge from a recent literature on demand for redistributive taxation
and transfers. The first is that despite a surge in income inequality, Americans’ preferences
for redistribution appear to have remained steady for decades, even among those with below
average income (Kuziemko et al. (2015), Ashok et al. (2015)). This “puzzle in American
political economy” (Bazzi et al. (2017), p. 4) has surprised public economists because
both basic intuition and median voter models like Meltzer and Richard (1981) predict that
as inequality increases, demand for redistribution will rise as well. Survey experiments
have uncovered a second, related result–preferences for redistribution are difficult to nudge
with information treatments. Facts about inequality (Kuziemko et al. (2015)), as well as
intergenerational mobility (Alesina et al. (2018)) and immigration (Alesina et al. (2019)),
appear to have relatively small effects on people’s preferences. Taken together, the evidence
1See Hochschild (2016), p. 61 and p. 93.
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to date has suggested that beliefs about redistribution in the U.S. are firmly held at the
individual level and therefore largely stable in the aggregate.2
This paper argues that a focus on political party produces a quite different set of
descriptive and experimental conclusions. In Section 1, I show that rising political
polarization better explains preferences than rising income inequality. Specifically, I find
that beneath the aggregate stability in preferences is a sharp divergence between Democrats
and Republicans; since 1978, the gap in support for redistribution between the parties has
more than doubled. I then demonstrate that the divide owes to preferences segregating rather
than strengthening, meaning that while more extreme views have not become more common,
deviations from party orthodoxy have became rarer. There are fewer and fewer Republicans
who support redistribution and fewer Democrats who oppose it. This evidence offers a
resolution–or at minimum a reframing–of the puzzle that preferences appear unchanged
while inequality increases. Redistribution is an inherently normative and political subject,
and along political lines these preferences are not stable.3
In Section 2, I return to the survey experiments from which Kuziemko et al. (2015)
concluded, “Our results suggest that, generally, greater information can increase respondents’
sense of concern about an issue, but not necessarily their support for policies that might
ameliorate it. Information about inequality and poverty has only a limited (and typically
statistically insignificant) tendency to increase support for higher income taxes on the well-off
or transfer programs for the disadvantaged” (p. 1505).4 Analysis of the political views of
respondents offers a constructive revision of that conclusion–I find an information treatment
that substantially increased support for taxation and transfers among conservatives, which
is a novel result in the literature. This treatment focused not on broad inequality but on
the economic circumstances of specific low-income families and how transfer policies could
affect those families. Its effects among conservatives are precisely estimated and about five
times the size of those previously reported, closing upwards of half the gap in preferences
between the liberal and conservative control groups. Understanding this treatment and its
effects is therefore especially relevant in a polarizing climate, when commentators like Klein
(2020) have argued that we have entered “post-persuasion” politics. Section 3 offers brief
concluding remarks on partisanship and redistribution.
2Throughout, I follow the literature and use the word “preferences” to mean support for redistribution,
as reported in surveys and survey experiments. See Sen (2014) for a discussion of different possible meanings
of preferences.
3Alesina et al. (2020) highlight different perceptions of inequality, mobility, and immigration across
Democrats and Republicans and compare those perceptions to reality, whereas my findings are on policy
preferences.
4I also discuss the comparable findings in Alesina et al. (2018) and Alesina et al. (2019) in Section 2.
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1.2 Partisan Trends in Preferences
The left panel of Figure 1.1 reproduces Figure 1 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), which
illustrates a surprising stylized fact in political economy: Preferences for redistribution in
the U.S. show little movement since 1978, despite a dramatic increase in income inequality
over that period. The plot shows responses to a General Social Survey (GSS) question on
whether the government should reduce income differences.5 Note that the trends in beliefs
are flat even among below average income respondents. More inequality appears not to
have led to more demand for redistribution, at least as measured by this standard survey
instrument.
The right panel shows a widening gap in redistributive preferences between Democrats
and Republicans. Beneath the stable population average, there has been a modest but steady
increase in support for redistribution among Democrats and a somewhat more pronounced
decline in support for redistribution among Republicans.6 In 1978, the average difference
between Democrats and Republicans on this seven-point scale was 0.97 points; by 2016 the
difference had more than doubled to 2.17 points. What one can conclude from Figure 1.1
alone is only that self-identified Democrats and Republicans are further apart today than in
previous decades. Whether one ought to call that divergence “polarization” or whether it
might be driven by semantic or compositional changes that do not reflect underlying changes
in preferences depends on precisely what polarization and party identification mean.
There are at least two types of preference polarization. The first and most obvious is
illustrated in the top panel of Figure 1.2. This shows a stylized case in which a bimodal
distribution of preferences emerges, with fewer people holding centrist views and more people
holding more extreme views on both the left and right. The bottom panel of Figure 1.2
shows a second possibility–even with the overall distribution of beliefs in the population
remaining relatively stable, average differences between parties can widen if those parties
become better sorted, such that, for instance, it becomes less likely for a Republican to
5Here is the full question for the GSS eqwlth variable: “Some people think that the government in
Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the
taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government
should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a
card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the
income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern
itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?”
Researchers often reverse the responses so that higher numbers mean more support for redistribution.
6These larger changes among Republicans are consistent with the idea of “asymmetric polarization”
advanced in Mann and Ornstein (2012a), Mann and Ornstein (2012b), and Mann (2014). The extent to
which asymmetric polarization characterizes policy preferences more broadly is disputed. Murray (2014)
argues that a comprehensive Pew study on polarization “undermines the notion, popular in Washington, of
‘asymmetrical polarization’—which blames Republicans for causing the division.”
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support redistribution and less likely for a Democrat to oppose it. It is this latter form of
polarization through sharpening party segregation that better characterizes redistributive
beliefs.7
Figure 1.3 shows rising partisan sorting over time, plotting changes in the distribution of
redistributive preferences from the start to the end of the GSS sample, 1978 to 2016. The
left panel, for the full population, shows small changes and little evidence of polarization.
While there is currently a slightly smaller share of Americans holding centrist views on
redistribution than in 1978, there is no broad movement out to the left and right poles
of the distribution. The within-party changes are larger and more clearly segregated.
The distribution among Republicans, in the center panel, has shifted uniformly towards
opposition to redistribution, such that while in 1978 fully 61 percent of Republicans had
either neutral or supportive preferences for redistribution, just 37 percent did by 2016.
Democrats have aligned less dramatically behind the opposite view, more uniformly favoring
redistribution. In 1978, 44 percent of Democrats held positions neutral to or against
redistribution, and by 2016 only 30 percent did. Deviations from the party position on
redistribution have become rarer.
What could be driving the sharpening partisan sorting in preferences? There are several
possible explanations. In an ethnography of Tea Party Republicans, Hochschild (2016) finds
that income redistribution has become a “flashpoint” as modern Republican identity has
consolidated around a worldview in which taxation and transfers amount to the government
encouraging the unemployed and the undeserving to cut in line at working people’s expense.
The evidence I have presented is consistent with those qualitative findings, as well as with the
polarizing climate more generally. But even without broad ideological changes, sorting along
economic and demographic dimensions could also account for the observed party differences.
If, for instance, poorer people more strongly support redistribution, and poorer people have
become less likely to be Republicans, we would observe the divergence across parties shown in
Figure 1.1 and the sorting in Figure 1.3. It could also be that redistributive beliefs across the
wealthier and poorer, the more and less educated, white and non-white, or men and women
have diverged, or that moderates have gradually left both the Democratic and Republican
parties, leaving behind more strident partisans who now drive raw cross-party differences.8 I
7And other views as well. Political scientists Fiorina and Abrams (2014) note that “What has changed
is how partisans are distributed in terms of their ideology and issue opinions. Self-identified Democrats have
become more homogeneously liberal and self-identified Republicans more homogeneously conservative.” See
Fiorina and Abrams (2008) for a review of the evidence on sorting. Klein (2020) (p. 31-36) also offers
a thorough discussion of the distinction (“Polarization is not extremism, but it is sorting.”), interpreting
changes like those in the top panel as polarization around beliefs and those in the bottom panel as polarization
around party identities.
8Deeper questions of how respondents might differentially interpret a fixed survey question over time
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turn next to a discussion of these possibilities, finding no strong evidence that demographic
sorting or mechanical attrition are beneath the political divide.
Following Alesina et al. (2011), Table 1.1 reports results from regressions on the
descriptive relationships between preferences for redistribution and individual demographic
characteristics in the GSS, with a new focus on the evolving role of political party. Panel
A of the table compares the first and last years of the GSS sample, 1978 and 2016. In
columns 1 and 2, I regress preferences on party affiliation and demographics. The outcome
is an indicator equal to one if the individual supports redistribution (coded as a response
greater than four on the seven-point GSS scale), and independents, who identify as neither
Republicans nor Democrats, are the excluded category. The main results again highlight the
partisan divergence. Column 1 shows that in 1978 Republicans were 7.5 percentage points
less likely to favor redistribution than independents, while Democrats were 7.6 more likely,
implying a rougly 15 percentage point gap between Republicans and Democrats (though the
coefficients on the parties are not statistically distinguishable in 1978, given the relatively
small differences between them and the small sample size). By 2016, shown in column 2,
that partisan gap in the probability of supporting redistribution had tripled to 45 percent.
To address the small samples and possible sensitivity to the start and end years, Panel B of
the table repeats the exercise using the first and second halves of the sample. Columns 5
and 6 show that between the pooled first (1978-1996) and second (1998-2016) periods, the
gap increased from 19 to 31 percent.
Table 1.1 also shows little evidence that demographic sorting underlies the partisan
polarization.9 Consider first the possibility that preferences have diverged across various
demographic groups based on income, education, etc. Columns 1 and 2 show that income has
if anything become a less important predictor of preferences over time, and that differences
across other demographic dimensions are either steady or declining as well.10 This result
bears on a second possibility, discussed above, which is that characteristics like income or
education determine preferences, and the income or education of the average Republican or
are difficult to address. The GSS is useful because it has asked an identically-worded question about
redistribution since the 1970’s. But one could view this as problematic, as people might have had quite
different redistributive policies in mind in 1978 and 2016. One solution is data on beliefs about specific
policies, which I use in the next section on experimental results.
9Figure A.2 in the appendix shows more detailed year-by-year demographic trends.
10See Table A.1 in the appendix for results with dollar income, rather than the binary income variable
used here, finrela in the GSS. The qualitative conclusions are unchanged. Use of finrela has two limitations,
which are that it is by design a perception–whether or not respondents believe they have below average
income–and it will not capture granular sorting at the top or bottom of the income distribution. I report it
in Table 1.1 in part for interpretability. One can more meaningfully compare the roles of party and income
with a binary income variable. The finrela variable also features in Figure 1.1 above and in Kuziemko et al.
(2015), and Cruces et al. (2013) have shown that perceptions of one’s position in the income distribution
matter for preferences.
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Democrat are systematically changing over time. To test for this sorting in the GSS sample,
in columns 3 and 4 I regress an indicator equal to one for Republicans and zero otherwise on
individual characteristics. The demographic differences in party composition between 1978
and 2016 are modest and statistically insignificant. I repeat the regressions with the first and
second halves of the sample in columns 7 and 8, which show that individuals with college
degrees are marginally less likely to be Republicans in the second period than the first.
Otherwise, the differences are small in magnitude and not statistically different from zero.
The partisan gap in preferences appears not to have arisen because the parties currently
contain substantially different demographic types of people than in the past.11
Another plausible possibility is that over time people with moderate preferences are
leaving the Republican and Democratic parties and becoming independents. If this were
true, then even without any individual changing his or her beliefs, the average Republican
and Democrat in the data would appear increasingly extreme, mechanically producing a
divergence. While there has been an uptick in the share of those in “other” parties or no
party, the changes are small relative to the doubling and tripling partisan gaps documented
above. In the GSS data, from 1978 to 2016, the share of self-identified independents in the
sample increased from 14.5 percent to 16.7 percent if one defines independents as excluding
those respondents who say they have partisan leanings (but do not strictly identify as a
Republican or Democrat), and from 36.3 percent to 41.3 percent when including the so-called
partisan “leaners”.12 Assuming these observed levels of party attrition and a distribution of
preferences fixed at the 1978 baseline, attrition alone creates a gap 2.2-6.4 percent the size of
the actual divergence. In a review of the literature on political polarization, Gentzkow (2016)
describes similar trends in partisan and ideological identification dating back to World War II,
concluding from American National Election Study data that “the shares calling themselves
‘conservative,’ ‘liberal,’ or ‘moderate’ have remained remarkably stable, with no hint of a
move toward the extremes in recent years” (p. 7).
This section has documented political sorting in Americans’ preferences for redistribution,
offering a new perspective on the extant puzzle in political economy that preferences have
remained stable despite a spike in income inequality. It is not increasing inequality but
11Boxell (2019) shows that, more generally, demographic change can account for a nontrivial share of
polarization in the population, and Boxell et al. (2017) find that polarization has increased most among
those over the age of 65.
12See appendix Figure A.1 for main findings inclusive of leaners and appendix Figure A.3 for the complete
picture of party identification over the sample period. Interestingly, Smidt (2017) finds that self-identified
independents in the 2000’s voted more reliably for one party than self-identified strong partisans in the 1970’s,
and Krupnikov and Klar (2014), in an article titled “Why People Call Themselves ‘Independent’ Even When
They Aren’t,” argue that the rise in self-styled independents has to do with the “socially desirable label” of
independence amidst ugly politics.
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rather political polarization that is driving preferences, which are segregating by party. Next I
revisit experimental findings on inequality and preference formation, with a new focus on the
political views of respondents, which uncovers a second result on the key role of partisanship.
A Kuziemko et al. (2015) experiment reported as having small and inconsistent effects was
in fact powerfully persuasive for conservatives, closing a substantial share of the gap in
preferences between liberal and conservative control groups.
1.3 Political Views and Preference Elasticities
Kuziemko et al. (2015) sparked a recent literature of survey experiments in economics
whose findings are broadly consistent–information treatments move people’s factual
perceptions but tend, with some exceptions, to change their preferences for redistributive
policies modestly if at all. More specifically, Kuziemko et al. (2015) propose a natural
hypothesis that could explain the coexistence of rising inequality and aggregate stability in
preferences, which is that people may simply be uninformed about the extent of the increase
in inequality. It could be that if people knew more about inequality, they would show more
support for redistribution. The authors test that hypothesis with a survey experiment in
which randomly selected respondents are treated with information about income inequality,
and they conclude that the “treatment has large effects on views about inequality but
only slightly moves tax and transfer policy preferences” (p. 1478). Alesina et al. (2018)
and Alesina et al. (2019) reach similar conclusions on the effects of treatments relating
to intergenerational mobility and immigration, respectively.13 It appears difficult to move
people’s views on redistribution with economic facts, in part because information treatments
could be “preaching to the choir” or “falling on deaf ears” (Alesina et al. 2018, p. 523),
meaning left-wing respondents already support redistribution but right-wing respondents too
firmly oppose it to be persuaded by short treatments.
The conclusions in Kuziemko et al. (2015) on inequality and redistribution, however,
are drawn from results averaging over respondents of varying political views.14 Social
psychologists have established that there are deep differences in normative instincts between
13Alesina et al. (2018) test how responsive preferences for redistribution are to information about mobility
and find that “Despite the significant and durable impact on perceptions of mobility, the treatment has no
significant impact on the value ascribed to redistributive policies by the government” (p. 549). Alesina
et al. (2019) study how perceptions of immigration affect redistributive preferences. Here merely asking
people questions about their views on the number and origin of immigrants somewhat reduces support
for redistribution through a priming effect, but “none of the favorable informational treatments is able to
overcome the negative effects on redistribution of prompting people to think at length about immigrants’
characteristics” (p. 4).
14Treatment effects in the paper are reported as divided by the average difference in preferences between
liberals and conservatives, so political views feature as scaling factors but not as objects of study themselves.
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right-leaning and left-leaning individuals (see Haidt (2013) for a moral foundations theory
of politics), so one might expect two types of heterogeneity in response to the normative
appeals tested in Kuziemko et al. (2015). First, for survey respondents of the same political
views, different information treatments could have different effects on preferences; second,
a given type of information treatment could affect respondents of different political views
differently. Next I give summaries of the treatments in three of the Kuziemko et al. (2015)
experiments–called the omnibus, emotional, and policy experiments, respectively–before
presenting evidence on heterogeneous treatment effects.15
In the omnibus experiment, “the goal of the information treatments was to provide
a large ‘shock’ to individuals’ knowledge about inequality and redistributive policies” (p.
1484). That shock comprised three pieces. First, treated respondents saw data and
figures on the distribution of income and their position in that distribution; next was a
counterfactual exercise showing the respondent how much income their household would be
making today had economic growth been more equally distributed since 1980; and lastly
was information about top tax rates and the estate tax.16 The emotional experiment took a
different approach, focusing on the bottom rather than the top of the income distribution,
asking respondents to fill out a budget of minimal monthly expenses necessary for rent,
food, utilities, etc. for a family of the same composition as their own. That budget was
then compared to poverty-line income (three-quarters of respondents tally a budget that
exceeds the poverty-line, even without major expenses like health care). Finally, the policy
experiment opens with the emotional treatment budgeting exercise before describing both a
family making a minimum-wage income and also precisely what the food stamps program
would provide that family each month, so that “the connection between poverty and a
government program is made explicitly” (p. 1503).
I find that this latter test, the policy experiment, has strong effects that were hidden by
the average results. Table 1.2 contrasts the average, full-sample findings with those from
separate regressions for conservatives, with the outcome in each column increasing in support
for that tax or transfer policy.17 The scaled effect in the tables is reported both in Kuziemko
et al. (2015) and here for interpretability; it refers to the raw treatment effect divided by the
15I omit two other experiments in the paper that focused more narrowly on the estate tax and trust in
the government.
16Readers can take the survey at https://hbs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_77fSvTy12ZSBihn.
17In the policy experiment survey, Kuziemko et al. (2015) did not ask for the party of the respondent,
but did ask whether individuals considered themselves liberal, moderate, or conservative on economic issues,
which is the variable policyview in the data. I use policyview for the main analysis and show in appendix
Table A.2 that the results are similar using the preferred presidential candidate of the respondent. See also
Appendix B for a full breakdown of the omnibus, emotional, and policy experiment results by all available
measures of political beliefs.
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average difference in beliefs between control-group liberals and conservatives.18 Kuziemko
et al. (2015) concluded from this experiment that “with the exception of the minimum
wage, these effects are still relatively small (roughly about 10-15 percent of the political
gap)” (p. 1503) and also that “the treatment does not have a consistent effect in terms of
inducing treatment participants to desire higher taxes (even if only on the wealthy) to pay
for these programs” (p. 1504). Panel A of Table 1.2 shows that those two claims are true on
average. In the full sample, preferences for taxation (columms 1 and 2) and various policy
interventions (columns 3 through 8) move little.
Table 1.2 also shows effects from separate regressions for conservatives. Note that the
samples are small, a feature of the respondent pool on the Amazon mTurk platform where
the surveys were administered. Yet the policy experiment had reliably large and precise
effects on conservative preferences for redistribution, effects 25-45 percent of the political
gap, meaning this concise treatment was so compelling that, for a typical conservative,
it closed upwards of half the distance between liberal and conservative beliefs, which is
a new finding in a literature whose effects on preferences have otherwise been reported
as relatively small.19 Among all respondents, the treatment had a modestly sized and
marginally significant effect on preferences for the top tax rate and a small (about 5 percent of
the political gap) and statistically insignificant effect on preferences for a tax on millionaires.
But among conservatives, these effects on tax preferences are statistically and economically
significant, on the order of 30 percent of the political gap. Similarly, on the expenditure
side, with support for redistributive policies like food stamps, housing assistance, and aid
to the poor more generally, the average effects reported in the paper and again here in
Table 1.2 are small, while for conservatives, the treatment induced large changes both in
support for specific policies and in broader beliefs on the appropriate role of government in
redistributing income. The policy experiment moved conservatives 44 percent of the way to
the liberal position on the minimum wage, 43 percent on food stamps, 40 percent on housing
assistance, and, on more general views, 37 percent on government aid to the poor and 25
percent on the scope of government. The interactions in Panel B of Table 1.2 show that,
even with small samples, the majority of these effects among conservatives are statistically
distinguishable not only from zero but also from the treatment effects for liberals.
To restate the central finding: Information about the economic circumstances of
low-income families combined with details on policies that could support those families
18The scaled effect also allows consistent comparison of effect sizes across experiments. Some questions
eliciting preferences were worded slightly differently in the omnibus than in the emotional and policy
experiments.
19One might wonder about persistence–weeks or months later, did the effects on preferences last? There
were no follow-up surveys to the policy experiment, so data for persistence tests are not available.
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induced conservatives to support substantially more taxation and redistribution. What was
it about the policy experiment that was so convincing to conservatives? Recall first that
the policy treatment was identical to the emotional experiment, with the addition of specific
policy information. The fact that the emotional experiment was much less effective at moving
preferences among conservatives (shown in Appendix B) suggests that the explicit connection
between disadvantaged households and the actual policies designed to aid those households
matters. It could also be that what the policy treatment did not contain is as important
as what it did. The policy experiment, notably, did not include a discussion of high-level
inequality. In fact, unlike the omnibus treatment, the policy treatment did not use the
word “inequality,” a politicized subject that may constitute a tribal trigger for right-leaning
respondents that precludes persuasion.20 Lukianoff and Haidt (2018), in a discussion of the
role of tribalism and identity in contemporary politics, write that “When the ‘tribe switch’
is activated, we bind ourselves more tightly to the group, we embrace and defend the group’s
moral matrix, and we stop thinking for ourselves... In tribal mode, we seem to go blind to
arguments and information that challenge our team’s narrative” (p. 58). Moreover, they
note, “Local conditions can turn the tribalism up, down, or off... making people highly
attentive to signs that reveal which team another person is on” (p. 59). The relevance of
these tribal identities and local conditions in shaping preferences for redistribution is one
avenue for future study.
1.4 Conclusion
Previous research has puzzled over the absence of comovement between income inequality
and preferences for income redistribution. Preferences appear to have moved little amidst
dramatic increases in inequality. I have documented that preferences are in fact polarizing
along political lines, with partisan sorting producing a widening gap between Democrats
and Republicans. This focus on party produces new experimental conclusions as well.
Kuziemko et al. (2015) summarized their experimental findings as follows: “Our results
suggest that, generally, greater information can increase respondents’ sense of concern about
an issue, but not necessarily their support for policies that might ameliorate it. Information
about inequality and poverty has only a limited (and typically statistically insignificant)
tendency to increase support for higher income taxes on the well-off or transfer programs
for the disadvantaged” (p. 1505). I have shown that an information treatment combining
data on poverty and policy led to large and statistically significant increases in support for
20One way to test this hypothesis would be to use data on whether respondents believed the treatments
to be politically biased. Unfortunately, while that question was asked in the Alesina et al. (2019) work on
redistribution and mobility (see p. 530 for a brief discussion), it was not asked in Kuziemko et al. (2015).
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taxation and redistribution among conservatives. This finding–that information treatments
have potential to meaningfully change people’s views on normative economic questions–is
especially relevant given my descriptive evidence that redistributive beliefs are segregating
by party. Even in a broadly polarized climate, preferences for redistribution are not closed
to ethical and empirical appeals.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Preferences for Redistribution, 1978-2016
Notes: The figures show responses to the GSS eqwlth question on whether the government
ought to reduce income diffences. Higher numbers indicate more support for redistribution.
Party identification comes from the GSS partyid variable; support for redistribution among
independents, not shown in the right panel, has increased slightly, less than among
Democrats. Black oversamples are dropped in this and subsequent GSS figures and tables.
See appendix Figure A.1 for plots with alternative party definitions and sample weighting
that show similar divergences across Democrats and Republicans.
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(a) Polarization as a bimodal distribution.
(b) Polarization as segregation in beliefs.
Figure 1.2: Two Stylized Types of Polarization
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Figure 1.3: Changes in Preferences, 1978-2016
Notes: These figures depict changes in the share of respondents holding each view on the
seven-point GSS scale from 1978 to 2016. The middle bar in the left panel, for example,
shows that four percent fewer Americans held centrist views on redistribution in 2016 than
in 1978.
14
Table 1.1: Party, Income, and Preferences for Redistribution
Panel A: First and Last Years of Sample Panel B: First and Second Halves of Sample
Outcome Support Redistribution Republican Party = 1 Support Redistribution Republican Party = 1
1978 2016 1978 2016 1978-1996 1998-2016 1978-1996 1998-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Republican -0.075 -0.264 - - -0.108 -0.173 - -
(0.049) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010)
Democrat 0.076 0.193 - - 0.078 0.137 - -
(0.042) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009)
Below Avg. Inc. 0.131 0.079 -0.049 -0.056 0.103 0.106 -0.063 -0.073
(0.040) (0.023) (0.035) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
College Degree -0.084 0.028 -0.019 -0.002 -0.087 -0.014 0.073 0.025
(0.049) (0.024) (0.041) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
White -0.192 0.010 0.158 0.147 -0.116 -0.023 0.206 0.193
(0.055) (0.026) (0.047) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Male -0.055 -0.042 -0.029 0.015 -0.051 -0.032 -0.001 0.023
(0.037) (0.022) (0.031) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Independent Mean 0.448 0.519 - - 0.475 0.473 - -
Partisan Gap 0.151 0.457 - - 0.186 0.310 - -
Observations 737 1,892 737 1,892 16,514 14,787 16,514 14,787
Notes: Data are from the GSS. All regressions are linear probability models. Columns 1 and 2 regress an indicator for support
for redistribution (from the eqwlth variable) on party affiliation and demographics, with independents as the excluded party
category. Columns 3 and 4 regress an indicator equal to one for Republicans on demographics. Columns 5-8 show estimates
cutting the sample by the first and second halves rather than the first and last years. “Below Avg. Inc.” is the GSS variable
finrela, an indicator equal to one if the respondent believes he or she has income below the national average. Independent
mean refers to the average of the outcome variable among independents, and the partisan gap is the difference between the
Republican and Democrat coefficients. See text for further details.
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Table 1.2: Policy Experiment Treatment Effects
Panel A: Separate Regressions for Conservatives
Top rate $1M tax Estate Min. Wage Food St. Scope Aid Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Sample 2.023 0.0311 -0.0217 0.323 0.313 0.0569 0.133 0.176
(1.209) (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0949) (0.0970) (0.0613) (0.0638) (0.0636)
Control mean 33.79 0.713 0.269 2.546 1.832 3.097 2.559 2.539
Scaled effect 0.140 0.0536 0.0642 0.310 0.153 0.0362 0.0811 0.129
Observations 1111 1110 1110 806 806 1111 806 806
Conservatives 4.294 0.175 -0.00164 0.461 0.881 0.395 0.608 0.556
(2.376) (0.0613) (0.0340) (0.188) (0.230) (0.138) (0.173) (0.165)
Control mean 24.44 0.327 0.0748 1.921 0.449 2.129 1.494 1.652
Scaled effect 0.298 0.302 0.00484 0.441 0.432 0.252 0.370 0.407
Observations 280 279 280 188 188 280 188 188
Panel B: Interactions by Political Views
Top rate $1M tax Estate Min. Wage Food St. Scope Aid Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy 0.764 -0.00277 -0.0679 0.153 0.160 -0.144 -0.0550 0.0761
(1.792) (0.0361) (0.0384) (0.140) (0.146) (0.0940) (0.0980) (0.0972)
Pol.×Moderate 1.702 0.00992 0.0962 0.342 0.0906 0.293 0.183 0.0765
(2.857) (0.0576) (0.0612) (0.225) (0.235) (0.150) (0.158) (0.157)
Pol.×Conserv. 3.613 0.156 0.0820 0.332 0.653 0.524 0.645 0.397
(2.957) (0.0597) (0.0633) (0.239) (0.250) (0.155) (0.168) (0.167)
Observations 1111 1110 1110 806 806 1111 806 806
Notes: Panel A shows results from the policy experiment with the full sample, averaging over respondents of
all political views. Panel B interacts the policy information treatment with the political views of the respondent
(variable policyview in the Kuziemko et al. (2015) data, which takes values liberal, moderate, or conservative),
with liberals as the omitted category. The columns refer to various measures of respondents’ preferences for
redistribution, where higher values indicate stronger support for taxation and transfers. Specifically, in the omnibus
experiment, according to Kuziemko et al. (2015), the “Top rate” variable “is continuous (respondents’ preferred
average tax rate (in percent) on the richest 1 percent). “Scope” is also continuous (a 1–5 variable, increasing in
the preferred scope of government activities). All other variables are binary. “$1M tax” and “Estate” indicate
the respondent wants income taxes on millionaires and the estate tax to increase, respectively. . . “Min. Wage”
indicates support for increasing the minimum wage.” The “Food St.” outcome is similarly a binary question about
support for the food stamps program. In the emotional and policy experiments, rather than binary, the variables
on the minimum wage, aid to the poor, food stamps, and public housing “are all categorical 0-4 and increasing
in support.” The scaled effect is the treatment effect divided by the average difference in preferences between
control-group liberals and conservatives. See the Kuziemko et al. (2015) web Appendix for full survey instruments.
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CHAPTER II
Choice in the Market for News: A Tradeoff of Civic
and Consumer Welfare
“ Most people seem to think that freedom consists of respect for consumptionchoices, whatever their origins and content... A similar conception of
freedom lies behind many of the celebrations of emerging communications
markets... But freedom requires certain preconditions, ensuring not just
respect for choices and the satisfaction of preferences, whatever they
happen to be, but also the free formation of desires and beliefs. ”
Cass Sunstein1
“ When a community succeeds in turning down everyone’s tribal circuits,there is more room for individuals to construct lives of their own choosing. ”
Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff2
“ I’m probably a victim, or a product, however you want to phrase it, of mybackground. ”
Joe Biden3
1Sunstein (2017), p. 159.
2Lukianoff and Haidt (2018), p. 59.
3Klein (2020), p. 15.
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2.1 Introduction
Prior (2007) has documented in detail our shift from a low-choice to high-choice media
regime. In 1970, three broadcast networks–ABC, CBS, and NBC–captured 80 percent of
television viewership, and among homes with the television on at night, 75 percent watched
a network newscast. These evening news programs aired similar content, all at the same
time, leaving little discretion for viewers. Moreover, Klein (2020) has pointed out that with
“three networks given access to public airwaves, the business model was about appealing
to as wide an audience as possible” (p. 145), so these stations presented a largely neutral
version of events.4 Cable news offers more choices with more partisan perspectives. By
2005, news viewership on cable had exceeded that on broadcast networks, and today viewers
are more sorted by party into like-minded cable shows. Fox News in particular has had an
outsized audience and influence on the right. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) estimate that
the ratio of conservative-to-liberal viewers of Fox News is about five-to-one, and, according
to Pew, Fox was the primary source of news for 40 percent of Trump voters in the 2016
campaign (see Gottfried et al. (2017); the corresponding figure for MSNBC among Clinton
voters was 9 percent).
What can economists say about this transition? One clear consequence is that news
consumers, in their capacity as consumers, are better off with more choices, just as food
consumers would be better off with more restaurant choices. Posner (2005) asks of the
increasingly segregated media market, “Does this mean that the news media were better
before competition polarized them?” “Not at all,” he answers, because markets provide
“what the consumer wants, and the more intense the competitive pressure, the better they
do it.” Another consideration in evaluating the news media market is its civic implications,
which can be in tension with consumer welfare. One strand of the economics literature,
for example, examines how increased choice affects the accuracy of reported news and of
people’s beliefs. The civic importance of a well-informed public, discussed by economists
as early as Becker (1958), are summarized more recently in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011):
“Democracy is most effective when citizens have accurate beliefs” (p. 1799).5 This paper
offers a new intergenerational perspective on a potential tradeoff between consumer choices
and civic objectives in the market for news. In the context of the expansion of choice in
television news, I ask how the media consumption of one generation affects the conditions
4This mid-twentieth century period when the press aimed to maintain at least an appearance of
balance and objectivity was a historical anomoly. See Chapter 2 of Hamilton (2004) for a discussion of
nineteenth century newspapers, just 13 percent of which identified as independent, the rest being explicitly
party-affiliated.
5See also Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), and Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008a).
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in which the political preferences of the next generation are formed.6 The central idea is
that partisan news consumption by parents could act as an externality that “pollutes” the
formative environment of young people, who may have less exposure to competing ideas and
information in the home, and therefore less of an opportunity to form their own views, as
their parents sort into partisan news sources. To fix ideas, Figure 2.1 presents a stylized
illustration of the shift from the low-choice to high-choice news regimes. In the low-choice
example, children of both Democratic and Republican parents are exposed to ABC news; in
the high-choice example, by contrast, children of Democratic parents are exposed to MSNBC,
children of Republican parents to Fox News.
This paper makes three contributions in exploring the role of cross-generation partisan
media influence. First, I field a novel online survey to descriptively assess the importance of
parents’ news media in children’s upbringings. To my knowledge, this is the first descriptive
evidence on this subject. The survey was designed to gauge not just levels but also trends
in the exposure of young people to partisan news. Two simple features of the survey allow
me to measure how young people’s self-reported exposure to partisan news has evolved over
time. First, I can examine the responses to questions like the following separately by age
cohort: “Overall, when you were growing up (ages 0-18), were you ever exposed to partisan
news media from your parents or guardians?” Second, I can compare self-reported formative
exposure of respondents to partisan news from their parents to how often respondents say
their own children are exposed to their partisan news. The pattern that emerges, and the
central finding of the survey, is striking. I define a cohort as the year in which a respondent
was ten years old. For cohorts through the 1980’s, around half of respondents say they were
“Frequently” or “Occastionally” to partisan news from their parents; that number shoots up
to nearly three-quarters in the 1990’s, when Fox News and MSNBC were launched.7
The survey also elicits values of respondents to gauge the hypothesized tension between
free media choice for adults and a balanced formative environment for young people. 91%
of respondents indicated that they believe people ought to be free to choose whatever news
media outlets they wish, and 90% also said they agreed that “young people (age 0-18)
deserve the opportunity to form their own political beliefs in an environment with exposure
to relatively neutral news and different points of view.” When then asked if kids in general
today do indeed have that opportunity, only 13% agreed (and when asked if their kids have
that opportunity 31% answered yes).
6Throughout, I use “political preferences” interchangeably with ideology or party. Ultimately, my model
will yield predictions that I test in the data on the self-reported party affiliation of parents and their children.
7While both Fox and MSNBC were launched in 1996, MSNBC did not become the forwardly liberal
outlet it is known as today until the mid-2000’s.
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My next contribution is a stylized overlapping generations model of media choice.8 The
model is intended to be a basic conceptual framework that serves two purposes in evaluating
the shift from a low-choice to a high-choice media regime. First, the model generates a
prediction that I can bring to the data, which is that expanded media choice for parents
will strengthen the transmission of political views from parents to children. Second, the
framework allows a light formalization of the welfare-like concept that survey respondents
almost universally supported–young people ought to have an environment in which they can
make up their own minds. In the context of the model, I call this agency, and I discuss the
relationship between agency for young people and the choice environment for adults.
For exposition, Figure 2.2 offers an anology between agency and income mobility.
Consider first three concepts more familiar to economists–inequality, mobility, and
opportunity. The first two are measurable features of the economy, and the last is a
normative value. Inequality is a feature of some static income distribution, and mobility
refers to how easily individuals can move from one place in that distribution to another. I
argue that we tend to take mobility as an important indicator because it reflects the extent
to which an economy (and policy) is upholding the normative value of equal opportunity;
low mobility suggests low opportunity, and that it is circumstances of birth more than
individual effort or talent that are determining labor market outcomes. Likewise, in the
context of political preferences, consider the analogous concepts of polarization, transmission,
and agency. Polarization is a feature of a distrubtion of preferences, but this paper is not at
heart about polarization. It is about transmission and agency. I argue that high transmission
of political views from one generation to the next indicates a society that is not upholding
the value of agency. In such a world, ideology is merely inherited, which is at odds with the
values expressed by respondents in my survey and the excerpt with which I started the paper
from Sunstein (2017): “Freedom requires certain preconditions, ensuring not just respect for
choices and the satisfaction of preferences, whatever they happen to be, but also the free
formation of desires and beliefs” (p. 159).
My third and final contribution is to test the transmission prediction using the rollout
of Fox News. I follow an empirical design pioneered by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), who
exploited the staggered introduction of Fox News across media markets in the 1990’s and
2000’s and, using a sample of twenty-eight states, find that Fox increased Republican vote
share in 2000 presidential election by 0.4-0.7 percentage (effects that sound modest but are
enough to turn tight elections).9 I exploit that same variation with updated Nielsen data
8Stylized in the sense that I do not micro-found behavior in utility maximization, but rather relate the
key pieces in a simple statical model.
9Another closely related paper is Martin and Yurukoglu (2017), who study Fox News election effects
using the channel position as an instrument. It turns out people watch less Fox News when it is higher
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to estimate how potential childhood exposure to Fox affects the likelihood that children of
Republicans grow up to become Republicans themselves. With a YouGov survey on political
views of linked parents and children, I find that in Republican-leaning zipcodes, an additional
year of Fox News exposure is associated with around a three percentage point increase in
the likelihood that a child of Republican parents identifies as a Republican. I also use the
Targetsmart voter file, which contains administrative records on voter registration, and find
no evidence that Fox News spurred changes in the transmission of party registration.10
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe the survey and
the descriptive evidence it offers. Section 2.3 lays out the model, showing how media choice
relates to cross-generation preference transmission and agency. In Section 2.4, I present the
main empirical results on the effects of Fox News, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Descriptive Evidence
I fielded the survey in July 2020 through Amazon’s mTurk, an online platform frequently
used for convenience samples by social scientists (e.g. in economics, Kuziemko et al. (2015)
use mTurk in their study of preferences for redistribution). This survey data has several
strengths and weaknesses. The central limitation is that the sample is non-representative.
Below I do compare the demographic and political characteristics of my mTurk sample to
the U.S. population to gauge its representativeness, and I also take several steps to ensure
data quality. First, I follow the guidance outlined in Kuziemko et al. (2015), including
implementing an attention check midway through the survey, taking only individuals with
at least a 90% approval rating on previous mTurk tasks, and, to screen out international
respondents posing as U.S. residents, restricting responses to U.S. IP addresses and launching
the survey in U.S. daytime hours.11 Following Moss (2018), I administered the survey with
CloudResearch (TurkPrime) to block suspicious geocodes that may include bots and to
oversample women to reach gender parity. Based on the advice of Lopez and Hillygus (2018),
who find that on contentious topics respondents can give deliberatively provocative responses,
I included recommended “trolling” checks for sincerity. Finally, I recorded response time and
up in the channel lineup. With this variation, the authors find similarly sized effects to DellaVigna and
Kaplan (2007) in 2000 and document that those effects grew in the 2004 and 2008 elections. More recently
Jamieson and Albarracin (2020), Bursztyn et al. (2020), and Simonov et al. (2020) study how Fox News has
affected misinformation, COVID cases and deaths, and compliance with social distancing guidance during
the pandemic.
10I discuss below why one might expect to find different effects on party identification and voter behavior.
The former is first of all a lower bar to clear with media influence–one could see changes in self-reported party
affiliation without seeing changes in voting, particularly in a low-turnout country like the U.S. Moreover, the
administrative data have major limitations, notably a weak statistical linkage between parents and children.
11See question B23 in appendix Section B.1.2 for the attention check text.
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dropped a small number of low outliers (less than five minutes) who clicked randomly through
the survey.
The chief advantages of the mTurk survey are twofold. First, it is about 1/30 the cost
of traditional surveys; I paid respondents $1.67 to complete the survey, targeting a $10
hourly wage for the ten-minute survey. Second, to my knowledge, this is the first survey
evidence on the influence (or lack thereof) of parental partisan media on young people’s
formative environments. This makes the novel evidence well worth the shortcomings of
mTurk, since no superior data exist. Table 2.1 shows how the mTurk sample compares to a
representative sample from the American Community Survey. On age, gender, and race, the
mTurk sample is reasonably representative. Respondents to the mTurk survey were more
educated and somewhat more Republican, however. 68.9% of the mTurk sample reported
holding a bachelor’s degree compared to just 31.5% of the general population. 41.8% of the
mTurk sample identified as Republican, compared to 39% of the population as measured
in the 2016 American National Election Study. The table also shows somewhat stronger
support for Donald Trump in the mTurk sample than in the general population.
The survey consisted of three main sections. First, Section A collected basic demographic
information. Section B covered respondents’ upbringings and the role of their parents’ or
guardians’ new media. Lastly, Section C surveyed respondents on a set of values questions,
including their views and experiences relating to their own children, before closing with
questions on political affiliation. Politics of the respondent were included last both to prevent
priming respondents into their party identities, and also to ensure they knew that the survey
was not tailored differently to people of different political views, which could risk perceptions
of bias in the survey. The final section allowed open responses on the subject and generated
a number of insightful (and humorous) comments. These responses are listed in appendix
Section B.1.1. The full set of survey instruments and response options is listed in appendix
Section B.1.2.12
The first purpose of the survey was to guage the levels and trends in exposure of young
people to partisan media from their parents. Is this an important force in society? Or
a negligible one? I begin with data on the question, “Overall, when you were growing
up (ages 0-18), were you ever exposed to partisan news media from your parents or
guardians?” Responses options on a four-point Likert Scale included “Yes, frequently,”
“Yes, occasionally,” “Rarely,” and “No, never.” Figure 2.3 shows the share of respondents
answering frequently or occasionally by cohort, defined as the year in which the respondent
was ten years old. A stark pattern emerges. Note first that around half of respondents
12Readers can take the survey at the following link: https://umich.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_
72hLOEJK7rRYj3f.
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through the 1980’s cohorts answered yes. A sharp break occurs in the 1990’s, when both
Fox News and MSNBC were launched (though as explained above, MSNBC would not take
a strong partisan turn until the 2000’s). This pattern suggests that indeed the advent of
cable news could have played a role in increasing the exposure of young people to partisan
press.13
The second main purpose of the survey was to assess various values respondents may hold
relating to media choice and kids’ formative environments. Table 2.2 summarizes answers
to four such questions. The first is, “Do you agree or disagree that young people (ages
0-18) deserve the opportunity to form their own political beliefs in an environment with
exposure to relatively neutral news and different points of view?” That may seem like it is
difficult to disagree with, but, in a way, that is the point–this appears to be a value with
near-universal support. Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows that 90% of respondents answered they
either “strongly agree” or “agree.” Turning to Column 2, however, we see that just 13% of
respondents believe that kids have that opportunity (this shows the share answering “mostly
neutral” or “completely neutral” to: “Overall, would you say most young people today are
raised in a political news media environment that is more one-sided and partisan, or more
neutral and balanced?”) A somewhat larger share in Column 3 reported that their own kids
(for those who have them) have had fair environments, which is unsurprising given the social
desirability of such a response. Importantly, Column 4 reports overwhelming agreement in
response to the question, “In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be free
to consume whatever news media they wish?” The motivation for the model I introduce in
the next section–and the motivation for this paper–is in part to explore and understand the
tension between the values espoused in Columns 1 and 4.
The survey also included a short battery of questions relating to how young people process
information and form their beliefs, which I discuss next in the context of the model.
2.3 A Conceptual Framework
This section lays out a stylized statistical model of cross-generation media influence.
The purpose of the model is to establish a simple conceptual framework with which to
evaluate how the shift from a low-choice to a high-choice media environment affects (1) the
transmission of preferences from one generation to the next and (2) what I call the agency
of young people, or the extent to which they determine their own political views. The model
generates a testable prediction, which is that more media choice for parents leads to a stronger
13At minimum, it is clear that something happened in the 1990’s, either in the perceptions of the survey
respondents in those cohorts or in their experiences.
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correlation of political preferences between parents to children. The key assumptions about
behavior are twofold. First, I assume selective exposure on behalf of parents, meaning they
choose news outlets that most closely match their own political ideologies. For evidence
related to selective exposure, see Iyengar and Kyu (2009), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011),
and Western et al. (2006); for models involving selective exposure, see Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), and Martin and Yurukoglu (2017).
Second, an implicit assumption in my model is “selection neglect” on behalf of children
exposed to partisan news, meaning young people do not take into account that they may
be in one-sided information environments in forming their views. Enke (2020), in a paper
titled “What You See is All There Is,” finds that in a laboratory setting people receiving
biased information signals still form beliefs on the basis of what is front of them, even when
told that the signals are disproportionately coming from one side of a distribution. To
assess the plausibility of this assumption in my setting, I included survey questions asking,
“Some kids (age 0-18) are raised in highly partisan environments, with exposure to partisan
parents, communities, and news outlets. Would you say these kids are aware that they
are only ‘hearing one side’ of the political story?” and, “Again consider kids in partisan
environments. Would you say kids in these environments are at risk of simply inheriting the
beliefs they grow up around, or are they capable of adjusting their beliefs to account for the
bias around them?” Answers to the first question were split somewhat evenly, with 51.8% of
respondents answering that kids are highly or somewhat aware, and 48.1% answering that
kids are only slightly or not at all aware. But on the second question, only 8.1% answered
that kids can mostly account for biases (which would correspond to a model of rational or
Bayesian belief formation); 49.5% answered that kids can somewhat adjust for biases but
are still influenced by partisan environments, and 42.4% said that kids cannot see through
biases and will mostly adopt views around them. I proceed with the assumption of selection
neglect and note that allowing children to partially “de-bias” would temper the transmission
prediction of my simple model.
The key equation relating media influence to political preferences is,
Pit = α1P
∗




αj = 1, (2.3.1)
with the variables defined as follows:
• Pit: Observed political preferences of person i in generation t.
• P ∗it: Underlying type of person i (determines views under Eit = 0).
• P̄i,t−1: Average of person i’s parents’ preferences.
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• Mit: Average slant of media exposure (e.g. Fox News ≈ 1).
• εit: Ideology of outside-the-home community influences.
Equation 2.3.1 says that person i’s political views at time t are some weighted average
of their own type P ∗it, which is intrinsic to them
14, and of the influence of their parents’
P̄i,t−1 (t − 1 denotes the previous generation), media exposure Mit, plus an error term εit
capturing other outside-the-home factors. Together, these influences–parents, media, and
community–comprise the environment Eit. Each variable is centered at zero on a left-to-right
political scale, as pictured in Figure 2.4, with more negative values corresponding to more
liberal, and more positive values to more conservative.
Next, assume party identification proceeds as follows:
1. Individuals draw a type P ∗it, parents P̄i,t−1, community εit (all ∼ N(0, σ2x)).15
2. Parents select media Mit closest to P̄i,t−1.
3. Individuals form preferences Pit based on Equation 2.3.1, and base their party (or vote)
on a simple cutoff as in Martin and Yurukoglu (2017):
Pit > 0⇒ Republican, Pit < 0⇒ Democrat
With this framework we can evaluate a shift from a low-choice to a high-choice media
regime. Assume that in the low-choice world, only one media outlet characterized by 0 on
the left-to-right scale is available; this is intended to model the centrist ABC, CBS, and NBC
network newscasts. In this environment, Mit = 0 for all individuals i, and the low-choice
environment ELCit reduces to:
ELCit (Mit) = α2P̄i,t−1 + α3Mit + εit = α2P̄i,t−1 + εit (2.3.2)
Assume that in the high-choice world, individuals have available a news outlet on the
same position on the ideological scale as themselves. Strictly speaking, this means the set of
14Alford et al. (2005), based on studies of twins, estimate that around one-third to one-half of political
views are genetically based, but that the environment plays a central role as well: “More importantly, let us
not forget that a heritable component of 50% for political ideology... still leaves plenty of opportunity for the
environment to alter attitudes and behaviors–and even orientation” (p. 165). One particularly thoughtful
respondent to my survey relatedly commented, “I also look at my own family. Three boys, raised by the same
two parents. My older brother is extremely liberal. I and my younger brother are extremely conservative.
We were all exposed to the same types of media and political opinions, had similar childhood and young
adult life experiences, similar interests, and yet we came out on opposite ends of the political spectrum. I
actually think there is an inherent, I suppose biological, basis for more of our political beliefs than we might
instinctively expect.”
15In reality these correlated, to start I assume they are independent.
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outlets available is {−∞,∞}. In Figure 2.4 above, for exposition, I have sketched Fox News
at 1 and MSNBC at -1. For suitably chosen variances σ2x of the variables in the model, most
individuals’ ideologies will lie in that [−1, 1] range, but the scale in the end in unimportant.
What’s important is that in the high-choice world, parents can find ideologically consonant
news sources. I could restrict news outlets to discrete choices like {−1, 0, 1}, but this would
complicate the framework with little conceptual gain.
Under high-choice, and assuming selective exposure, we have Mit = P̄i,t−1, so that
EHCit (Mit) = α2P̄i,t−1 + α3Mit + εit = (α2 + α3)P̄i,t−1 + εit. (2.3.3)
Compare the low-choice and high-choice environments for children. We have ELCit (Mit) =
α2P̄i,t−1 +εit, and E
HC
it (Mit) = (α2 +α3)P̄i,t−1 +εit. Note that the high-choice world amplifies
parental influence (the coefficient on parents’ views P̄i,t−1 increases from α2 to α2 +α3, where
the α’s are positive weights). This is the first key insight of the model. When media choice is
low, parents have less lattitude to convey their own views to their children through television
news. But when media choice expands, parents can amplify their own views, influencing
children not only direclty, but also through the news that features in the home.
We can now examine how the shift from low-choice to high-choice affects preference
transmission across generations. Mostly simply, we can ask, how strongly correlated are
preferences across generations?16 Deriving the correlations ρ(Pit, P̄i,t−1) between parents’
and childrens’ views in the both the high-choice and low-choice environments yields:
ρHC(Pit, P̄i,t−1) =





= ρLC(Pit, P̄i,t−1) (2.3.4)
The model predicts that more media choice will lead to a higher correlation in political views
across parents and their children. In a paper titled, “The Home as Political Fortress,” Iyengar
et al. (2018) document a secular increase the correlation between parents’ and kids’ politics.
My contribution is to propose that the news media may be strengthening that fortress. To
test this hypothesis, I need variation in access to partisan media among parents, for which
I use the rollout of Fox News in Section 2.4 below. Before proceeding to the empirics, I use
the model to explore one further issue I call agency.
The central tension in values this paper introduces is that between news choice for
parents and the opportunity for young people to form their own views in a balanced
environment. If all children of Republicans grew up around Republican news and became
16One could also ask, conditional on having Republican (or Democratic) parents, what is the probability
that a child becomes a Republican or Democrat?
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Republicans themselves, rarely or never having been exposed to competing sets of facts,
values, and arguments, it would seem they had relatively little opportunity for deliberation
and determination themselves. Likewise with children of Democrats. I now lightly formalize
this notion in the context of the model, defining agency A in preference formation as follows.
I ask, for a given environment E, what is the probability that your party (or vote) will reflect
your type P ∗it? Mathematically, this looks like:
A(E) := P(Party reflects type) (2.3.5)
= P(Pit > 0|P ∗it > 0) · P(P ∗it > 0) + P(Pit < 0|P ∗it < 0) · P(P ∗it < 0) (2.3.6)
= 1/2 (P(Pit > 0|P ∗it > 0) + P(Pit < 0|P ∗it < 0)) (2.3.7)
This concept of agency has a Rawlsian flavor, as I’m asking before you know your type, what
are the odds that in a given environment your ultimate political views will reflect that type?
Given the assumptions of normality in the model, agency across exposure environments
has the bell-curve shape depicted in Figure 2.5, which captures the intuition that in more
extreme environments–more partisan parents, more partisan news, etc.–characteristics of
the individual are less likely to determine party. Note that the relationship in Figure 2.5
holds independently of the media environment. So to evaluate the shift from low-choice
to high-choice media regimes, we need to ask how choice affects the environment E (or its
absolute value, which determines A), which we have done above in equations 2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
Using those results, Figure 2.6 shows two cases of expanded media choice. For the first
case, in the plot on the left, consider a household with Republican parents (P̄i,t−1 > 0) in a
Republican community (εit > 0). In this case, we have:
|EHC | = |(α2 + α3)P̄i,t−1 + εit| > |α2P̄i,t−1 + εit| = |ELC | (2.3.8)
(e.g. Republicans watching Fox vs. Republicans watching ABC)
Here the high-choice amplification of parental views pushes the environment further to the
right, reducing the agency–the likelihood that parties reflect individual types–of the children,
as illustrated in the left-hand figure. This is the tradeoff at the heart of this paper. Agency
is lower in the high-choice environment, which itself sounds like something of a paradox.17
But there is a second case to consider.
17A paradox arising in part from the assumption that children here are passive agents. Arguably, with
the advent of social media and the general expansion and fragmentation of the media market, children too
have more choice, which would complicate the analysis. This focus of this paper, and the empirical exercise
that is feasible, relates only to the market for television news, where it is less likely that young children or
adolescents have directly benefited from the rollout of Fox News, which I study in Section 2.4.
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Assume instead we have a household with Republican parents (P̄i,t−1 > 0) in a very
liberal community (εit << 0), such that the cumulative, weighted influence of parents and
community makes for a left-of-center environment, Eit < 0. Now it could be the case that
|EHC | = |(α2 + α3)P̄i,t−1 + εit| < |α2P̄i,t−1 + εit| = |ELC |, (2.3.9)
where, as illustrated in the right-hand plot in Figure 2.6, more media choice makes for a
higher-agency environment. The intuition here is that in an otherwise highly one-sided
environment (εit << 0), the introduction of alternative partisan news programs could
actually serve as a counterweight. Interestingly, this is precisely how Fox News asks us
to understand itself–as a conservative voice in an otherwise liberal-leaning public dialogue.
The cumulative effect on agency will therefore depend on the distribution of these cases in
the population. In a highly geographically sorted setting, which arguably holds today (see
e.g. Bishop (2009) on “The Big Sort”), the former case will predominate.
2.4 Empirical Tests
2.4.1 Data and Design
I follow the design developed in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) to estimate how Fox News
affected the transmission of political views from parents to children. Specifically, DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007) study a twenty-eight state sample and exploit the fact that Fox News
rolled out across different media markets at different times. As shown in Figure 2.7, Fox
was launched in 1996 and reached saturation in the U.S. around 2004. The authors digitized
publicly available data from the Television and Cable Factbook to determine when Fox arrived
in each local area. Martin and Yurukoglu (2017), however, later showed that the Factbook
data contained significant measurement error, and that proprietary data from Nielsen was a
more accurate measure Fox’s staggered arrival.18 I therefore use the DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007) design and the Nielsen FOCUS data set from Martin and Yurukoglu (2017). My
outcome data is a 2015 YouGov survey that appears in Iyengar et al. (2018). The key
features of the data for my purposes are that it features parent-child pairs with zipcode
location identifiers; its chief disadvantage is that it is a small sample, with around 1,000
total respondents, or 500 parent-child pairs. The average age of the child in the 2015 survey
is 25.12, meaning the typical child was about 10 years old in 2000, the year by which I divide
the treatment and control groups.
18From the Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) online appendix: “About 40 percent of the control group in
DVK is mis-classified as not having cable access to Fox News. About 25 percent already had access in 1998
and hadn’t been updated for at least two years in the Factbook” (p. 61); see Table A2 in that appendix.
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As in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), I divide locations–zipcodes, in my case–into
those that did and did not have access to Fox News in 2000, and I wish to test whether
children of Republican parents in the earlier arrival Fox zipcodes are more likely to have
become Republicans themselves.19 First, the validity of the design depends on ruling out
selection–one might expect that Fox selected first into disproportionately Republican areas.
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) show that with sufficient controls, this actually was not the
case. One intution for that finding is that while a rural area like Idaho may on average be
more Republican, and Manhattan more Democratic, it may still have been more profitable
to enter the larger market first. Moreover, Fox’s arrival depended on negotiations with
numerous local cable providers, which also produces some idiosyncratic variation.
Table 2.3 shows results of selection tests for the sample of YouGov zipcodes. Specifically,
Panel A regresses an indicator variable for Fox’s availability in 2000 on the share of
Republican contributions in a zipcode in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. These
are zipcode-level FEC political contributions data, based on OpenSecrets Bulk Data, as in
Martin and Yurukoglu (2017). There is no strong relationship between political contributions
and Fox’s entry in this sample. The coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. Panel
B instead uses Republican vote share, where again no clear selection pattern emerges. Table
2.3 is consistent with the finding in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) that Fox did not arrive
disproportionately early in disproportionately Republican places.
2.4.2 Results
The main specification I estimate to test for transmission effects is
ChildRep = β1ParRep + β2ParRep x Fox + β3Fox + Controls + ε, (2.4.1)
where β2 is the coefficient of interest. Here “ChildRep” is an indicator for whether the child
identifies as a Republican, and “ParRep” similarly is an indicator for whether the parent
is a Republican. The “Fox” variable equals one if the zipcode of the respondents had Fox
News available in 2000 and zero otherwise. The controls include various demographics of
the parents and children from YouGov and zipcode characteristics as described in Table 2.4.
Panel A of the table shows in the first row that there is a strong relationship between the
party of the parent and the party of the child. Having a Republican parent increases the
probability that a child becomes a Republican by about 45 percentage points.
19Another limitation of the YouGov data is that I do not know the zipcode in which the child grew up;
reported is the zipcode of the parent in 2015, which I use as an imperfect proxy to determine potential Fox
exposure in the 1990’s and early 2000’s.
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The second row tests whether having had a Republican parent and early access to Fox
News further increases the likelihood that the child is a Republican. These coefficients do
have a positive sign, consistent with the predictions of my model, but they are not statistically
significant. One major limitation of using such a small sample is the imprecision of the
estimates. For interpretation of the magnitudes, note that there is an average difference
in years of potential Fox exposure between the treatment and control groups of about four
years. Thus, dividing a coefficient of 0.081 (in the third and fourth columns) by four shows
that an additional year of potential Fox exposure is associated with about a two percentage
point increase in the likelihood that the child becomes a Republican. Panel B runs the same
tests, but within Republican-leaning zipcodes (defined as those with Republican contribution
shares exceeding half). Here there are somewhat larger and more precisely estimated β2
coefficients, translating to an additional year of potential Fox exposure being associated with
about a 3.3 percentage point increase the probability that a child of Republicans becomes a
Republican.
Lastly, I use the 2013 TargetSmart voter file to test whether these same effects appear
in voting behavior (or, more accurately, voter registration behavior). The voter file
contains individual-level admininstrative data on voter registration from state databases.
Its advantages are that it provides a larger sample, and it is a measure of behavior rather
than self-reported beliefs. In thirty-one states, registering to vote includes a prompt for
party registration, which is often a requirement to participate in primaries (the conditions
vary by state and party). The data do have major limitations for my study, however.
Importantly, the voter file does not contain parent and child links. It does contain last
names and addresses, so I follow the procedure in Iyengar et al. (2018) to construct predicted
parent-child pairs, which are individuals living at the same address, with the same last name,
and whose age difference exceeds 18.20 Clearly this will not catch most parent-child pairs, as
those who are not living at the same address or whose last names differ cannot be matched
(and some with the same last name at the same address will not in fact be parent-child
pairs). Nonetheless, I follow the Iyengar et al. (2018) method to provide a novel test of Fox
News’ influence on the transmission of party registration across generations.
Table 2.5 reports estimates of Equation 2.4.1 using a fourteen state sample of the 2013
TargetSmart voter file and the Iyengar et al. (2018) matching procedure.21 Row 1 shows
coefficients on the parent’s party of comparable size to the Table 2.4 YouGov regression
results. In row 2, there is no evidence that more Fox News exposure increased the likelihood
20Thanks to Tobias Konitzer for generously sharing code and data.
21These are the states for which party registration is available and which also appear in the DellaVigna and
Kaplan (2007) sample of twenty-eight states, for comparison, which satisfied the computational constraints
of the platform provided to me for analysis of the proprietary TargetSmart data.
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that children of registered Republican parents registered as Republicans themselves (see
the Table 2.4 notes for details on controls, which mirror those in DellaVigna and Kaplan
(2007)). As discussed briefly above, there are numerous reasons the YouGov survey findings
and the TargetSmart registration results could differ, including that one could self-identify as
a Republican without actually registering or voting as such, and that the Targetsmart data
are limited to predicted parent-child pairs where the child is living at the same address as
the parent and thus is not representative. In sum, I take the results presented in this section
as offering suggestive evidence of a Fox News leading to a stronger association between
self-reported Republican beliefs between parents and their children. But given the data and
design limitations, further work would be necessary to confidently conclude that Fox caused
Republican parents to more strongly transmit their political views.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has explored the idea that as media choice expands and people sort into
ideologically consonant news sources, children may as a consequence be raised in more
limited, partisan information environments. More choice may sound on the surface as though
it would expand freedom. But this may not be the case for the generation that succeeds
that expansion in choice and is raised in “epistemic bubbles.” I have presented three main
sets of arguments and evidence, focusing on the shift in television news from network to
cable. First, I gathered what is to my knowledge the first survey evidence on young people’s
exposure to their parents’ partisan news. This shows both a sharp increase in that exposure
in the 1990’s, around the time that Fox News was launched, and also an apparent tension
in values–most people say they support free choice in news, while also believing that kids
“deserve the opportunity to form their own political beliefs in an environment with exposure
to relatively neutral news and different points of view,” and that very few young people today
in fact have that opportunity. I next developed a model to formalize that opportunity for
belief formation as a concept I call agency. The model also generates a testable prediction,
which is that more news media choice will strengthen the transmission of political beliefs from
parents to children. Testing that prediction with the rollout of Fox News in the 1990’s and
early 2000’s, I find suggestive evidence of a stronger correlation between Republican parents’
and children’s party in places where Fox arrived earlier, but no such evidence in data on
voter registration. I conclude that while the data and empirical design have limitations,
and ought therefore to be interpreted with caution, the survey and model offer evidence and
ideas worthy of further study as our media and politics appear only to be heading towards
further division. One cannot claim that such division is what citizens and consumers have
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chosen, if young people were merely conscripted into the fight without the full opportunity
to deliberate and determine their beliefs for themselves.
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Figure 2.1: Low-Choice vs. High-Choice Media Environments
Notes: The figures are stylized illustrations of the central mechanism of interest in this
paper, which is that parents’ media choices can influence children’s formative environments,
and those environments can become more polarized as the menu of media choices expands.
The environment is denoted E in the model below.
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Figure 2.2: Agency by Analogy to Mobility
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Figure 2.3: Exposure to Parents’ Partisan Media Over Time
Notes: The figure shows the share of respondents answering “frequently” or “occasionally”
to the question, “Overall, when you were growing up (ages 0-18), were you ever exposed to
partisan news media from your parents or guardians?” Responses are shown separately by
cohort, defined here as the year in which the respondent was ten years old. The vertical red
dashed line indicates the year in which Fox News was launched.
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Figure 2.4: Left-to-Right Scale for Modeled Variables
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Figure 2.5: Agency Across Environments
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Figure 2.6: Two Cases of Agency and Media Choice
Notes: As described in the text, the figures illustrate two cases of how media choice can
affect agency. On the left is a case of Republican parents in a Republican community, and
on the right a case of Republican parents in a more liberal community. The latter case sees
agency for young people increase as a consequence of increased media choice for parents.
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Figure 2.7: Fox Rollout Timeline





















Table 2.1: Survey Summary Statistics





Bachelor’s degree 0.689 0.315
- -
Republican 0.418 0.390
Trump voter 0.472 0.416
N 519 -
Notes: Ages are medians. *Party benchmark is from the
2016 ANES; “Trump voter” refers to 2020 voting intentions,
data from RealClear Politics July 2020 average.
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Table 2.2: Share Who Agree with Each Statement
Kids deserve balanced Kids have that My kids had that People free to
media environment environment environment choose media
0.900 0.133 0.306 0.906
Notes: The table shows the share of respondents who answered they either
“strongly agree” or “agree” to the questions in columns 1 and 4. Columns 2 and
3 report the share who responded “mostly neutral” or “completely neutral” to
questions about the political environments in which most kids and their own
kids are raised today. See text for additional question details. The sample in
Column 3 includes only respondents with children.
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Table 2.3: Fox Availability and Pre-Period Political Conditions
Panel A: Pre-Period Contributions
Dep. Variable: Fox Available in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 Republican Contribution Share -0.008 0.029 -0.019 -0.035
(0.095) (0.099) (0.106) (0.107)




Census Demographics X X X
N (Zip codes) 423 417 390 390
Panel B: Pre-Period Vote Shares
Dep. Variable: Fox Available in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 Republican Vote Share -0.083 -0.067 -0.355 0.020
(0.199) (0.230) (0.548) (0.276)




Census Demographics X X X
N (Zip codes) 456 441 441 441
Notes: The tables show tests for correlations of Fox News entry with political
conditions prior to its 1996 launch. These are coefficients from regressions
of whether Fox News was available in 2000 in YouGov zipcodes on the
listed variables and Census measures of population, income, education, and
employment. * sig. at 10 percent, ** sig. at 5 percent.
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Table 2.4: Effects of Fox News on Transmission of Political Preferences
Panel A: Full Sample
Outcome: Child Republican
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent Republican 0.477** 0.445** 0.454** 0.450**
(0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
Parent Republican × Fox 2000 0.108 0.093 0.081 0.081
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070)
Fox News 2000 -0.005 0.002 0.017 0.017
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
YouGov Individual Controls X X X
Census Demographic Controls X X
1996 Republican Vote Share X
N (Parent-Child Pairs) 456 456 441 441
Panel B: Republican Zip Codes
Outcome: Child Republican
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent Republican 0.464** 0.439** 0.461** 0.458**
(0.053) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)
Parent Republican × Fox 2000 0.163** 0.143* 0.135* 0.135*
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079)
Fox News 2000 -0.008 0.007 0.019 0.018
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
YouGov Individual Controls X X X
Census Demographic Controls X X
1996 Republican Vote Share X
N (Parent-Child Pairs) 361 361 348 348
Notes: The tables shows estimates of Equation 2.4.1 using the YouGov
data. Panel A shows full-sample results, Panel B only Republican-leaning
zipcodes. Census demographics are zip-code level population, income,
education, and employment, and the YouGov controls are similar
variables at the individual level. * sig. at 10 percent, ** sig. at 5 percent.
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Table 2.5: Effects of Fox News on Transmission of Voter Behavior
Dep. Var.: Child Registered Republican
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parent Republican 0.513** 0.486** 0.435** 0.431**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Par. Republican × Fox News 2000 -0.012 -0.014* 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Fox News 2000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.012* -0.011*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006)
Census and Cable Controls X X X
Census/Cable Controls, House FE X X
1996 Republican Vote Share X
N (Parent-Child Pairs) 661,800 661,770 661,635 661,084
Notes: * sig. at 10 percent, ** sig. at 5 percent; standard errors clustered by
local cable company, which is the level of treatment. Cable controls are measures
of the numbers of subscribers to each local cable company, and are described in
detail in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007); “House FE” refers to House District
fixed effects, which also appear in the DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) regressions.
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CHAPTER III
TV and Labor Supply: Evidence from the U.S. Rollout
“ Here we must begin with the most fundamental fact about the impact oftelevision on Americans: Nothing else in the twentieth century so rapidly
and profoundly affected our leisure. ”
Robert Putnam1
“ The fact that even in 1950 the average television household was watchingfor four and a half hours per day makes clear what a dramatic improvement
television was over previous entertainment technologies. ”
Matthew Gentzkow2
3.1 Introduction
Home entertainment has undergone a massive expansion in variety, quality, and
availability, from the early advent of radio and TV to more recent innovations like YouTube
and Netflix. Economic theory predicts that an increase in the value of leisure time will
reduce labor supply. Aguiar et al. (2021) have recently argued that video games have had
exactly that effect, explaining half of the sharp increase in younger men’s leisure time in
the 2000’s. We study this question in the context of the most important leisure innovation
of the twentieth century: the launch of television. Moreover, we are able to do so with a
1See Putnam (1998), p. 221.
2See Gentzkow (2006), p. 970.
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well-identified natural experiment, leveraging idiosyncrasies in government rollout rules to
generate exogenous variation in the timing of television’s introduction across local areas in
the U.S.
Next to sleep and work, nothing occupies more of Americans’ time than TV.3 Figure
3.1 shows that since the early days of television availability, Americans have spent more
than an hour and a half hours per day watching television. In a study of time use in the
twentieth century, Aguiar and Hurst (2006) find that “More than 100 percent of the increase
in leisure can be accounted for by the increase in the time spent watching television” (p.
987). Putnam (1998) notes that “television privatized leisure time” and meant for “less of
virtually every form of civic participation and social involvement.” While TV undoubtedly
crowded out other leisure activities, little is known about its effects on labor markets. This
paper exploits the staggered and regulated 1950’s introduction of TV stations across the
U.S. to estimate the effects of TV on labor supply, a design pioneered by Gentzkow (2006)
to study the impact of TV on voter turnout.
Our identification strategy leverages quasi-random variation generated by the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) rule-based approach to television deployment. This
approach addresses concerns that individuals with large amounts of spare time self select
into television viewing. The most compelling source of variation arises during an unexpected
interruption of the TV rollout. The interruption generates several “ghost stations” that were
meant to go live but could not because of the interruption. Constructing and operating a
broadcast tower required FCC licensure, and in September 1948, the FCC ceased issuing new
licenses while it revised its spectrum allocation plan. The interruption was expected to last
about six months, but was ultimately not lifted until nearly four years later, creating credible
treatment and control groups during this period. We leverage this quasi-experiment in two
ways. First, we compare treated areas (where applications were approved) only to areas
where applications were frozen, rather than to the entire untreated sample. We also show
difference-in-differences (DiD) results that use all television launches. This approach assumes
that the FCC deployment is unrelated to local demand. Historic records indeed suggest that
the FCC did not take local demand into account when making its decisions but rather relied
on rigid rankings based on fixed local characteristics. The rollout interruption provides a
clean placebo test to verify whether the process is orthogonal to demand in practice. We
run a placebo test where we estimate the effects of “ghost stations” whose applications were
in fact denied as though they had been approved to test for spurious effects. Blocked stations
3TV is still far more popular than browsing the internet or computer gaming. Watching television takes
up over half of American leisure time–55.2% between 2013 and 2017, according to the American Time Use
Survey. Note that the BLS counts streaming as television watching, independent of whether this happens
on a television screen or computer monitor.
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did not affect labor supply, lending credibility to the full-sample DiD.
We find statistically significant but modestly sized impacts on work. Specifically, our
main results, from individual-level DiD regressions of Social Security work histories on
TV exposure, show that the launch of an additional channel is associated with a decline
in the probability of working on the order of 0.2-0.5 percentage points. We control for
trends in labor demand with different sets of year and place fixed effects, and for individual
selection into television viewing with individual fixed effects. The effects arise within age and
demographic groups–older people, notably–and are not confounded by demographic changes
in the population. We also show that different trends in labor force participation between
education, gender, racial or marital groups cannot explain our findings.4
The estimates translate to an hour of TV viewing crowding out about three minutes of
work–meaning most TV time substitutes for other leisure activities–and a long-run decline
in employment rates of around two percentage points. For these back of the envelope
calculations we use additional data and assumptions. First, we approximate the long-run
impact of television by studying when adding more television stations stops having an effect.
Our results suggest that this happens relatively quickly after the first three or four stations.
Additionally, we translate our results into a total hours worked effect by adding intensive
margin estimates. For this exercise, we supplement the Social Security records with data on
work hours for a sub-sample of manufacturing jobs and find that work hours were relatively
unresponsive, consistent with anecdotal evidence of rigid work schedules in this time period.
Our results show that the impact on total work hours comes from an extensive margin decline
in lifetime work hours, particularly from earlier retirements. We finally use data on television
time use to convert work hours effects into time use elasticities. Taken together, the findings
show significant but moderately sized time use elasticities. The overall effect on labor supply,
by contrast, is non-trivial. Such aggregate estimates multiply the time-use elasticities with
television time investment, and given the immense time spent with television, particularly
among some population groups, the overall effects on the labor market are substantial.
We find that the main effects are driven by retirement-aged workers, consistent both with
economic intuition relating to workers on the margin of labor force participation, and with the
mid-century cultural shift of retirement from a mere necessity to an opportunity for “golden
years” of relaxation.5 The share of those aged over 64 who were working halved between
1940 and 1970 (McGrattan and Rogerson (2004)), and among the possible reasons given for
4Several influential studies highlight diverging employment trends among demographic groups (studies
of education, gender and racial groups include Binder and Bound (2019); Bayer and Charles (2018); Krueger
(2017); Juhn (1992).) Most of these documented trends do not coincide with our sample period in the 1950s
and 1960s, though.
5Interestingly, this is the opposite of the younger demographic emphasized in Aguiar et al. (2021).
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this trend in Costa (1998) is the greater availability of compelling, low-cost entertainment
like TV.6 The fact that older workers–who are at the margin of labor force participation to
begin with–are most responsive, aligns with the predictions of economic theory. This older
population group is also among the most frequent users of television according to time use
records (see Figure 3.1), which lends further plausibility to the view that easily available,
high-quality entertainment affects leisure decisions.
Another contribution of this paper is to build the first data set measuring TV signal
strength during the U.S. rollout. To date there exist no comprehensive measurements of
broadcast reach in this period. Many economics studies, beginning with Gentzkow (2006)
on TV’s effects on voter turnout, approximate the coverage of 1950’s stations with the
boundaries of Designated Market Areas (DMA’s) from the 2000’s.7 We discuss why this
approach generates measurement error, and we produce precise local estimates of historical
broadcast reach. Specifically, we digitize information on the technical characteristics of all
commercial towers in operation from 1948 to 1960 from annual editions of the Television
Factbook. We then run the data through the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) of signal
propagation to compute decibel-level signal strength at receiving locations. The chief
advantages of the new data are that we more accurately measure the historical boundaries of
a given channel, and that we measure coverage intensity–the number of channels available in
an area–which makes for an improvement over the binary DMA measure of TV availability.
Our study contributes to three broad literatures, the first relating to the impact of
non-wage factors on labor supply decisions. Non-pecuniary attributes of work play a major
role in motivating or discouraging work (Le Barbanchon et al. (2021); Maestas et al. (2019);
Sorkin (2018); Mas and Pallais (2017); Krueger (2017)). Our paper takes this idea one step
further and studies how attributes of leisure time affect the labor-leisure tradeoff. Specifically,
we focuses on the impact of new leisure technologies.8
This idea goes back to classic work in Becker’s (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of
Time,” which argues that labor supply research primarily focuses on the opportunity cost
6Note also that one need not believe people were consciously choosing to stay home and watch TV in
order for TV to have had effects on labor supply. Our empirical estimates will aim to approximate an
experiment in which some cities had strong TV access while otherwise similar cities had little or none,
and one could imagine people in TV cities finding time at home more appealing and entertaining without
themselves explicitly attributing subsequent behavior changes to TV.
7Subsequent work using this DMA approximation include: Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b); Baker and
George (2010); Campante and Hojman (2013); Thomas (2019); Kim (2020); and Angelucci et al. (2020).
8Previous studies of technical change find important effects on production processes and skill demand
(for a review, see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). If new technologies simultaneously affect production and
leisure, this can raise identification challenges. In the case of television, the technology was rarely used
in economic production, making this setting particularly suitable to isolate the impact on the leisure-labor
tradeoff.
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from foregone earnings but is “not equally sophisticated about other non-working uses of
time.” This argument sparked an influential line of work into the role of home production.
This work studies the impact of new technologies on the productivity in household tasks.
Nieto (2020) examines the launch of digital TV in the U.K. from 2008 to 2012 and finds
that TV functioned as a substitute for child care, which increased women’s employment.
Other work studies the introduction of dishwashers, microwaves, washers, and dryers and
finds that such appliances acted as “engines of liberation” and increased women’s labor
force participation by reducing the burden of home production (Greenwood et al. (2005)
and related work by De Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008), Coen-Pirani et al. (2010), Ngai and
Petrongolo (2017), Greenwood et al. (2016), and Bose et al. (2020).) By contrast, studies
on the impact of technologies on the value of leisure are scarce. Two papers in this area
examined the impact of leisure technologies through a macroeconomic lens. Most relevant,
as discussed above, Aguiar et al. (2021) study how video games changed the labor supply of
young men during the 2000’s. Kopytov et al. (2020) and Rachel (2020) find that declining
prices of leisure technologies could explain employment trends. However, some scholars flag
the absence of clean identification as a challenge in these settings. A review of the related
literature by Abraham and Kearney (2020) concludes, “the mechanism and direction of the
effect warrant consideration, but the point estimates reported unavoidably rest on a good
many unverifiable modeling assumptions.” Our study leverages a natural experiment to
provide such a well-identified estimate of the incentive effects of leisure technologies.
Second, our study contributes to the literature on secular employment and retirement
trends (for reviews see, e.g. Abraham and Kearney (2020); Juhn and Potter (2006) and
Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999)). The decline in participation rates among the elderly in
the middle of the twentieth century represents one of the biggest shifts in U.S. employment
rates over the past century (Blundell et al. (2016); Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999); Costa
(1998)). A long-standing puzzle is that increasing generosity of Social Security appears to
explain a major share of the trend until 1940 (Fetter and Lockwood, 2018), but only a
minor share of the later trends (e.g., Blau and Goodstein (2010); Anderson et al. (1999);
Krueger and Pischke (1992); Moffitt (2012)). Costa (1998) suggests that “the lower price and
increased variety of recreational goods has made retirement more attractive” and fostered
a new “retirement lifestyle.” We provide a simple life-cycle labor supply framework and
show both theoretically and empirically that, while television affected everyone equally, the
biggest responses occur at the retirement margin. Our study thus provides direct evidence
of the “retirement lifestyle” channel and shows that the availability of television contributed
to rising retirement rates.
Finally, our results can help rationalize the long-run decline in employment rates that has
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accompanied rising wages. If leisure is a normal good, increasing wages will lead to falling
employment rates. The fact that incomes rose sharply in the post-war years could therefore,
in theory, explain the increasing prevalence of earlier retirements (Costa (1998); Boppart and
Krusell (2020)). However, the canonical labor supply model requires a backward-bending
labor supply curve to rationalize higher wages reducing work. Such behavior is inconsistent
with the evidence that in fact falling wages are responsible for recent labor supply trends (e.g.
Moffitt (2012)) and is outside the range of elasticities typically estimated in microeconomic
studies of labor supply (e.g., Imbens et al. (2001); Gelber et al. (2017); Cesarini et al. (2017)).
Our paper provides a simple framework to reconcile rising wages, falling employment, and
standard substitution elasticities. We argue that wage growth has been accompanied by
a simultaneous increase in the opportunity cost of work, so incentives to work have not
increased as much as wage growth alone suggests. Taking this into account enables the
canonical labor supply framework with standard substitution elasticities to explain trends
in labor supply.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model relating
innovations in entertainment technology to the labor supply decision, generating a testable
prediction. In Section 3, we discuss how we construct the data on TV access, and we then
introduce our two sources of labor market data. Section 4 presents the design and main
results, followed by placebo tests and heterogeneity analysis showing that the effects are
concentrated among workers near retirement age. Section 5 offers a brief discussion on the
implications of the findings, including how the results relate to broader trends in wages and
labor force participation, and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Entertainment Technology and Labor Supply
Here we present a simple labor supply framework to study the impact of entertainment
technologies. In a standard setup with increasing returns from leisure with age, such technical
change has intensive and extensive margin effects, as well as life-cycle implications. Our
framework builds on the leisure-labor approach in Becker (1965) and Aguiar et al. (2021).
These frameworks are static, one-period models; we additionally allow the value of leisure
time to vary over the life cycle. Structural models of retirement introduce similar age-specific
utility shocks and model dynamic lifetime optimization problems (see, Blundell et al. (2016)
for a review). Our model is similar in spirit, but for simplicity, we assume individuals are
hand-to-mouth consumers and abstract away from inter-temporal savings decisions. This
9A complementary interpretation of our findings is that the availability of easily accessible entertainment
helped shape new norms around retirement choices. This is in line with evidence that finds a central role
for norms in retirement decisions (e.g., Seibold (2020); Costa (1998)).
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more stylized framework still provides useful insights into labor supply over the life cycle.10
Consider an individual with preferences over leisure (l) and consumption (c) and utility
function U(c, ξ(a)l). The parameter ξ(a) captures heterogeneity in the value of leisure in
the population. In particular, we assume that the value of spending time at home increases
relative to the value of working as people age; alternatively, one can interpret the assumption
as work becoming more taxing as people age, as modeling a rising cost of working or rising
value of leisure are isomorphic. Assume that ξ(a) is an increasing function of a, denoted by
β(a) with β′(a) > 0, and a shock ν that is independent of age: ξ(a) = β(a) + ν.
The wage rate is w and going to work incurs a fixed cost x. This fixed cost implies that
working a small number of hours is undesirable and workers will either work substantial hours
or not at all (see, e.g. Lazear (1986)). The budget constraint when working is c = w ·l−x+b0
and c = b0 when not working, with non-wage income b0. The optimization problem is:
max U(m, ξ(a)l) (3.2.1)
s.t. m =
w · (1− l)− x+ b0 l ≤ 1b0 l = 1





representing the labor supply elasticity. The quasi-linear utility function rules out income
effects (we discuss more general functional forms below). Consider a person who is just
indifferent between working and not working, and denote this person’s value of leisure by
ξ(ã). Figure 3.2 illustrates this case. All people with ξ(a) > ξ(ã) will not work and people
with ξ(a) < ξ(ã) will work, implying that people with age a > ã are retired.
We can now derive the retirement age in this economy. The marginal retiree is indifferent




equals the utility at the interior point U0 = U
∗. Utility at the interior solution (U∗) follows
from utility maximization. At an interior solution the first order conditions imply that
l∗ = ξ(ã) · wε and hence U∗ = b0 + w − x − w
1+ε
1+ε
ξ(ã). Combining this result with U0 = U
∗,
we get an implicit expression for ã:
ξ(ã)w1+ε + εξ(ã)−1/ε − (1 + ε) [w − x] = 0 (3.2.2)
10 The retirement literature typically takes one of two approaches. The static approach models retirement
as a tradeoff between lifetime income and retirement, analogous to a labor-income tradeoff (Mitchell and
Fields, 1984; Burtless, 1986). The dynamic approach models a dynamic, inter-temporal life-cycle decision
problem (Gordon and Blinder, 1980; Gustman and Steinmejer, 1986; Blundell et al., 2016; French and Jones,
2017). Our approach is a simplified middle ground between the two. It allows for different choices over the
life-cycle but abstracts from inter-temporal savings decisions.
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We can use this expression to derive comparative statics and analyze the impact of
leisure-enhancing technologies. Such technologies increase ν and have two effects on labor
supply. First, it affects the optimal labor supply:
∂l∗
∂ν
= wε > 0
For all workers at an interior solution, leisure consumption increases by wε. The greater
utility of leisure leads to a marginal reduction in work hours.
Moreover, such technological changes have extensive margin effects and push a greater
share of people to shift from l∗ to l = 1. The effect operates through a falling retirement






A rising value of leisure thus leads to earlier retirements and increased exit from the labor
force. Figure 3.2 shows the intuition behind this result. The rising value of β0 pivots the
indifference curve upward and makes it steeper. This implies that the new marginal retiree
has ξ(ã
′
) < ξ(ã), and hence ã′ < ã. The new marginal retiree is thus younger and individuals
with age between ã′ and ã will have exited the labor force. The model offers three simple
insights. First, leisure-enhancing technologies reduce labor supply both at the extensive and
intensive margin. Second, the group that responds most are older workers whose relative
value of leisure is highest. This group is at the margin of labor force participation to begin
with and therefore most likely to respond to leisure-enhancing technologies by exiting the
labor force. Third, while the value of leisure changes only marginally, the labor supply
responses is still substantial among some groups. A fixed cost of work implies that some
people jump from near full-time participation to not working at all.
The simplicity of the results hinges on the functional form assumption, but some of these
predictions hold more broadly. Intensive margin results on l∗ are sensitive to parametric
assumptions. If individuals have a strong income effect, the direction of the change could go
the other way and the impact of entertainment technologies at the intensive margin in the
general model is thus ambiguous. This highlights one of the problems with testing intensive
margin effects of entertainment technologies. Studies typically assume that income effects
are small or absent to arrive at unambiguous predictions about l∗. Our extensive margin
predictions, by contrast, are not sensitive to the functional form assumptions. These results
are one of the few predictions of the general labor supply framework that hold independently
11There is a knife edge case.
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of the parametric assumptions about the utility function.
3.3 Data
Our study combines a newly built data set on television signal strength in the 1940’s and
1950’s with administrative employment records. The television data are based on archival
records of broadcast towers and a model of signal propagation, and the employment data
primarily rely on work histories from the Social Security Administration. We next discuss
each in turn.
3.3.1 Measuring TV Access
To date, there are no comprehensive measurements of TV signal strength during the
U.S. rollout. Previous studies typically approximate the coverage of 1950’s stations with the
boundaries of Designated Market Areas (DMA’s) from the 2000’s.12 We digitize archival
records to precisely measure television signal reach. The chief advantages of the new data
set are twofold, which we describe in detail below. First, we more accurately measure the
broadcast boundaries of each given station; and second, we measure coverage intensity–the
number of channels available in an area–which makes for an improvement over the binary
DMA approximation of TV availability.13
Commercial television was first licensed for broadcast in 1941, with experimental stations
in a few major cities like New York and Los Angeles. The rollout took off after World War
Two, and the post-war expansion was a staggered city-by-city process over the following
two decades whose timing was governed in part by a sharp regulatory freeze. The freeze
came about due to signal interference between neighboring stations, an issue that occured
due to an error in the FCC’s signal model. This interruption plays an important role in our
identification strategy and we return to this topic below. Most of the growth in coverage and
viewership occurred in subsequent years, during the 1950’s; in 1950, less than 20 percent of
households owned a TV, and by 1960, 87 percent did (see Gentzkow (2006) for a detailed
discussion of the rollout process). Our first contribution is to produce precise measurements
of TV access in this period.
We use the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) to calculate signal reach during the rollout.
The ITM computes signal strength in decibels at a receiving location as a function of
the distance of that location from a broadcast tower, tower technical specifications, and
12Work using this DMA approximation includes: Gentzkow (2006); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b); Baker
and George (2010); Campante and Hojman (2013); Thomas (2019); Kim (2020); and Angelucci et al. (2020).
13In appendix section C.1.2, we revisit the results in Gentzkow (2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b)
using the new ITM data.
53
topography between the tower and receiving location.14 The new data has two advantages.
First, we reduce measurement error and discuss such improvements in detail in Appendix
A. Second, the DMA approximation ultimately produces a binary coverage variable. Since
different cities also had different numbers of channels, and some pioneering stations had
limited broadcast hours, a binary treatment indicator can miss variation of interest in the
intensity of TV “treatment.” With the ITM, we can separately calculate signal strength for
each individual channel and therefore track the rising availability of TV at both the extensive
and intensive margins.
Using the ITM requires detailed information on broadcast towers. We collect three
sets of data on broadcasting technology from early editions of the Television Factbook, a
trade publication for advertisers and other industry players. First, beginning in 1948, the
Factbook published the technical characteristics of all commercial stations in operation. We
use these as inputs for the ITM. Specifically, for each station in each year from 1948 to 1960,
our digitized Factbook data include latitude and longitude, height above ground, channel
number and frequency, visual and aural power, and other details like call letters and start
date. There were 41 stations on air in 1948. Already by 1960, there were 570.15 We estimate
the signal strength of each station at the geographic center of each U.S. county from 1948
to 1960.
The second and third groups of data involve secondary extensions of original broadcasts.
A town across a mountain range from a nearby city would be cut off from that city’s TV
signals, and the ITM would correctly measure that town as having no TV access through
the air. However, some towns constructed antennas on top of the mountains to capture
signals and then wire the broadcasts into the otherwise obstructed homes. This was the
birth of cable TV and was known at the time as Community Antenna Television (CATV).16
We have digitized the Factbook directories of CATV locations, start dates, and estimated
number of subscribers. Finally, an alternative to piping a signal through a CATV system
was to rebroadcast it through the air with small antennas called translators. The Factbooks
record the locations of licensed translators beginning in 1957, and we have digitized them
through 1960.
Finally, we use data on pending applications to the FCC for broadcast licenses from TV
14The ITM model has also been used in other countries: Olken (2009); Enikolopov et al. (2011); Della
Vigna et al. (2014); Yanagizawa-Drott (2014); and Durante et al. (2019). Wang (2020) also uses the ITM to
estimate the effects of a 1930’s populist radio program in the U.S..
15Latitude and longitude are first published in the 1952 Factbook. Earlier years give station addresses,
which we geocode. The Factbook was published four times per year in 1948 and 1949 and twice per year
from 1950 to 1960. We digitize the latest edition available in each year.
16In 1966, both the American Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics published
articles on CATV; see Fisher (1966) in the references.
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Digest. These data aid identification because an unexpected FCC licensing freeze halted
approval of all new stations from September 1948 to April 1952. Stations whose applications
were approved before the 1948 freeze were allowed to continue broadcasts, but those pending
approval when the freeze took place could not begin broadcasting until the freeze was lifted
four years later. Data on frozen applications combined with the ITM allows us to implement
a novel empirical strategy like that in Koenig (2020), which is to compute the signal strength
of stations that were in reality blocked by the FCC as though they had been approved, which
produces a powerful placebo test. If a regression specification using these “ghost towers”
shows effects of TV where there was none, then that specification must reflect spurious
correlations.
Figure 3.3 shows a snapshot of the ITM output in 1950. Here we have mapped the
strongest signal available in each county. The units are decibels, where zero indicates
top-quality signal strength. Any signal below -50 decibels was effectively unwatchable, and
we have colored the figure to indicate that coverage transition as the map shifts from red
to blue. City centers are clearly visible, as is the fading strength of the signals–a typical
broadcast reached about 100 miles from its tower, leaving some counties well outside of
urban centers still within reception rings but others out of range. This is an extensive margin
perspective on the data, in the sense that the map displays whether a county could receive
a watchable signal from any station. We also estimated the number of stations available in
each county in each year.
3.3.2 Employment Data
Our main source of labor market data is the Current Population Survey (CPS) Social
Security Earnings Records Exact Match file (henceforth “SSA-CPS”), which matched
respondents from the March 1978 CPS to their Social Security earnings histories.
The full SSA data covers work histories of the near universe of U.S. workers going back
to the 1930’s. Our data is a sample based on the individuals in the March 1978 CPS, and
matches those individuals to their full Social Security history.17 The data is a worker-level
panel and is one of the only micro data sets that covers years between the decadal Censuses
during this period. We focus on the adult population in the mainland U.S. and study changes
in working behavior between 1937 and 1960.18
A key appeal of the data is that it is a panel that tracks individuals over time. This allows
17This dataset was initially compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to evaluate survey responses in
the CPS; aside from such evaluations, the data has been underutilized by researchers. A notable exception
is Acemoglu et al. (2004) who study labor supply behavior of women in the post-war period. The data is
available as ICPSR repository 9039.
18Adult age was 21 at the time.
55
us to address a major challenge for location based studies: changes in the composition of local
labor markets. In the panel data, we can control for individual fixed effects, hold observed
and unobserved fixed individual characteristic constant, and identify effects through changes
in individuals careers.
A further appeal of the administrative data is that the records are based on employer
reports to the SSA, and relative to retrospective survey data such third-party reported data
tends to be more accurate. A drawback of administrative data is usually the lack of detailed
demographic information. Since our data is based on the CPS, we can link the SSA records to
information from the CPS. This allows us to use information on workers’ age, race, education,
occupation, and place of residence. The residence information is the metropolitan statistical
area (MSAs) and rest of state for non-MSA residents, and we run the regressions at this
geographic level.19
For each individual we observe the number of qualifying quarters worked per year and
we code an individual as employed if they worked at least half a qualifying quarter.20 The
data reports are at annual frequency during the 1950’s, however in earlier years multiple
years are grouped together and multi-year summary records are available.21 Our baseline
sample includes the annual data for 1951-1960 and two multi-year observations representing
the average of 1937-1946 and 1947-1950, respectively. Appendix section C.2 provides further
details on the data.
We additionally account for the expansion of Social Security coverage and the Korean War
in the 1950’s. The Social Security administration expanded their definition of employment
during the 1950’s. We drop individuals who are affected by the coverage expansion to work
with a consistent sample.22 The start of the Korean War led to a draft and we exclude
drafted soldiers from the analysis to avoid spurious employment effects from the draft.
Our sample is representative of the 1978 CPS cohort and thus not representative of the
U.S. in earlier years. Note that this does not affect the validity of our local average treatment
effect (LATE) estimates. We are, however, also interested in whether the LATE generalizes.
Appendix C.2 therefore constructs weights and estimates effects on a representative U.S.
population. The results are similar, with slightly bigger effects.
19Finer geographic data would provide little additional variation, since television signal reach usually
coincides roughly with MSA boundaries. As a result, we lose relatively little information by aggregating
data at the MSA level.
20SSA qualifying quarters may differ from quarters worked if earnings in a quarter are below the qualifying
threshold or if a person works in non-qualifying employment (e.g. some self-employment).
21While the SSA imputes annual values, we do not make use of these imputations. The imputations
assign total quarters consecutively across the years until they run out and hence the timing does not contain
additional information relative to the raw data files.
22Details on the data cleaning process are reported in appendix section C.2.
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Typically, administrative data lack demographic information. Our matched SSA-CPS
data provides a rare opportunity to combine administrative labor market records and detailed
demographic information from the CPS. However, demographic information is collected in
1978 and we do not observe it at a yearly level. This means, for instance, that we only observe
the place of residence in 1978. Previous studies note this difficulty and treat demographic
information as fixed throughout the sample period (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2004)). As with
these previous studies, this approach has drawbacks as people may not have lived in the
place we assign them to. Such measurement error thus works against us finding effects.
In our baseline approach we follow Acemoglu et al. (2004) and treat demographics as fixed
throughout the sample period; our regressions thus have the spirit of an intent-to-treat (ITT)
effect. Keeping people’s location fixed rules out that spurious moves towards television areas
affect our results. Still, we present an ITT estimate, which is a lower bound for the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Appendix C.2.3.4 compares our ITT estimates to the
ATT and shows that the results are close to the ATT for realistic migration patterns.
We use an additional data source to study hours worked and the intensive margin
labor supply responses to television. In the 1950’s, data on work hours was collected for
national statistics but rarely reported at geographically disaggregated levels. However,
several regional offices of the Bureau of Labor Statistics published local area breakdowns
of hours data. These records are summarized in the Current Employment Statistics (CES).
The data come from surveys of non-agricultural employers in the manufacturing sector and
include average hours worked by location. These reporting areas in the CES are typically
MSAs or state level aggregates. Our sample includes 51 local areas and covers the period
1947-1960. The panel is thus relatively small but provides a glimpse into intensive margin
effects.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
We now turn to estimates of the impact of television on labor supply. We make
use of the natural experiment that arises from the regulated rollout of television in the
1940’s and 1950’s. Television station launches were staggered over two decades, leading to
substantial regional heterogeneity in access. Our analysis uses this variation in the following
difference-in-differences regression:
Eaigt = γgt + δi + βg·TVat + π·Xaigt + εaigt, (3.4.1)
Here the outcome Eaigt is a dummy with value 100 if individual i of gender g in area a
at time t is employed, and TVat denotes the number of available TV channels in area a
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at time t. An alternative specification would use only the first television launch and we
explore this further below. We do not use such an approach as our baseline since first
stations were typically experimental and had limited broadcast hours, moreover many of
these first launches happen before our outcome data becomes annual. Time fixed effects
(γtg) absorb aggregate trends in labor supply. We allow for different year effects by gender
since employment trends were different in the post-war period. Individual fixed effects (δi)
control for individual preferences and characteristics; these also absorb area effects, since we
assign individuals to a time-invariant area a. Finally, Xaigt is a vector of control variables.
The main effect of interest is captured by βg, which we allow to differ across men and women.
The main identification assumption is that television launches are orthogonal to other
local labor market trends. We will use the freeze experiment, as well as conventional parallel
trend checks to probe this assumption. Another potential threat to identification are moves
across boundaries and changes to composition in the local labor force. We address this in two
ways, first we use individual fixed effects to control for observed and unobserved individual
characteristics and thus alleviate most selection concerns. Second, we address spurious moves
by treating the location of individuals as fixed throughout the sample.
3.4.1 Results: Social Security Records
Table 3.1 shows estimates of the differences-in-differences specification in equation 3.4.1
using the Social Security data. During the 1950’s several changes to national policies and
trends in norms shaped aggregate labor market trends23 and our identification uses variation
at a local level to separate the impact of television from these aggregate trends. The analysis
compares locations differentially affected by television and uses year fixed effects to absorb
the impact of aggregate trends and individual fixed effects to control for generation-specific
work patterns. The results show that an additional TV channel reduced the probability that
an individual was employed by between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points. These are relatively
modestly sized effects, given the high employment rates around 78% for men and 40% for
women in our sample.
A large literature has documented that employment probabilities evolve over the life cycle.
Accordingly, in our preferred specifications we account for these changes by controlling for
age group fixed effects (from Column 2 onwards). And find similar results after adding these
controls.
Another potential worry is that aggregate year fixed effects do not adequately capture
23See Albanesi and Olivetti (2016); Goldin and Katz (2002); Fernández et al. (2004) for evidence on
changing household decision making, Goldin and Margo (1992) for rising demand for skilled workers, and
Smith et al. (1989) for anti-discrimination policies.
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the impact of broad societal trends. We probe this possibility by introducing different time
trends across demographic groups (Column 3). Specifically, we allow for different trends by
schooling, age, race and marital status groups, while continuing to control for gender-specific
year effects. Such controls thus explicitly address trends introduced by shifting gender and
family norms, as well as by expanded schooling, more generous retirement packages, and
changing life-cycle work patterns. These controls have little impact on the results, which
suggests that the aggregate year fixed effects do reasonably well at absorbing relevant trends.
We next repeat this exercise in a more flexible way and introduce region- and state-specific
time trends (Columns 4 and 5). Such controls capture potential spurious trends that could
arise not only from demographics but also from unobserved factors. The results are again
similar across these specifications.
Studies of local labor markets can also be biased by workers who move across labor market
boundaries. For example, departures of people with strong labor market attachment from
areas in which TV first launched would lead to spurious negative employment effects. Here
the panel structure of our data is of great help. Recall that we control for individual fixed
effects and thus hold both observable and unobservable characteristics of workers constant.
Composition effects are thus not a concern in this setting.
A more subtle problem arises if moves occur at the same time as changes in employment.
Take a person who becomes unemployed and moves to a city where television is available.
In this case individual fixed effects will not resolve the resulting biases. By their nature,
individual fixed effects are time invariant and do not capture the persons’ employment status
change. Fixed effects alone therefore do not fully resolve the potential challenges from
migration. To address these more subtle issues, we can again leverage the data’s panel
structure again and treat an individuals’ location as fixed throughout the analysis. By
assigning individuals to the same locations, we rule out that migration drives the findings.
Ideally, we would like to assign people to their places of birth and estimate an
intent-to-treat (ITT) effect. As described above, such data is unavailable in the Social
Security records, and we instead follow the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2004) and assign
individuals to their 1978 residence. This has a similar interpretation as the conventional
ITT effect with one additional drawback–if people stop working and move to an area in the
exact year of a television station launch in that area, our baseline specification picks this up
as an effect of television. In this case, we cannot distinguish causal effects from coincidental
moves. Appendix C.2.3.4 performs a bounding exercise to assess the potential biases from
this source and shows that the impact on our estimates is minor.
Overall, our results show similar responses by men and women. In absolute terms,
the effects are smaller and less significant for women (Table 3.1). An important driver of
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these differences are the lower baseline employment rates among women. Importantly, the
effect sizes for men and women are comparable in relative size; both experience roughly
a 0.6% decline in employment upon the launch of an additional station. The comparable
responsiveness suggest that both groups have similar underlying utility functions and share
fundamental preferences.
An underlying assumption of the identification strategy is that the rollout process is
unrelated to local trends. Historical records of the rollout rules indeed suggest that this
is likely the case. The FCC processed launch permits according to its internal priority
ranking of locations. The position in this ranking was based on largely fixed location
characteristics (e.g. in 1956 on population and distance to nearest antenna). The determining
factor of the launch timings was thus the rank position of a place and speed of FCC
processing. Local demand conditions, by contrast, had no effect on the timing of television
launches. These institutional features thus give us reason to be optimistic about the baseline
difference-in-difference results. The following section will go further, examining pre-trends
and using disruptions of the planned process to probe the validity of the research design.
The difference-in-differences analysis is credibly causal only if the treatment and control
groups have parallel pre-trends. Since our treatment variable is continuous, we use two
versions of pre-trend checks. The first uses simple leads and lag values of our treatment and
is reported in the Appendix C.2.3.1. The second approach uses a distributed lag model, as
suggested in a series of recent work on difference-in-differences settings like ours ( Fuest et al.
(2018), Serrato and Zidar (2016), and Drechsler et al. (2017), and Schmidheiny and Siegloch
(2019)). This uses the following first-difference transformation of equation 3.4.1:
∆Eiagt = αgt +
a∑
j=0





βg,k ∆Channelsa,t+k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Future Stations
+ΠXiagt + ∆εiagt (3.4.2)
the βj coefficients capture the past impact of lagged stations and βk the impact of future
stations. The time pattern of a station’s impact is plotted in Figure 3.4. The figures show
that treatment and control regions evolve in parallel in the years leading up to the launch
of a TV channel. The differences are close to zero and insignificant in the lead up to
television launches, and after the launch of a TV station employment declines in the affected
location. The clear change at the time of treatment indicates that the difference-in-difference




Having explored a variety of controls for alternative trends, we now leverage additional
policy variation to sharpen the tests. The unexpected interruption of the rollout process
provides a natural experiment where some locations narrowly miss out on television launches.
We use affected areas in a first exercise to test for spurious effects.
We perform two tests–first, a horse race between blocked TV station launches and actual
launches and investigate if labor effects are different in places with launches compared to
locations where such launches are blocked. We find that negative employment effects arise
only from launched and not from blocked television stations (Table 3.2, Columns 1 and 2).
The rollout thus does not appear to be related to spurious local labor demand shocks. This
is a powerful identification check, as we observe places that were meant to be treated in
an untreated state of the world. We can thus inspect spurious effects at the time period
of the supposed treatment. The results confirm that the rollout rules are unrelated to such
spurious shocks.
Second we narrow in on places that received television around the rollout interruption.
The idea here is that close to the cutoff places are economically and demographically similar,
and the gap in TV dates arises because of the interruption of the rollout. To exploit this
source of variation we repeat our analysis and compare places that received television right
before the interruption to those where television was launched right after the interruption.24
These estimates show a clear negative effect of television; the effect of a station launch is
again around a 0.4 percentage point decline in employment. This is close to our baseline
estimates and suggests that the raw rollout variation provides reasonably reliable estimates.
Next, we stretch the experiment further and hone in on areas that had recently received
television and those that were next on the priority list but had the launch blocked. Relative
to the previous test, this excludes areas that leapfrogged in the priority ranking during the
rollout revision and received television immediately at the end of the interruption. Instead,
it focuses on places that were ranked consecutively in the initial priority ranking. For this
test, we focus on the years when launches are affected by the interruption, either due to the
hold-up or the subsequent catch-up period (1947-1954).25 Such estimates stretch our sample
thin but have the advantage that they exclusively rely on years when differences in TV access
are caused by the policy intervention. Our estimates again show significant negative effects
of television and confirm that the effects arise at the time of television launches and only if
24Recall that the interruption lasted from September 1948 to April 1952; we here focus on areas with
launches between 1947 and 1954.
25Ideally, one would also exclude 1947, the year before the interruption. However, the reporting of
multi-year averages in the SSA data of the 1940’s does not allow to separate 1947 from the 1947-1950 bin.
Results that exclude the 1947-1950 observation show similar effects.
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a station is actually launched. These interruption experiment estimates are again relatively
close to our baseline results, which helps to rule out that spurious correlations are driving
our previous difference-in-differences specifications. Columns 2, 4 and 6 additionally allow
for separate time trends by demographic groups and show similar results.
3.4.3 Results: Current Employment Statistics
We next investigate the impact of television on work hours. So far we have focused
the analysis on extensive margin responses, and we now additionally allow for changes
to hours worked. The Social Security data does not contain information on work hours
so we supplement our analysis with data from the CES. Recall that this data focuses on
manufacturing workers. This data is available at the MSA level and we therefore run the
difference-in-differences analysis at this more aggregated level.
We first replicate the employment regressions in the CES data. The results show negative
employment effects and broadly align with our baseline SSA results (Panel A in Table 3.3).
The smaller sample size of the CES, however, reduces the power of these estimates and the
results are therefore not statistically significant. Because of the reduced sample size, we first
show results that replace the flexible year fixed effects with more restrictive year trends and
subsequently allow for more flexible time effects (cubic, state specific trends) and ultimately
non-parametric year effects. All the specifications show similar effects, with point estimates
around a one percentage point decline in employment.
We can now turn to analyze work hours. Panel B estimates the impact of television
on total hours worked, the product of employment and average hours worked. We again
find a decline by about 1 percentage point. The employment effect thus explains nearly all
of the change in total hours worked, whereas average hours worked are unaffected by the
launch of television stations. This result aligns with historical accounts of the labor market
in the 1950’s, when workers had only limited control over working hours. Work hours were
largely set through union agreements and there was minimal scope for part-time work. The
extensive margin was thus the main plausible margin of adjustment and that is indeed what
we find in the data.
3.4.4 Heterogeneous Effects: The Role of Retirement
We next turn to job flows and study the behavioral changes that are driving the results.
The main impact of television is on workers near or above retirement age, with only modest
effects on workers under the age of 55.
Television sharply changed the work habits among workers near or above retirement age.
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To illustrate this fact, we first allow for treatment effects to differ by age groups. Figure 3.5
splits the sample into ten year age bins and plots the treatment effects by age group bin.
The most striking impact is on the oldest workers in the sample. Effects increase sharply
once workers get close to retirement age and we do see significant effects on workers over 55
and even starker effect on workers over the retirement age. By contrast, the effect on prime
aged workers is markedly smaller and mostly insignificant.
To evaluate the retirement hypothesis more directly, Figure 3.5 disaggregates the overall
effects into three possible transition rates. We differentiate entries, exits and retirements and
define retirement as a permanent exit from the labor force. The long-run work histories of
the longitudinal Social Security data allows us to observe whether individuals return to work
later in life and we define retirement as permanent exits from the workforce. The results
show a large and significant increase in retirement rates among older workers. Among the
age group over 65 the probability of retirement increases roughly 2 percentage points, while
reassuringly we find no discernible effect on the retirement of age groups below 55 (Figure
3.5). These retirement effects are also substantially larger than the effects on other labor
market flows. Figure 3.5 shows some modest changes in labor market entry rates, however
these effects are dwarfed by the magnitude of retirement effects. Moreover, the increase in
the exit rate among older workers is largely due to rising retirement probabilities.
The results are consistent with prior evidence that the 1950’s were a period that
transformed the perception of retirement. In earlier decades retirement happened when
people could no longer work; in the middle of the century attitudes shifted and retirement
became seen as a desirable third stage of life with additional time for leisure activities (Costa
(1998)). Our finding supports Costas’ hypothesis that the cheap availability of around the
clock entertainment contributed to this trend.
3.5 Discussion
We next analyze how such entertainment innovations have affected labor supply trends.
In a first step, we look at the steady state effect of the television rollout and calculate
the employment effect of universally available television. To do this, we explore how the
impact of TV changes with a growing number of local stations. We run separate regressions
that exploit a growing number of station launches, starting with only the first station, the
second and so forth.26 We then multiply the effect per station with the number of active
stations in treated areas and obtain the implied “steady state” employment effect. Figure
3.6 shows that the negative employment effect increases as we take the first few stations
26Note that this approach is more flexible than imposing a specific polynomial structure of effects.
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into account. Using only the change from zero to one station, we find modest, insignificant
negative effects. These small effects of the initial station may seem surprising at first, but
are likely driven by the extremely limited broadcast hours that were typical of pioneering
stations. Hours and variety expanded with the entry of competing stations. In line with this,
we see the employment effects grow once we take subsequent station launches into account.
This pattern holds up to the third station, after which we do not observe additional effects
from more launches.
The employment effect stabilizes at a 2 percentage point decline in the
employment-to-population ratio. Since the results are relatively unmoved by further
television launches, we consider this the long-run steady state effect that prevails when
television is universally available. Most places had three or more stations by 1960 but
coverage was far from universal. That universal coverage was likely reached in the 1980s or
1990s when cable and satellite television broadcast to all U.S. areas. We thus evaluate our
results relative to the employment trends over this period. A decline in the employment to
population ratio of around 2 percentage points compares to a 12 percentage point decline
among men between 1950 and 1990. Most of this decline coincides with the peak television
rollout in the 1950’s and 1960’s but the magnitude of our results could at best explain a sixth
of the overall decline. This is a non-trivial effect but is modest relative to findings on the
effect of other factors, such as the launch of the Social Security two decades earlier. Fetter
and Lockwood (2018) find that Social Security led to a decline of labor force participation
among older workers of around 8.5 percentage points between 1930 and 1940. Importantly,
female labor market trends were markedly different during this period and employment rates
were growing rapidly. Our results show negative employment effects for women too, albeit
smaller than for men.
Note that our results do not aim to distinguish socially optimal responses from self-control
problems. Modern entertainment technologies are designed to captivate and draw users in,
and some argue that this has led to excessive consumption of the likes of mobile phones,
social media and television series. Our results do not distinguish such effects but rather aim
to quantify overall employment changes and the resulting impact on labor market trends.27
Finally, we use our estimates to provide benchmark estimates that can help inform
the broader debate on entertainment technology and labor supply. If we are willing to
assume that leisure preferences are similar, our setting can shed light on the impact of such
technologies on work behavior more generally. To compare different types of entertainment
27For a welfare analysis one would distinguish addictive behavior from socially optimal behavior. Our
estimates thus do not provide a full welfare analysis, in keeping with the drug addiction literature, which
typically estimates aggregate labor market effects (Krueger (2017)). It seems highly likely to us that the
addiction component is far weaker in the case of television.
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technologies, we first need to measure the “quality” of an entertainment technology. People
will likely disagree on what is high vs. low quality entertainment, and we aim to cut through
this debate with a revealed preferences approach that uses observed behavior to infer quality.
Specifically, we measure the time spent on an entertainment activity. The intuition is that
people will spend more time with a more appealing entertainment activity. Data on time use
shows that in 2010 the average American spent 19.3 hours watching television per week and
provides a numeraire for our estimate.28 With this data we can compute time use elasticities
which capture how many minutes of work are lost from one hour of television watching.29
The numerator of the time use elasticity is the steady-state labor supply response. We
convert the two percentage point decline in employment into a work hour effect. Using a 40
hour work week, this estimate implies a decline of 0.02 · 40 = 0.8 hours per week.30 Since we
found no additional intensive margin effects, these estimates represent the total decline in
work hours.
Finally, we divide the work effects by television time use to compute the time use
elasticity. This shows that one hour with television reduced work by approximately by
0.8/19.3 · 60 = 2.5 minutes. In other words, the vast majority of the time – over 57 minutes
– of an hour spent with television crowds out non-work activities. Leisure innovations thus
appear to primarily replace alternative leisure activities.
These results suggest that recent entertainment technologies have had a modest impact
on aggregate employment so far. Given the small magnitude of the elasticity, entertainment
technologies only have a sizable aggregate impact if the time investment is very large. As a
benchmark, time spent with computers for recreational purposes takes up less than 3 hours
per week (excluding computer games). Computer gaming is even less common. Recent
evidence suggests that the heaviest user group of computer games — men aged 21-30 —
spend around 3 hours weekly with computer games, while the rest of the population spends
less than one hour on such games (Aguiar et al. (2021)). These time investments translate
into a 0.1 decline of work hours per week for young men. While this is a non-negligible effect,
it would only account for roughly 5% of the recent decline in employment rates among young
men. More recent data, however, suggests that screen time among the young is now reaching
28Using alternative base years for the long-run steady state analysis leads to similar results because
hours of TV watching increased only slightly since the 1980’s. The source for this data is the BLS series
TUU10101AA01027132.
29Similar elasticities are popular in studies of consumer surplus created by entertainment goods, since
time-spending elasticities capture demand behavior even if there is no monetary expenditure (e.g., Goolsbee
and Klenow (2006)). To see the relation to consumer surplus, note that the demand and expenditure
elasticities are closely related. Differentiating expenditure e(p, q) = pq(p) with respect to price p yields an
expression for expenditure elasticity εe in terms of demand elasticity εe = 1 + εq.
30Average hours worked are in this ballpark range and declined from 42 hours in 1950 to 40 hours in the
2000’s (McGrattan and Rogerson, 2004)
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record levels. A 2019 study of German adolescents finds that 18 to 25 year olds spend 23.4
hours on the internet for communication, shopping, research, and entertainment purposes
(BzGA (2020)). The study does not differentiate between work and leisure purposes. If most
of this time was spent on entertainment, these levels of usage would generate sizable labor
market effects and would lead to meaningful changes in employment patterns if it becomes
widespread in the future.
3.6 Conclusion
Economists have recently taken an interest in the possibility that entertainment
technology may affect work behavior, a hypothesis explored in the context of contemporary
video games by Aguiar et al. (2021). All else equal, one would expect an increase in the
utility derived from leisure time through superior entertainment to reduce labor supply,
particularly for workers already on the margins of labor force participation to begin with.
This paper tests that prediction with the rollout of television, the single most consequential
improvement in entertainment technology in the twentieth century. Television brought large,
lasting, and salient changes to daily life. Our hypothesis in this paper is that these changes
could have affected not only the allocation of leisure time but also the labor-leisure tradeoff.
We find that TV led to statistically and economically significant declines in employment
during the 1940’s and 1950’s regulated rollout of broadcasts. Two additional results lend
confidence to our main findings. First, the effects of TV are largest for retirement-age
workers; we see no evidence that TV led younger workers to quit their jobs, but the
availability of TV did increase retirement rates among older workers. This is consistent
with the change in the nature of retirement documented in Costa (1998), whereby leaving
one’s career began to happen not only by necessity but also for the enjoyment of “golden
years” of leisure, and with the fact that today, according to data from Aguiar and Hurst
(2006), people in the U.S. aged over 65 spend on average four hours a day watching TV.
Second, we are able to exploit a sharp freeze in broadcast licensing to run a series of placebo
tests that help rule out spurious associations between TV access and employment patterns.
We show that “ghost stations” whose applications for broadcasts were just denied by the
FCC have no effects on work, suggesting that it was indeed TV broadcasts themselves,
rather than correlated or confounding trends in economic conditions, that led to the increase
in retirement.
While research and discussion of trends in labor force participation continues to focus
on labor demand topics like trade and technology, we offer novel evidence on the role of
an under-explored supply-side question of technical change–how entertaining is time spent
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at home? TV improved the outside option for people on the margins of the labor force
as it rolled out in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Given that our findings are from this historical
period, one might also ask how relevant they are to understanding labor markets today. The
proliferation of ever more compelling TV and of broader entertainment opportunities more
generally speaks to the likely persistence and importance of these effects. Entertainment
technology is of course far from the only or primary consideration, but it is one of many
forces that operate in modern labor markets.
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Figure 3.1: Hours of Television Watching per Day
Notes: The figure shows the amount of time American’s spend watching television as primary
activity. Data are from the Historic American Time Use Study (AHTUS). The hours refer
to “primary activity.”
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Retiree
Curve.png
Notes: The figure shows the indifference curve of the marginal retiree, a person who is just
indifferent between working and not. The age of the marginal retiree is indicated by ã. The
dashed line is a case with low β0 and the dash-dot line is a case with higher β0.
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Figure 3.3: ITM-Measured Signal Strength in 1950
Notes: The figure shows the signal level, in decibels, of the strongest station in each county
in 1950, as computed with the ITM. Broadly, counties shaded red had TV access, while
counties shaded blue did not; signals whose strength was less than -50 decibels, where the
map turns from red to blue, were effectively unwatchable. Not shown in this visualization
of the data is the number of stations available locally.
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Figure 3.4: Dynamic Effects of Station Launches
Notes: The figure shows dynamic effects of the launch of a TV station, separately for men
and women. Specifically, these are estimated coefficients from individual level regression of
equation 3.4.2 and 95 percent confidence intervals. See text for further details.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of TV on Entry, Exit, and Retirement
Notes: The figure shows the impact of television on job transitions. Effects on employment
entry are shown in black, on exits in blue and on retirement in red. Retirement is defined as
a permanent exit from employment (proxied by the absence of a work observation until the
end of our data). The plotted results are coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions
of the respective labor market transitions on television exposure, allowing for separate
coefficients by age group. For additional specification details see Table 3.1.
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Station Count
Notes: The steady state employment effects are the product of the average effect of stations
(coefficient from a DiD regression) and the number of stations in treated labor markets. We
estimate the average effects in separate regressions for each station count, restricting the
sample to local television station launches up to that count. A stable steady-state effect
implies that an added station has little additional effect. The shaded are 90% confidence
bands.
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Table 3.1: Individual-level Effects of TV on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(Men) × Stations -0.574*** -0.585*** -0.600*** -0.315** -0.681***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.140) (0.187)
1(Women) × Stations -0.246** -0.246** -0.261** 0.0281 -0.222*
(0.112) (0.110) (0.111) (0.122) (0.123)
Observations 325,130 325,130 325,130 325,130 325,130
R-squared 0.678 0.679 0.680 0.854 0.679
Year × Gender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Region × Year
Person FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends No No Demographics State No
Mean DV Men 78.29 78.29 78.29 78.29 78.29
Mean DV Women 38.28 38.28 38.28 38.28 38.28
Notes: The table shows individual level regressions of an employment dummy with value
100 for an employed worker on the number of TV stations available in the local area. Data
are at the individual level and covers individuals over the age of 21 and spans 1937-1960, at
annual frequency from 1951 onward and multi-year averages for earlier periods (see text for
details). All regressions include gender-specific year fixed effects. Demographic trends allow
for different time trends for high-school graduates, race (white, black, other), marital status
and 5 year age bins. Regions are census regions. Television is measured at the MSA level.
Standard errors are clustered at the same level and span 134 clusters. Source: SSA-CPS
employment records and Television Factbooks ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.2: Effects of TV on Employment Using Variation from Regulator Shutdown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interruption Experiment
Horse Race Broad Control Group Narrow Control Group
Stations -0.321*** -0.335*** -0.386*** -0.391*** -0.447*** -0.419***
(0.0978) (0.0979) (0.0987) (0.0993) (0.112) (0.112)
Blocked stations 0.120* 0.107
(0.0703) (0.0707)
Observations 317,016 317,016 257,856 257,856 99,644 99,644
R-squared 0.680 0.681 0.680 0.680 0.775 0.775
Demographic Trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table shows the impact of television on employment rates, using variation from the
regulator shut-down. Columns 1 and 2 compare the effect of TV stations and stations that were
blocked during the regulator shutdown 1948-1952. Columns 3 through 6 focus on variation from
the rollout interruption. Column 3 and 4 use a “broad control group” of untreated locations, and
focuses on places with TV station launches near the interruption start and end date (1947-1954).
Columns 5 and 6 use a narrower definition and only uses places with imminent launches at the
start of the interruption as control group, additionally it restricts the sample years to the period
when TV variation was due to the interruption (years of the interruption and the following unwind,
1947-1954). The estimates use the baseline specification in column 3 of Table 3.1. See Table notes
for additional details ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 3.3: MSA-Level Effects of TV on Employment and Hours in Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: CES Log Manufacturing Employment
Stations -0.0108 -0.0122 -0.0118 -0.0111
(0.00852) (0.00838) (0.00854) (0.0111)
Observations 446 446 446 446
R-squared 0.994 0.994 0.997 0.994
Panel B: CES Log Total Manufacturing Hours
Stations -0.0115 -0.0133 -0.0131 -0.0101
(0.00841) (0.00832) (0.00871) (0.0110)
Observations 446 446 446 446
R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.997 0.994
Area Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends Yes Cubic State No
Year Effects No No No Yes
Notes: The table shows regressions of labor market outcomes on
the number of TV stations available. Data are at the MSA level.
Specifically, the outcomes are log employment and log total hours
from the CES manufacturing data, respectively. Robust standard
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A.1 Supplementary tables and figures
Figure A.1: U.S. Preferences for Redistribution, 1978-2016.
Notes: Each plot is a variant on the Figure 1.1 trends in preferences for redistribution
in the GSS. Panel A applies the GSS sample weights wtssall. Panel B includes in the
categories “Democrat” and “Republican” respondents who said that they leaned towards one
of those parties but still considered themselves independents. This compresses the divergence
somewhat, relative to Figure 1.1. Panel C includes independents.
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Figure A.2: Preference Differences Across Demographic Groups
Notes: This figure shows differences across the indicated groups in GSS redistributive
preferences over time. “Party” refers to Democrats versus Republicans; “College” to those
with and without a four-year college degree; “Race” to white and non-white; “Income”
to below and above average income; and “Gender” to men and women. Differences are
normalized to zero in 1978.
Figure A.3: GSS Party Identification Over Time
Notes: The figure shows party identification of GSS respondents from 1978 to 2016 and
follows the Gentzkow (2016) figures that show the same stable trends with ANES data on
party and ideology.
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Table A.1: Party, Income, and Preferences for Redistribution (With Dollar Income)
Panel A: First and Last Years of Sample Panel B: First and Second Halves of Sample
Outcome Support Redistribution Republican Party = 1 Support Redistribution Republican Party = 1
1978 2016 1978 2016 1978-1996 1998-2016 1978-1996 1998-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Republican -0.047 -0.273 - - -0.108 -0.176 - -
(0.050) (0.030) (0.010) (0.011)
Democrat 0.088 0.200 - - 0.081 0.135 - -
(0.043) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010)
Income ($10,000) -0.025 -0.007 0.007 0.012 -0.022 -0.015 0.016 0.015
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College Degree -0.057 0.025 -0.025 -0.018 -0.056 0.008 0.054 0.001
(0.050) (0.026) (0.042) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
White -0.208 0.013 0.153 0.143 -0.111 -0.016 0.201 0.185
(0.057) (0.027) (0.048) (0.023) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Male -0.048 -0.038 -0.019 0.013 -0.048 -0.031 -0.002 0.020
(0.038) (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Independent Mean 0.448 0.519 - - 0.475 0.473 - -
Partisan Gap 0.135 0.474 - - 0.189 0.311 - -
Observations 696 1,735 696 1,735 15,214 13,315 15,214 13,315
Notes: Data are from the GSS. All regressions are linear probability models. Columns 1 and 2 regress an indicator for support
for redistribution (from the eqwlth variable) on party affiliation and demographics, with independents as the excluded party
category. Columns 3 and 4 regress an indicator equal to one for Republicans on demographics. Columns 5-8 show estimates
cutting the sample by the first and second halves rather than the first and last years. Income is in tens of thousands of dollars.
Independent mean refers to the average of the outcome variable among independents, and the partisan gap is the difference
between the Republican and Democrat coefficients. See text for further details.
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Table A.2: Policy Experiment Effects, by Preferred Presidential Candidate
Top rate $1M tax Estate Min. Wage Food St. Scope Aid Housing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 2.023 0.0311 -0.0217 0.323 0.313 0.0569 0.133 0.176
(1.209) (0.0240) (0.0258) (0.0949) (0.0970) (0.0613) (0.0638) (0.0636)
Control mean 33.79 0.713 0.269 2.546 1.832 3.097 2.559 2.539
Scaled effect 0.140 0.0536 0.0642 0.310 0.153 0.0362 0.0811 0.129
Obs. 1111 1110 1110 806 806 1111 806 806
Obama 0.990 0.00440 -0.0148 0.330 0.226 -0.0112 0.00395 0.117
(1.570) (0.0276) (0.0369) (0.125) (0.126) (0.0753) (0.0792) (0.0802)
Control mean 37.31 0.864 0.343 2.716 2.320 3.532 2.960 2.868
Scaled effect 0.0687 0.00760 0.0436 0.316 0.111 0.00711 0.00240 0.0859
Obs. 716 716 716 526 526 716 526 526
Romney 4.186 0.121 -0.0329 0.501 0.772 0.257 0.691 0.441
(2.742) (0.0712) (0.0331) (0.225) (0.275) (0.153) (0.194) (0.202)
Control mean 25.39 0.299 0.0556 2.090 0.744 2.181 1.564 1.795
Scaled effect 0.290 0.208 0.0972 0.480 0.378 0.164 0.421 0.323
Obs. 226 226 225 154 154 226 154 154
Other 7.717 -0.0363 -0.0569 0.886 0.725 0.326 0.517 0.472
(3.748) (0.0818) (0.0751) (0.307) (0.341) (0.232) (0.253) (0.247)
Control mean 30.80 0.663 0.256 2.433 1.217 2.547 2.183 2.133
Scaled effect 0.536 0.0627 0.168 0.849 0.355 0.208 0.315 0.346
Obs. 169 168 169 126 126 169 126 126
Notes: The table shows results from separate regressions by preferred presidential candidate for the policy
experiment in Kuziemko et al. (2015). See Table 1.2 for details on the outcomes.
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Table A.3: Table 4 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Policy Views
Ineq. v. serious Ineq. increased Rich deserving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample 0.102 0.104 0.119 0.120 -0.0500 -0.0526
(0.0154) (0.0144) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0114)
Control mean 0.285 0.285 0.738 0.738 0.180 0.180
Scaled effect 0.357 0.365 0.539 0.540 0.173 0.182
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3703 3703 3704 3704 3690 3690
Liberals 0.147 0.150 0.0870 0.0829 -0.0454 -0.0486
(0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0135) (0.0137)
Control mean 0.414 0.414 0.836 0.836 0.0964 0.0964
Scaled effect 0.516 0.528 0.392 0.374 0.157 0.168
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1536 1536 1536 1536 1529 1529
Conservatives 0.0399 0.0325 0.151 0.148 -0.0808 -0.0784
(0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0305) (0.0315) (0.0323) (0.0327)
Control mean 0.129 0.129 0.615 0.615 0.386 0.386
Scaled effect 0.140 0.114 0.680 0.668 0.279 0.271
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 877 877 878 878 875 875
Moderates 0.0913 0.0885 0.137 0.131 -0.0332 -0.0323
(0.0249) (0.0253) (0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0182) (0.0185)
Control mean 0.238 0.238 0.706 0.706 0.137 0.137
Scaled effect 0.320 0.310 0.617 0.589 0.115 0.111
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1290 1290 1290 1290 1286 1286
Notes: Table 4 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by variable
policyview.
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Table A.4: Table 4 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Party
Ineq. v. serious Ineq. increased Rich deserving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample 0.102 0.104 0.119 0.120 -0.0500 -0.0526
(0.0154) (0.0144) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0114)
Control mean 0.285 0.285 0.738 0.738 0.180 0.180
Scaled effect 0.357 0.365 0.539 0.540 0.173 0.182
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3703 3703 3704 3704 3690 3690
Democrat 0.133 0.137 0.0938 0.0938 -0.0539 -0.0588
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0133) (0.0134)
Control mean 0.376 0.376 0.812 0.812 0.124 0.124
Scaled effect 0.465 0.480 0.423 0.423 0.186 0.203
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1991 1990 1991 1990 1982 1981
Republican 0.0400 0.0396 0.144 0.144 -0.100 -0.0936
(0.0213) (0.0217) (0.0328) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0339)
Control mean 0.0841 0.0841 0.591 0.591 0.395 0.395
Scaled effect 0.140 0.139 0.650 0.648 0.347 0.324
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obsservations 803 801 803 801 800 798
Other 0.0755 0.0905 0.148 0.143 0.0131 0.0112
(0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0210) (0.0216)
Control mean 0.268 0.268 0.712 0.712 0.109 0.109
Scaled effect 0.265 0.317 0.667 0.646 0.0451 0.0386
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 914 912 915 913 913 911
Notes: Table 4 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by party.
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Table A.5: Table 4 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Preferred
Presidential Candidate
Ineq. v. serious Ineq. increased Rich deserving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample 0.102 0.104 0.119 0.120 -0.0500 -0.0526
(0.0154) (0.0144) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0114)
Control mean 0.285 0.285 0.738 0.738 0.180 0.180
Scaled effect 0.357 0.365 0.539 0.540 0.173 0.182
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3703 3703 3704 3704 3690 3690
Obama 0.123 0.125 0.0967 0.0963 -0.0505 -0.0524
(0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Control mean 0.353 0.353 0.793 0.793 0.127 0.127
Scaled effect 0.431 0.437 0.436 0.435 0.175 0.181
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2504 2502 2505 2503 2496 2494
McCain 0.0670 0.0675 0.183 0.190 -0.0934 -0.0916
(0.0227) (0.0235) (0.0314) (0.0324) (0.0321) (0.0328)
Control mean 0.0909 0.0909 0.591 0.591 0.355 0.355
Scaled effect 0.235 0.237 0.825 0.857 0.323 0.317
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 830 828 830 828 826 824
Other 0.0707 0.119 0.150 0.172 0.0165 -0.0195
(0.0468) (0.0496) (0.0438) (0.0454) (0.0394) (0.0413)
Control mean 0.245 0.245 0.690 0.690 0.163 0.163
Scaled effect 0.248 0.416 0.675 0.776 0.0569 0.0675
Covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 374 373 374 373 373 372
Notes: Table 4 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate
regressions by preferred presidential candidate.
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Table A.6: Table 5 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Policy Views
Top rate $1M tax Estate Petition Min. wage Trust Scope Dem 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.931 0.0502 0.357 0.0648 0.0325 -0.0292 0.132 0.0152
(0.549) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0115) (0.0339) (0.0125)
Control mean 30.21 0.740 0.171 0.234 0.690 0.158 3.076 0.529
Scaled effect 0.0914 0.111 2.043 0.394 0.0995 1.250 0.110 0.0246
Observations 3741 3704 3673 3060 3690 3702 3704 3703
Liberals 0.162 0.0290 0.439 0.0654 0.0417 -0.0447 0.140 0.0375
(0.859) (0.0144) (0.0232) (0.0272) (0.0190) (0.0188) (0.0478) (0.0180)
Control mean 34.18 0.904 0.254 0.305 0.822 0.171 3.552 0.800
Scaled effect 0.0159 0.0641 2.515 0.398 0.128 1.917 0.117 0.0607
Observations 1547 1536 1523 1254 1529 1535 1536 1536
Conservatives 1.206 0.0726 0.241 0.0405 -0.00428 -0.0380 0.0830 0.0177
(1.083) (0.0331) (0.0255) (0.0273) (0.0330) (0.0221) (0.0754) (0.0223)
Control mean 24.00 0.452 0.0797 0.141 0.496 0.148 2.349 0.182
Scaled effect 0.118 0.161 1.378 0.246 0.0131 1.629 0.0690 0.0286
Observations 888 878 872 700 875 877 878 878
Moderates 1.280 0.0549 0.340 0.0896 0.0350 -0.00786 0.112 -0.0192
(0.983) (0.0231) (0.0242) (0.0263) (0.0257) (0.0199) (0.0602) (0.0245)
Control mean 29.74 0.743 0.134 0.215 0.666 0.149 3.007 0.442
Scaled effect 0.126 0.121 1.945 0.545 0.107 0.337 0.0934 0.0310
Observations 1306 1290 1278 1106 1286 1290 1290 1289
Notes: Table 5 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by variable policyview.
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Table A.7: Table 5 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Party
Top rate $1M tax Estate Petition Min. wage Trust Scope Dem 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.931 0.0502 0.357 0.0648 0.0325 -0.0292 0.132 0.0152
(0.549) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0115) (0.0339) (0.0125)
Control mean 30.21 0.740 0.171 0.234 0.690 0.158 3.076 0.529
Scaled effect 0.0914 0.111 2.043 0.394 0.0995 1.250 0.110 0.0246
Observations 3741 3704 3673 3060 3690 3702 3704 3703
Democrats 1.023 0.0411 0.422 0.0599 0.0527 -0.0457 0.0677 -
(0.739) (0.0132) (0.0203) (0.0237) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0429)
Control mean 32.87 0.886 0.226 0.314 0.791 0.203 3.548 -
Scaled effect 0.100 0.0909 2.418 0.364 0.161 1.961 0.0563 -
Observations 1990 1990 1973 1632 1981 1989 1990 1990
Republicans 1.561 0.0717 0.196 0.0495 -0.00544 -0.00478 0.180 -
(1.163) (0.0356) (0.0253) (0.0282) (0.0352) (0.0233) (0.0811)
Control mean 24.49 0.416 0.0612 0.136 0.473 0.136 2.297 -
Scaled effect 0.153 0.158 1.120 0.301 0.0167 0.205 0.150 -
Observations 801 801 795 664 798 801 801 801
Other 0.424 0.0325 0.331 0.0863 -0.00531 -0.0177 0.207 -
(1.221) (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0310) (0.0175) (0.0810)
Control mean 29.62 0.718 0.153 0.150 0.668 0.0840 2.765 -
Scaled effect 0.0416 0.0718 1.895 0.525 0.0163 0.759 0.172 -
Observations 950 913 905 764 911 912 913 912
Notes: Table 5 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by party.
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Table A.8: Table 5 (Omnibus Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Preferred
Presidential Candidate
Top rate $1M tax Estate Petition Min. wage Trust Scope Dem 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.931 0.0502 0.357 0.0648 0.0325 -0.0292 0.132 0.0152
(0.549) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0115) (0.0339) (0.0125)
Control mean 30.21 0.740 0.171 0.234 0.690 0.158 3.076 0.529
Scaled effect 0.0914 0.111 2.043 0.394 0.0995 1.250 0.110 0.0246
Observations 3741 3704 3673 3060 3690 3702 3704 3703
Obama 0.862 0.0464 0.397 0.0612 0.0291 -0.0458 0.0996 0.0102
(0.680) (0.0135) (0.0183) (0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0152) (0.0404) (0.0174)
Control mean 32.58 0.847 0.222 0.284 0.769 0.193 3.425 0.746
Scaled effect 0.0846 0.103 2.275 0.372 0.0891 1.963 0.0828 0.0166
Observations 2527 2503 2481 2061 2494 2502 2503 2502
McCain 2.093 0.115 0.278 0.0743 0.0462 0.00882 0.256 0.00775
(1.085) (0.0347) (0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0350) (0.0208) (0.0793) (0.0199)
Control mean 23.63 0.426 0.0455 0.122 0.478 0.0887 2.199 0.0766
Scaled effect 0.205 0.254 1.593 0.452 0.142 0.378 0.213 0.0125
Observations 836 828 824 690 824 827 828 828
Other 1.936 -0.00719 0.319 0.0815 0.0838 -0.0314 0.155 0.0520
(2.005) (0.0519) (0.0449) (0.0478) (0.0526) (0.0279) (0.143) (0.0352)
Control mean 28.54 0.699 0.109 0.150 0.619 0.0787 2.653 0.0880
Scaled effect 0.190 0.0159 1.828 0.495 0.257 1.347 0.129 0.0840
Observations 378 373 368 309 372 373 373 373
Notes: Table 5 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by preferred presidential candidate.
88
Table A.9: Table 10 (Emotional Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Policy
Views
Ineq. v. Ineq. Poverty v. Min. Aid Food Housing Trust
serious increased serious Wage poor stamps gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.0783 0.0410 0.0885 0.0469 0.117 0.177 0.0397 -0.00979
(0.0292) (0.0258) (0.0313) (0.0989) (0.0665) (0.101) (0.0670) (0.0211)
Control mean 0.337 0.775 0.296 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 0.124
Scaled effect 0.221 0.225 0.257 0.0449 0.0714 0.0866 0.0291 0.0931
Observations 1002 1001 799 799 799 799 799 1002
Liberals 0.112 0.0897 0.132 0.133 0.185 0.504 0.171 -0.0237
(0.0485) (0.0332) (0.0556) (0.163) (0.0950) (0.160) (0.104) (0.0334)
Control mean 0.484 0.840 0.423 2.966 3.137 2.491 3.017 0.142
Scaled effect 0.316 0.491 0.384 0.128 0.113 0.247 0.125 0.225
Observations 456 456 349 349 349 349 349 456
Conservatives 0.0144 0.0320 0.0777 0.469 0.289 0.336 0.111 0.00363
(0.0488) (0.0689) (0.0506) (0.217) (0.177) (0.222) (0.165) (0.0335)
Control mean 0.130 0.657 0.0787 1.921 1.494 0.449 1.652 0.0370
Scaled effect 0.0405 0.175 0.226 0.450 0.176 0.164 0.0810 0.0345
Observations 230 230 190 190 190 190 190 230
Moderates 0.104 -0.0209 0.0771 0.0284 -0.0787 -0.135 -0.0674 -0.0325
(0.0566) (0.0508) (0.0605) (0.194) (0.141) (0.206) (0.135) (0.0461)
Control mean 0.268 0.763 0.274 2.403 2.508 1.895 2.500 0.159
Scaled effect 0.293 0.114 0.224 0.0272 0.0479 0.0659 0.0493 0.309
Observations 316 315 260 260 260 260 260 316
Notes: Table 10 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by variable policyview.
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Table A.10: Table 10 (Emotional Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Preferred
Presidential Candidate
Ineq. v. Ineq. Poverty v. Min. Aid Food Housing Trust
serious increased serious Wage poor stamps gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.0783 0.0410 0.0885 0.0469 0.117 0.177 0.0397 -0.00979
(0.0292) (0.0258) (0.0313) (0.0989) (0.0665) (0.101) (0.0670) (0.0211)
Control mean 0.337 0.775 0.296 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 0.124
Scaled effect 0.221 0.225 0.257 0.0449 0.0714 0.0866 0.0291 0.0931
Observations 1002 1001 799 799 799 799 799 1002
Obama 0.0733 0.0514 0.0988 0.105 0.0573 0.162 0.0590 -0.0281
(0.0412) (0.0300) (0.0444) (0.134) (0.0792) (0.130) (0.0841) (0.0305)
Control mean 0.410 0.816 0.352 2.716 2.960 2.320 2.868 0.171
Scaled effect 0.207 0.281 0.287 0.101 0.0349 0.0792 0.0432 0.268
Observations 643 643 507 507 507 507 507 643
Romney 0.173 0.0604 0.214 0.402 0.268 0.133 -0.0800 0.0262
(0.0508) (0.0761) (0.0645) (0.238) (0.210) (0.294) (0.208) (0.0408)
Control mean 0.0430 0.624 0.0897 2.090 1.564 0.744 1.795 0.0538
Scaled effect 0.487 0.331 0.622 0.385 0.163 0.0650 0.0586 0.249
Observations 199 199 169 169 169 169 169 199
Other vote 0.122 -0.0611 0.0780 0.0585 0.0806 -0.0285 -0.0880 0.0298
(0.0956) (0.0814) (0.111) (0.354) (0.304) (0.393) (0.307) (0.0386)
Control mean 0.390 0.790 0.333 2.433 2.183 1.217 2.133 0.0244
Scaled effect 0.345 0.334 0.227 0.0560 0.0491 0.0139 0.0644 0.283
Observations 160 159 123 123 123 123 123 160
Notes: Table 10 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by preferred presidential candidate.
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Table A.11: Table 11 (Policy Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Policy Views
Ineq. v. Poverty v. Min. Aid Food Housing Private Trust
serious serious Wage poor stamps charity gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.0405 -0.00637 0.323 0.133 0.313 0.176 -0.137 -0.0325
(0.0279) (0.0272) (0.0949) (0.0638) (0.0970) (0.0636) (0.0709) (0.0207)
Control mean 0.343 0.326 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 2.025 0.149
Scaled Policy Effect 0.108 0.0196 0.310 0.0811 0.153 0.129 0.0740 0.654
Obs. 1111 1111 806 806 806 806 1068 1111
Liberals 0.00352 -0.0216 0.232 -0.0409 0.233 0.124 0.0697 -0.0375
(0.0489) (0.0479) (0.147) (0.0927) (0.152) (0.0957) (0.0800) (0.0330)
Control mean 0.504 0.447 2.966 3.137 2.491 3.017 1.364 0.165
Scaled Policy Effect 0.00940 0.0664 0.222 0.0249 0.114 0.0911 0.0377 0.754
Observations 509 509 383 383 383 383 483 509
Conservatives 0.0166 0.0233 0.461 0.608 0.881 0.556 -0.636 0.0169
(0.0438) (0.0403) (0.188) (0.173) (0.230) (0.165) (0.196) (0.0416)
Control mean 0.129 0.122 1.921 1.494 0.449 1.652 3.210 0.116
Scaled Policy Effect 0.0444 0.0716 0.441 0.370 0.432 0.407 0.344 0.339
Observations 280 280 188 188 188 188 270 280
Moderates 0.0823 -0.0318 0.464 0.134 0.350 0.195 -0.174 -0.0275
(0.0571) (0.0552) (0.207) (0.143) (0.199) (0.129) (0.150) (0.0419)
Control mean 0.278 0.312 2.403 2.508 1.895 2.500 2 0.153
Scaled Policy Effect 0.220 0.0978 0.444 0.0813 0.171 0.143 0.0944 0.553
Observations 322 322 235 235 235 235 315 322
Notes: Table 11 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by variable policyview.
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Table A.12: Table 11 (Policy Experiment) from Kuziemko et al. (2015), by Preferred
Presidential Candidate
Ineq. v. Poverty v. Min. Aid Food Housing Private Trust
serious serious Wage poor stamps charity gov.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample 0.0405 -0.00637 0.323 0.133 0.313 0.176 -0.137 -0.0325
(0.0279) (0.0272) (0.0949) (0.0638) (0.0970) (0.0636) (0.0709) (0.0207)
Control mean 0.343 0.326 2.546 2.559 1.832 2.539 2.025 0.149
Scaled effect 0.108 0.0196 0.310 0.0811 0.153 0.129 0.0740 0.654
Observations 1111 1111 806 806 806 806 1068 1111
Obama 0.0437 0.00178 0.330 0.00395 0.226 0.117 -0.0410 -0.0624
(0.0393) (0.0387) (0.125) (0.0792) (0.126) (0.0802) (0.0737) (0.0286)
Control mean 0.428 0.391 2.716 2.960 2.320 2.868 1.528 0.189
Scaled effect 0.117 0.00548 0.316 0.00240 0.111 0.0859 0.0222 1.253
Observations 716 716 526 526 526 526 685 716
Romney 0.0376 -0.0468 0.501 0.691 0.772 0.441 -0.483 0.000702
(0.0365) (0.0377) (0.225) (0.194) (0.275) (0.202) (0.222) (0.0446)
Control mean 0.0551 0.110 2.090 1.564 0.744 1.795 3.210 0.102
Scaled effect 0.100 0.144 0.480 0.421 0.378 0.323 0.262 0.0141
Observations 226 226 154 154 154 154 219 226
Moderates 0.0823 -0.0318 0.464 0.134 0.350 0.195 -0.174 -0.0275
(0.0571) (0.0552) (0.207) (0.143) (0.199) (0.129) (0.150) (0.0419)
Control mean 0.278 0.312 2.403 2.508 1.895 2.500 2 0.153
Scaled effect 0.220 0.0978 0.444 0.0813 0.171 0.143 0.0944 0.553
Observations 322 322 235 235 235 235 315 322
Notes: Table 11 from Kuziemko et al. (2015), separate regressions by preferred presidential candidate.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Survey Appendix
B.1.1 Open Responses
At the end of the survey, respondents received the following open-response prompt: “Do
you have any other thoughts or experiences about the news media and young people to
share?” Below is the full set of substantive answers.
1 I challenge your interpretation of a fairness doctrine as the government controlling
the media. The media would still be allowed to say whatever they like, no censorship.
They would just have to allow opposing views equal time. Since even cable and
online news sources are somewhat financed by the public, this is a fair exchange,
and would lead to much less echo chamber nonsense.
2 I just wish the news was more balanced and less partisan. It results in brainwashing
of young minds. Thanks for the HIT! I did my best and hope the data is useful!
3 I think the amount of bias and skewed reporting is extremely dangerous for the
younger population that may not have the experience to separate information from
propaganda.
4 I think the current state of the ”news” in our world is just a sad excuse for
propaganda.
5 Seems like a totally ”liberal” view in the ”mainstream” media and if you disagree,
you are labeled racist, or anti-whatever.
6 think and gather information beforeyou decide
7 In my experience I grew up in a republican supporting family. I myself became a
republican supporter.
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8 It’s obviously a little troubling that news today is just shaped by what you want to
hear. Algorithms are destroying objectivity.
9 the news lie and the young people that don’t know better accept it like sheep.
10 I believe that, too often, children are needlessly influenced by the politics or religion
of their parents. To such a degree, that these ideals often become the children’s own
without any substantive introspection. This almost occurred to me, but fortunately,
as I passed through high school, I was finally provided contrasting opinions and
perspectives, which allowed be to gradually and completely alter my views in so
many integral ways.
11 90 percent of the media is thoroughly orchestrated lies
12 it will be fine to report genuine news
13 All mainstream media in the US is biased. I found that out about 6 years ago, there
is a ton of propaganda which is sad because people stay ignorant when they think
they understand what’s actually going on in the world. I only get news from leftist
sites with a history of being objective and providing facts.
14 Only that young people should not feel restricted to their parent’s political views.
15 I do want to say that I grew up in the 60’s, so we didn’t have access to the media
like we do now. Also, growing up, my parents were definitely Democrats, but they
totally came to their senses later on and switched to Republican. I followed them.
:) That’s why I said they would have voted for Trump if they were still alive.
16 i like to say watch news media to the young people
17 There are some age and gender differences in the topics teens share on social media.
... posting selfies, videos or other updates of their lives to social media. ... A central
conversation surrounding social media and young people is the ... feelings that they
have people who will support them through .
18 Back when I was growing up it wasn’t at all like it is today, a divided mess.
19 From my own experience, I didn’t really question the political beliefs that I heard
in my home as a child. I basically just accepted them and ”by default” supported
the Republican party. It wasn’t until I got to college and was out on my own more
that I started actually questioning my own beliefs and exploring how I actually felt
about issues.
20 0-18 is a really wide range when it comes to awareness of their parents political bias
21 lately they been very once side and not telling the news truthfully. get your news
from many sources
22 the media is often toxic, especially right leaning, and families can often instill their
same twisted values into their children
23 Young people must be exposed to news media and they must analyze the situation
and decide the best for the future of their country
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24 I think it’s up to each individual to form their own opinion. I do want to stress
that I’m fine with bias, but I’m not fine with spreading news that is provably
non-factual. My parents, kids and wife can believe whatever they want... They can
believe whatever they want, just don’t post on Facebook that one of the candidates
is secretly a lizard man wearing a human suit. Partisan bias is fine. Spreading
imaginary bull#### is not.
25 I would only add that I think it is important you expose children to different views,
and allow them to make up their minds. For instance, I have let my daughter watch
Fox News and MSNBC so she can see the two sides of partisan belief.
26 TEENAGERS SHOULD USE THE MEDIA WISELY AND CORRECTLY
27 The news media can and has influenced young people. Facebook is full of political
jargon. I have a daughter who should be out carrying a ”Vote for Trump” sign.
She’s obsessed.
28 I think young people are exposed to such loaded news that it brainwashes young
people into becoming loyalists to an ideology or party, without seeing the other side
of the argument.
29 Young people are in future of USA.
30 I do not care about politics, nor do I care what happens in the world around me.
Let everyone else deal with that.
31 Because of the internet kids are exposed to all sorts of different viewpoints regardless
of their physical social environment.
32 news media keep people update and bring people together with common topic.
33 biased mstly fake
34 I think young people are bombarded with liberal media and education so it can be
difficult for them to see what’s on the other side. I know this because I think it was
like that for me growing up and I didn’t change my view on things until I started
looking into the right more on my own.
35 media is very important of this situation. media gives lot of information about
current and previous situation
36 The young people should aware of political news , which helps them to become a
leader or else to select a good leader
37 BE SURE FOR NEW MEDIA AND BE AWARE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE
38 it is important for a person to be a part of a political view
39 I became a republican on the day Ronald Reagan was shot. I was eight years old.
Several students in my class cheered when we got the news. I decided that I did not
want to be like them.
40 I grew up with my dad wanting to lay down a very fundamentalist Christian
foundation for my life; as such we’d listen to Christian radio all the time, which
often included conservative political messages, but never actually outright said they
were political. At the age of 16 I began learning how to think for myself and I broke
out of my Christianity and began viewing all types of media. I was a traditional
”Liberal” for a while and now I consider myself a Democratic Socialist.
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41 I feel the news media is out of control because I feel they don’t report accurate news
anymore. I feel this shouldn’t be aloud. They should only report the facts and leave
their opinion out of it.
42 It is a much different news climate now than when I was younger.
43 it is more like a business today
44 Just because your family grew up a certain way does not mean you have to agree
with it.
45 I mostly worry about the racist elements that come into play with certain
conservative politics that kids are exposed to. It’s kind of terrifying to see whole
generations of people pretty much indoctrinated into a very concrete and negative
way of thinking.
46 There isn’t news today it is all one sided
47 daily news are very important every people
48 I wish the media was more biased but they have become very one-sided and I think
they will lie in order to get a ”good story”. The media no longer has integrity.
49 I don’t really know what party I stand for. I don’t let my son watch the news
because it’s to violent and he is 7.
50 the news media is so incredibly biased towards the democratic party and liberal
idealism that the republican party will probably be dead by the time the next
generation grows up unless an effort is made to continue to spread the beliefs our
country was built upon
51 yeah, i have thought that the media was so powerful weapon in the world. it can be
change the past and the future
52 I think it’s important for children to have their questions answered with responses
from multiple different perspectives and this can be tough to do with media in it’s
current state.
53 i think young people may not be as interested as older people.
54 It is very difficult for young people right now since so much information is
overwhelming and it is difficult to know the truth.
55 in this day and age it’s not really ”there’s good people on both sides” - the right
wing is flat out dangerous so i don’t think these questions really apply negatively if
the kid grows up in a moderate/left-leaning household
56 More experience to see the news media, to gain knowledge.
57 Usually it was only during disasters (like 9/11, plane crashes, etc) where the
television was on a news media station when I was younger. That was when I
was exposed to news more.
58 please analyse the news right or wrong
59 My children often inform me what in going on in the news because they get so much
of it in social media. I talk with them about being careful of getting facts not falsity
60 Everything these days is one sided.
61 Unfortunately it is very difficult to find a neutral source of news in today’s
environment. The local news probably comes the closest to filling this role.
62 everytime share sports news and political news
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63 Most of the news media on TV is liberal so of course if that’s all they are exposed
to, it will influence them.
64 young people are pre-occupied with other things now...
65 Today it seems that young people have a huge desire to ”fit in” and go with the
majority opinion of their group.
66 The news media is always on-sided.
67 propaganda works and is highly effective and what the msm is spewing today is pure
leftist propaganda
68 I think all youngsters should see news and know what happening in the country
69 They watch and make their own opinions based on their experience
70 I do think the news today is a lot more biased/partisan than when I was growing
up so that it has a stronger affect on influencing young peoples opinions and beliefs.
71 The family joke while growing up is that my parents would cancel out one another’s
vote. My sons are much more conservative than I am. In fact, they are closer to
being libertarians. Go figure.
72 There is so much content out there that it has to be hard to escape an echo chamber
of news and opinions.
73 I don’t really know how early young people tend to start becoming interested in
politics. I grew up with parents who were news junkies and differed in their political
opinions. That got me interested early on and gave me different points of view. It
seems to me that most kids grow up in a more partisan environment, but I see them
frequently switching their views once they get into college or move out on their own.
74 I think this is an important topic for discussion and it’s one that does concern me,
especially as a conservative. However, despite everyone’s intuitive belief that the
media has this incredible influence on people’s beliefs, I’m not sure reality bears
that out. Look at the 2016 election. If you used all media as a barometer for who
should win–I’m not talking about predictions, but rather the tenor of reporting on
each candidate–Clinton should have won easily. The mainstream media is clearly
left-leaning. And yet we haven’t had a 50-year run of Democratic domination in
the White House or Congress. (Well, for a while Congress was like that.) I also
look at my own family. Three boys, raised by the same two parents. My older
brother is extremely liberal. I and my younger brother are extremely conservative.
We were all exposed to the same types of media and political opinions, had similar
childhood and young adult life experiences, similar interests, and yet we came out
on opposite ends of the political spectrum. I actually think there is an inherent, I
suppose biological, basis for more of our political beliefs than we might instinctively
expect.
75 Young people need to experience things for themselves before forming political
views. They have tendency to adapt to the views of those around them from my
observations, and with the way cable news and the internet work, tehy just seek out
supporting information to correlate with how they feel.
76 News media is very important to develop our social knowledge.
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77 My mother was a very liberal democrat, but when she turned about 75, she went
to the extreme opposite and became a very conservative republican. I’ve been very
struck and curious about that. She passed away at 82.
78 The rely too much on reading news on social media.
79 The world I grew up in is vastly different from today’s world. Cable TV was in
its infancy and my parents did not have it in our home. There was no such thing
as social media. The only daily news we got was the newspaper and 30 minuts of
national news and 30 minutes of local news. And although my parents were both
registered Democrats their ideology was closer to that of Republicans; they were very
conservative in their beliefs. I was in my late adolescence and early teens during the
Civil Rights movement which seemed to cause the paradigm shift in parties. At 18 I
registered to vote as a Democrat but by then I was very liberal in my thinking and
this caused tension and arguments with my parents when we watched the nightly
news together and saw the Vietnam Protests and Civil Rights protests. I supported
the protesters and the efforts of Martin Luther King and others while my parents
saw it as trouble makiers and instigators who should be prevented from overturning
the apple cart and destroying the status quo. The only time we agreed politically
was when we all voted for Jimmy Carter for President.
80 Young people today have a lot more opportunity to find their own news sources
online and do not have to rely on what their parents bring into the house.
81 news papers and media was very interesting
82 when i was a child there were only I believe two news channels and they were not
on all day, probably only once or twice
83 young people are more matured now which is good for the society
84 Other than parents, from my experience, my friends, work colleagues and some
celebrities had also play some parts in shaping my political beliefs.
85 I think televised news only provides one side to a story, and the children watching
don’t understand that. They also don’t know how or don’t care to seek out the
other side, so they get convinced at a very early age as to what their beliefs should
be.
86 I think that there should be a news outlet that in completely neutral and that kids
need to research all political parties and what they stand for in order to make an
informed decision themselves.
87 We need a strong news media, especially in these times. Good luck with your
research.
88 There is no longer any journalistic integrity in most of the news media, which is a
shame, and they should be ashamed of themselves. It seems like more so than ever
integrity is low on the priority list, and the focus is on getting viewers to tune in or
click on their site etc.
89 I think kids absorb and internalize their parents’ opinion. Especially if those opinions
are strongly held.
90 This should get exposed to both sides.
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91 My parent primarily focused on the local news, didn’t show interest or focus on
politics. Most of the political discussions we had were based on decision that affected
us based on race.
92 I was born in 1954, so there was no internet. What first got me interested in the
news was Woodstock, when I was 13. From then on, I was pretty curious about
what was going on, and they became difficult times by the time I was a teen. (Kent
State, Vietnam, etc.)
93 The media has never in my lifetime been so openly biased and partisan. If it doesn’t
change, it will contribute to a civil war, with each side believing in their absolute
truth and the absolute stupidity and evil of the other side.
94 I think young people should strive towards forming their own opinions
95 A central conversation surrounding social media and young people
96 News media are very helpful to learn some social things to make children to learn
very easyly and its very nice
97 I think it depends on what types of media they see and how old they are when they
see it and agree with the issues that they start to form their own opinion.
98 Both views should be presented (non-partisan) so young people can make a True
Informed choice.
99 The media wasn’t overtly biased or divurgent when I was a kid. People had to be
deeply partisan to even find the heavily partisan things like mother jones or national
review, and now those sources are relatively moderate compared to Breitbart and
Common Dreams
100 I just think its best to ease into news and politics at your own pace.
101 The news media is very biased and dishonest. You have to sift through what they
are trying to tell you and figure out the truths for yourself first. Once you do that
you have to make up your own mind on what your unique opinions are regarding
different issues.
102 The experience of news media is good
103 I remember growing up, my parents didn’t talk a lot about politics and as a result
I didn’t know much. However, my friends did have those parents and they always
had their parents political views. I think when someone grows up, what determines
what views they take is based on whether they think rationally or not.
104 Sharing the news in media helps to gain knowledge.
105 each and every child should be toiught to read newspaper
106 I think for the most parts kids take in the influences from their environments.
107 I find a lot of news sources very biased, it’s hard to know who to believe.
108 I believe that every young person must form his own position on politics as soon as
possible.
109 Social Media is used a lot by the younger generation.
110 We are in a time of crisis with our news media and our country.
111 I grew up in basically a cultlike environment and have gotten free but am still
impacted by the experience to this day
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112 Mom was involved in politics when I was young to help the schools get better
funding. It was good for me to learn from that.
113 I feel it’s both easier & harder to get both sides or opinions on a subject. News is
much more entertainment driven/hit driven & seems less concerned with neutrally
presenting facts. Everything feels much more op-ed but presented as fact & you are
painted negatively if you choose to present a different side/opinion. Kids want to
be liked & want to belong so it is easier just to believe what is the popular view
B.1.2 Survey Instruments
The survey instruments and response options are listed below (no responses listed
indicates an open response question). Survey logic is not shown here; e.g. a respondent with
no children would not see questions asking about children. After Section A on demographics,
a brief section surveyed respondents on their family structure when growing up, which Section
B then reflected. For instance, a respondent who said they grew up with a father and mother
would be asked about both, a respondent who grew up with only a father (or other male
guardian) would be asked only about the father, and so on. Language allowed for same-sex
parents as well. For brevity, Section B below lists only the questions as asked regarding
fathers. Questions for mothers or female guardians were otherwise identical. The survey is
available here: https://umich.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_72hLOEJK7rRYj3f.
Section A: Demographics
A1: What is your age?
A2: Please indicate your marital status. [Single (1), Married (2), Other (3)]
A3: What is your gender? [Male (1), Female (2)]
A4: How would you describe your ethnicity/race? [European American/White (1),
African American/Black (2), Hispanic/Latino (3), Asian/Asian American (4), Other (5)]
A5: Do you have children? [Yes (1), No (2)]
A6: In which zip code do you currently live?
A7: Which category best describes your highest level of education? [Eighth grade or less
(1), Some high school (2), High school degree / GED (3), Some college (4), 2-year college
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degree (5), 4-year college degree (6), Master’s degree (7), Doctoral degree (8), Professional
degree (JD, MD, MBA) (9)]
A8: Did you grow up in the United States? Specifically, is the U.S. where you spent the
most time from ages 0-18? [Yes, I grew up in the U.S. (1), No, I grew up outside the U.S.
(2)]
A9: In which zipcode did you grow up? (Where did you spend the most time from ages
0-18?)
A10: What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year? [$0 - $9,999
(1), $10,000 - $ 14,999 (2), $15,000 - $19,999 (3), $20,000 - $29,999 (4), $30,000 - $39,999
(5), $40,000 - $49,999 (6), $50,000 - $69,999 (7), $70,000 - $89,999 (8), $90,000 - $109,999
(9), $110,000 - $149,999 (10), $150,000 - $199,999 (11), $200,000 or more (12)]
A11: What is your current employment status? [Full-time employee (1), Part-time
employee (2), Self-employed or small business owner (3), Unemployed and looking for work
(4), Student (5), Not in labor force (not working and not looking for work, including retired,
full-time parent, etc.) (6)]
A12: Has the COVID-19 pandemic affected your employment status? [Yes, my hours
were reduced because of the pandemic. (1), Yes, I was laid off because of the pandemic. (2),
Minimally or not at all. (3)]
Section B: Role of Respondents’ Parents or Guardians
Prompt: We would like to learn about the main household adult influences in your
childhood (up through age 18). Whether these adults were biological parents, step parents,
or other guardians is not important for our study, and we will refer to primary male guardians
as “fathers” and female guardians as “mothers” in the next few questions.
B1: When you were growing up, how interested was your father (or main male guardian)
in information about what was going on in government and politics? [Extremely interested
(1) Very interested (2), Moderately interested (3), Slightly interested (4), Not interested at
all (5)]
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B2: About how often did your father watch, read, or listen to news about what was going
in government and politics? [Daily (1), A few times a week (2), A few times a month (3),
Almost never (4), Never (5)]
B3: In general, which types of news media did your father consume? Select all that
apply. [Broadcast television (like ABC, CBS, etc.) (1), Cable television (like MSNBC, Fox
News, CNN, etc.) (2), Radio (like NPR or talk radio) (3), Newspapers or magazines (like the
Wall Street Journal or Newsweek) (4), Internet and social media (like Twitter or Facebook)
(5), Podcasts (like the Daily) (6), Other (please describe): (7), None (8)]
B4: Which of the following specific news outlets do you recall your father consuming
when you were growing up? Select all that apply. [ABC, CBS, or NBC national newscasts
(1), Local TV newscasts (2), CNN (3), MSNBC (4), Fox News (5), NPR or other public radio
(6), Conservative talk radio (7), The New York Times (8), The Wall Street Journal (9), Local
newspapers (Like the Detroit Free Press or Seattle Times) (10), Facebook or Twitter (11),
Other (please describe): (12), None (13)]
B5: How important do you believe your father’s news media was in influencing his
political beliefs? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3),
Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
B6: Growing up, about how often did you see, read, or hear your father’s news media?
Examples include seeing some of a news media program your father was watching on TV, or
hearing a radio show he was listening to in the car. [Daily (1), A few times a week (2), A
few times a month (3), Almost never (4), Never (5)]
B7: How important do you believe your father’s news media was in influencing your
political beliefs? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3),
Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
B8: Some people find it important to pass on their political beliefs to their children,
while others do not. How important do you believe it was to your father for you to hold
similar political beliefs to him? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately
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important (3), Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
B9: When you were growing up (ages 0-18), did your father usually think of himself
as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? [Republican (1), Democrat (2),
Independent or Other (3)]
B10: Would he call himself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? [Strong
(1), Not very strong (2)]
B11: Would he call himself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? [Strong
(1), Not very strong (2)]
B12: Would he think of himself as closer to, or leaning towards, the Republican or
Democratic party? [Republican (1), Democratic (2), Neither (3)]
B13: Where did he see himself on the liberal-conservative spectrum? [Very liberal (1),
Liberal (2), Moderate (3), Conservative (4), Very Conservative (5)]
B14: Which candidate did he support in the 2016 presidential election? If he could not
or did not vote, pick the person you believe he wanted to win at the time. [Hillary Clinton
(1), Donald Trump (2), Neither (3)]
B15: Overall, when you were growing up (ages 0-18), were you ever exposed to partisan
news media from your parents or guardians? [Yes, frequently (1), Yes, occasionally (2),
Rarely (3), No, never (4)]
B16: Were you ever exposed specifically to cable news (like CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News)
that your parents or guardians watched at home? [Yes, frequently (1), Yes, occasionally (2),
Rarely (3), No, never (4)]
B17: Overall, when you were growing up, how important was your parents’ or guardians’
news media in shaping the types of political ideas and information you were exposed to?
[Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3), Slightly important
(4), Not at all important (5)]
B18: How important do you believe your parents’ news media was in influencing your
own political beliefs? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important
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(3), Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
B19: When you were growing up, would you say your parents’ or guardians’ news media
had a partisan perspective, or was closer to being neutral or balanced? [Extremely partisan
(1), Very partisan (2), Somewhat partisan (3), Mostly neutral (4), Completely neutral (5)]
B20: How important would you say your parents’ political beliefs themselves were
in influencing your views? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately
important (3), Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
B21: Some young people feel a need to ”rebel” against their parents’ politics, others do
not. Was it important to you to rebel against or reject your parents’ views? [Extremely
important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3), Slightly important (4), Not
at all important (5)]
B22: When you were growing up, how frequently was politics discussed in your home?
[Daily (1), A few times a week (2), A few times a month (3), Almost never (4), Never (5)]
B23: Before proceeding to the next and final set of questions, we want to ask for your
feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include
responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. This will not affect in
any way the payment you will receive for taking this survey. In your honest opinion, should
we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your
full attention to the questions so far? [Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so
far, and I think you should use my responses for your study. (1), No, I have not devoted
full attention to the questions so far, and I think you should not use my responses for your
study. (2)]
Section C: Respondents’ Views and Experiences on Media and Young People
Today
C1: Do you agree or disagree that young people (age 0-18) deserve the opportunity to
form their own political beliefs in an environment with exposure to relatively neutral news
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and different points of view? [Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Undecided (3), Disagree (4),
Strongly disagree (5)]
C2: Overall, would you say most young people today are raised in a political news media
environment that is more one-sided and partisan, or more neutral and balanced? [Extremely
partisan (1), Very partisan (2), Somewhat partisan (3), Mostly neutral (4), Completely
neutral (5)]
C3: In general, do you agree or disagree that people should be free to consume whatever
news media they wish? [Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Undecided (3), Disagree (4), Strongly
disagree (5)]
C4: As a response to polarized news media, some have proposed government policies such
as a ”fairness doctrine” that would require television shows, for example, to air contrasting
opinions on controversial issues. Do you agree or disagree that the government should
regulate the content of news media programs? [Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Undecided
(3), Disagree (4), Strongly disagree (5)]
C5: About how often do/did your children see, read, or hear your news media? Examples
include seeing some of a news media program you were watching on TV, or hearing a radio
show you were listening to in the car. [Daily (1), A few times a week (2), A few times a
month (3), Almost never (4), Never (5)]
C6: Some people find it important to pass on their political beliefs to their children,
while others do not. How important is it to you for your children to hold similar political
beliefs to you? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3),
Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
C7: Overall, how important would you say your news media is/was in shaping the types
of political ideas and information your kids are/were exposed to? [Extremely important (1),
Very important (2), Moderately important (3), Slightly important (4), Not at all important
(5)]
C8: Overall, how important do you believe your news media is/was in influencing your
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kids’ political beliefs? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important
(3), Slightly important (4), Not at all important (5)]
C9: Are your kids mostly closer to being Republicans, Democrats, or what? [Republican
(1), Democrat (2), Some of both (3), Neither (4), My kids are too young to identify with a
party (5)]
C10: Overall, would you say your children are/were raised in a political news media
environment that is/was more one-sided and partisan, or more neutral and balanced?
[Extremely partisan (1), Very partisan (2), Somewhat partisan (3), Mostly neutral (4),
Completely neutral (5)]
C11: Around what age would say your kids started to make their own choices about news
media to consume? (If your children haven’t yet, please enter the rough age you believe they
will.)
C12: Some young people feel a need to “rebel” against their parents’ politics, others do
not. Do you sense that it is/was important for your kids to rebel against or reject your views?
(If they are too young, please answer for your perception of kids generally today.) [Extremely
important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3), Somewhat important (4), Not
at all important (5)]
C13: Overall, when your kids were growing up (age 0-18), were they ever exposed to
partisan news media from you? [Yes, frequently (1), Yes, occasionally (2), Rarely (3), No,
never (4)]
C14: Were your kids ever exposed specifically to cable news (like CNN, MSNBC, and
Fox News) that you watched at home? [Yes, frequently (1), Yes, occasionally (2), Rarely
(3), No, never (4)]
C15: How interested are you in information about what is going on in government and
politics? [Extremely interested (1), Very interested (2), Moderately interested (3), Slightly
interested (4), Not interested at all (5)]
C16: About how often do you watch, read, or listen to news about what is going in
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government and politics? [Daily (1), A few times a week (2), A few times a month (3),
Almost never (4), Never (5)]
C17: In general, which types of news media do you consume? Select all that apply.
[Broadcast television (like ABC, CBS, etc.) (1), Cable television (like MSNBC, Fox News,
CNN, etc.) (2), Radio (like NPR or talk radio) (3), Newspapers or magazines (like the Wall
Street Journal or Newsweek) (4), Internet and social media (like Twitter or Facebook) (5),
Podcasts (like the Daily) (6), Other (please describe): (7), None (8)]
C18: Which of the following specific news outlets do you consume? Select all that apply.
[ABC, CBS, or NBC national newscasts (1), Local TV newscasts (2), CNN (3), MSNBC (4),
Fox News (5), NPR or other public radio (6), Conservative talk radio (7), The New York
Times (8), The Wall Street Journal (9), Local newspapers (like the Detroit Free Press or
Seattle Times) (10), Facebook or Twitter (11), Other (please describe): (12), None (13)]
C19: How important do you believe your news media is in influencing your political
beliefs? [Extremely important (1), Very important (2), Moderately important (3), Slightly
important (4), Not at all important (5)]
C20: Some kids (age 0-18) are raised in highly partisan environments, with exposure to
partisan parents, communities, and news outlets. Would you say these kids are aware that
they are only ”hearing one side” of the political story? [Highly aware (1), Somewhat aware
(2), Slightly aware (3), Not at all aware (5)]
C21: Again consider kids in partisan environments. Would you say kids in these
environments are at risk of simply inheriting the beliefs they grow up around, or are they
capable of adjusting their beliefs to account for the bias around them? [Kids are not yet
able to see through bias, and will mostly adopt views around them. (1), Kids can somewhat
account for bias, but will still be influenced by it. (2), Kids can mostly account for biased
upbringings in forming their own beliefs. (3)]
C22: Do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or
what? [Republican (1), Democrat (2), Independent or Other (3)]
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C23: Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? [Strong
(1), Not very strong (2)]
C24: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
[Strong (1), Not very strong (2)]
C25: Do you think of yourself as closer to, or leaning towards, the Republican or
Democratic party? [Republican (1), Democratic (2), Neither (3)]
C26: Where do you see yourself on the liberal-conservative spectrum? [Very liberal (1),
Liberal (2), Moderate (3), Conservative (4), Very Conservative (5)]
C27: Which candidate did you support in the 2016 presidential election? If you could
not or did not vote, pick the person you wanted to win at the time. [Hillary Clinton (1),
Donald Trump (2), Neither (3)]
C28: Which candidate will you support in the 2020 presidential election? If you cannot
or will not vote, pick the person you want to win. [Joe Biden (1), Donald Trump (2), Neither
(3)]
C29: Imagine you had been raised in an environment where your political influences–your
parents, community, news media, etc.–had been the opposite views of those you actually
experienced. Do you agree or disagree that you would likely have different political beliefs
today? [Strongly agree (1), Agree (2), Undecided (3), Disagree (4), Strongly disagree (5)]
C30: Have you changed the political party you support over your life, or have you mostly
supported the same party? [I have changed the party I support. (1), Mostly I have supported
the same party. (2)]
C31: Around what age would you say you first identified with or supported a political
party or candidate?
C32: Around what age would you say you first started to consume news media yourself?
This could mean watching TV news, reading a newspaper, etc.
C33: Do you have any other thoughts or experiences about the news media and young
people to share?
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C34: These are the last two questions and will not affect your payment. We find some
people don’t take surveys seriously, instead providing insincere or humorous responses. How
often do you do this? [Always (1), Often (2), Occasionally (3), Rarely (4), Never (5)]
C35: Have you provided honest and thoughtful responses to this survey? [Yes, completely
(1), Yes, mostly (2), Partly (3), No (4)]
109
APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Appendix B: Measuring TV Access
C.1.1 Measurement Error in the DMA Data
Gentzkow (2006) approximates 1950’s broadcast ranges with Nielsen media markets, or
Designated Market Areas (DMAs), that are based on 2003 viewership. A DMA is a group
of counties around a metropolitan area. The approximation takes the year in which the first
station in a DMA began operation and assumes that each county in that DMA received a
signal in that year. We found that 1960’s coverage maps show differences between historical
broadcast ranges and the 2003 DMAs. The DMA approximation sometimes underestimates
and sometimes overestimates how far signals reached. The next two subsections give
examples of each case. These are not representative, as we chose them specifically for
exposition of the two types of problems with the DMA approximation.
C.1.1.1 An Example of DMA Underestimation (A type II error)
Proximal cities confound the DMA approximation of TV access. For example, panel (A)
of figure C.5 shows a coverage map of Kansas City from the 1967 TV Factbook. The blue
line is the broadcast ring as defined by those counties that have over 50 percent coverage
according to the map. Panel (B) overlays in red the Kansas City DMA. The DMA is too
small–it excludes counties to the northwest that were likely covered. Moreover, for a region
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with little variation in terrain, the irregular shape of the DMA suggests that it cannot reflect
the roughly circular true broadcast range.1
Let TVYEARi denote the year in which county i first had TV access. In panel (B),
the DMA approximation assigns the highlighted counties between the two rings a TVYEAR
of 1954. However, those counties fall well within the range of the Kansas City tower, and
that tower started broadcasting in 1950. Therefore the true TVYEAR of the highlighted
counties is likely 1950, not 1954. This misclassification owes to the nearby DMAs, Topeka
and St. Joseph, whose broadcasts began in 1954. While it is true today that the highlighted
counties are closest to the Topeka and St. Joseph signals, and are therefore not in the 2003
Kansas City DMA, those counties are close enough to Kansas City to have viewed Kansas
City broadcasts in 1950.
The TV ownership data from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) confirm that this is a case in
which today’s DMAs do not align with 1950’s signals. The DMA data assign the highlighted
counties in panel (B) as not receiving a TV signal until 1954, four years after the counties
in the red Kansas City ring. If that were true, we ought to observe the highlighted counties
buying TVs well after the Kansas City counties. Panel (A) of figure shows that in fact
the timing of TV purchases is almost identical across the two groups, consistent with the
hypothesis that Topeka and St. Joseph viewers received a 1950 signal from Kansas City.
Substantial TV ownership in a county before that county’s DMA-approximated TVYEAR
is evidence of measurement error arising from signal overlap.
When signals overlap like this, DMAs underestimate coverage. The overlap between
Kansas City and Topeka, for example, leads the DMA data to underestimate how many
counties the Kansas City broadcast reached in the 1950’s. Spot-checking coverage maps
suggests that DMAs can also overestimate coverage.
C.1.1.2 An Example of DMA Overestimation (A type I error)
Today’s DMAs sometimes extend further from city centers than historical signals did.
Panel (C) of figure C.5 shows a Factbook coverage map of Minneapolis-St. Paul. The blue
line rings counties whose coverage exceeded 50 percent. Panel (D) adds the Minneapolis-St.
Paul DMA in red. That DMA is too large, in that it includes the highlighted counties that
were likely out of reach of the broadcast, which leads to overestimation of coverage. The
1For two reasons, the Factbook maps ought to be taken only as suggestive regarding true 1950’s signal
reach. The first is that these maps were not published until the 1960’s, and tower technology–power, height,
etc.–improved substantially over time. The second is that the shading in the maps reflects surveys of
viewership, not measures of signal strength. County coverage exceeding 50 percent for a station means that
over 50 percent of households in the county watched that channel. Our measurement of signal reach will not
rely on these maps.
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highlighted counties have a DMA TVYEAR of 1948, since that is when the first Minneapolis
station began operation. But many of those counties appear to be too far away from the
tower to receive the early Minneapolis signals. Panel (B) of figure shows that TV purchases
in the highlighted counties–the group inside the DMA but outside the mapped broadcast
range–lagged purchases in the counties inside the Factbook coverage area, consistent with
the hypothesis that the DMA overestimates 1950’s signal reach. That pattern remains after
controlling for county characteristics like income and population that are associated with
TV ownership.
C.1.1.3 Causes and Prevalence of Measurement Error
This section moves beyond examples to the causes of measurement error and evidence
on the prevalence of those causes. To start with underestimation, the two conditions under
which the signal overlap problem arises are: Neighboring DMA towers (1) are close enough
for signals to overlap and (2) started broadcasts in different years2. The closer the towers and
the further apart the initial broadcast years, the larger the potential measurement error. To
find possible areas of overlap, we ranked pairs of DMAs by their distance apart. There are
166 unique pairs of DMAs whose towers are less than 100 miles apart (a typical broadcast
radius) with broadcasts beginning in different years. Among them are the Kansas City,
Topeka, and St. Joseph pairs. Other metropolitan areas such as Pittsburgh and Cleveland
are close enough to smaller neighboring stations like Youngstown to create the same overlap
issue.3
Overestimation, by contrast, can arise because of improvements in TV towers over time.
In most cities, the 1950’s saw expanded broadcast ranges through both upgrades to existing
stations and also construction of new towers. The 2003 DMAs are therefore prone to overstate
early 1950’s signal reach, when towers were weaker. As shown in figure C.7, the average
height above ground of a commercial tower in 1948 was 483 feet, and already by 1960 that
had increased to 629 feet. Some stations moved to higher ground, and tower height above
average surrounding terrain rose from 721 to 992 feet. Average visual power jumped from
19 to 170 kilowatts over that period, and average aurul power increased from 11 to 87
kilowatts.4 The fixed DMAs do not capture shifts in broadcast areas that followed changes
2Condition (2) is necessary because if two towers were close but started broadcasts in the same year,
then all surrounding counties would get a signal in the same year, so proximity alone would not lead to
misclassification. Terrain also matters–mountains could prevent overlap–and our measurement of TV access
will account for variation in elevation.
3Table C.5 lists the first 40 pairs and shows the distance between towers. Note also that in 1948 the
FCC froze applications for new broadcast licenses in part because it realized it had allowed stations to be
too close together.
4Power does not map directly to broadcast reach, as higher frequency channels require more power to
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in tower technology.
These measurement issues tend to affect particular types of counties. The DMA
approximation always gets major cities right. Underestimation and overestimation occur
at the fringe of the broadcast areas of those cities, as the figure C.5 examples show with
Kansas City and Minneapolis-St. Paul, and the fringe plays a key role in estimating TV’s
effects. Gentzkow (2006) exploits broadcast rings to identify the causal effects of TV on voter
turnout. The idea is that since TV reception reached about 100 miles from a broadcast tower,
counties just inside and outside of that radius comprise treatment and control groups. Using
this method, variation in access to TV is “driven by whether a county happened to fall
within the roughly 100-mile radius of television broadcasts” (p. 945), so measuring that
radius accurately is especially important for inference.
We took the evidence presented thus far as reason to pursue a more precise measure
of TV access. Those measurements, constructed using digitized TV Factbook data and the
Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) of signal propogation are discussed in section 3.3.1 of the
main text. To validate the ITM measurements, we turn next to comparisons of key findings
in the literature using the DMA approximation and ITM data.
C.1.2 TV Data Validation Exercise
As referenced in the introduction, much of our knowledge on the effects of TV relies on
the DMA approximation. Among the many papers using the DMA approach are Baker and
George (2010) on household debt, Campante and Hojman (2013) on political polarization,
Thomas (2019) on smoking, Kim (2020) on consumer culture and spending, and Angelucci
et al. (2020) on media competition and news consumption. The original DMA papers are
Gentzkow (2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) on how TV impacted voter turnout and
children’s test scores, respectively. Here we replicate the main results of these two papers
using the ITM, and we find that the estimated effects are about twice as large with the new
data.5
Gentzkow (2006) studies how the 1950’s TV rollout affected voter turnout. The direction
of the effect is a priori ambiguous–it could be that TV broadened news viewership and
therefore stimulated political engagement, or, alternatively, that TV crowded out news
consumption with entertainment programming, which in turn dampened political knowledge
and interest. Gentzkow finds robust evidence for the the latter case, using the following
baseline difference-in-differences specification:
operate.
5We are grateful to Matthew Gentzkow for his correspondence and generous assistance with code and
data.
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Yit = αi + δrt + γTVit + βXit + εit (C.1)
Here the outcome Yit is voter turnout in county i and year t, and controls include county
effects αi, region-year effects δrt, as well as flexible time trends interacted with county
characteristics in Xit. The explanatory variable of interest TVit is the number of years
that county i has had TV access in year t, so the coefficient γ captures the effect of an
additional year of TV access on voter turnout.
Row 1 of table C.6 reports the main results from the paper. Columm 2, the
fully-controlled, preferred specification shows that an additional year of TV availability led
to 0.136 percentage point decline in voter turnout, an effect size that “explains half of the
total off-year decline in turnout since the 1950’s. The effect on presidential-year turnout
is smaller—accounting for roughly a quarter of the total decline— and is not significantly
different from zero” (p. 933). (Note that the effects in row 1 are much larger for the column
4 mid-term elections than the column 3 presidential elections.) Rows two and three show
results using the ITM rather than the DMA’s to measure TV access, with both a -40 and -50
decibel threshold for access. The effects are upwards of 2-3 times larger, which is consistent
with a reduction in attenuation bias arising from measurement error.
We find similar results in the context of a study on TV and education. Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2008b) investigate how TV influenced children’s test scores, providing a rigorous
test of longstanding worries that TV could “rot children’s brains” using data from the 1965
Coleman Report. This paper uses a two-stage least squares approach, instrumenting for
TV ownership in a household with the availability of a TV signal; the idea is that TV
ownership and viewership may well have been endogenous choices, but that conditional on
a set of controls, access to a TV signal was idiosyncratic. The central results are based on
the following first- and second-stage regressions:












The main outcome ygc in equation C.2 is average test scores for students in grade g and
location c, which is regressed on the number of years of potential preschool television exposure
for those students, TVgc, and additional controls. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) instrument
for TVgc in equation C.3 with a variable ADOPTc for the time at which location c adopted
TV broadcasts, as measured using the DMA approximation.
Table C.7 reports the main findings from the paper, as well as the first-stage F-statistic
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from equation C.3. Contrary to common narratives about the harmful influence of TV, the
row 1 results show that, if anything, TV exposure during childhood increased test scores.
Many of the effects are imprecise, but they are positive, and for reading scores, the coefficient
is statistically significant, “consistent with a variety of existing evidence suggesting that
children can learn language-based skills from television” (p. 300). In rows 2 and 3, we
estimate the same two-stage least squares specification using the ITM to measure TV access.
Note first that first-stage F-statistic is larger, meaning there is a stronger association between
TV signal availability and TV ownership using the ITM. We take this as validation that the
ITM is more accurately measuring signal reach than the DMA’s. The effects on test scores
in columns 2-5 are larger and more precise as well, with the exception of general knowledge
scores.
Taken together, these replication exercises suggest that future researchers studying the
effects of TV should use the ITM measurements of access. The DMA approach appears
to produce substantial underestimates of TV’s influence. We aim to make the ITM data
available for both further revisions of existing results and future original work.
C.2 Appendix B: Empirical Appendix
C.2.1 Social Security Sample
The Social Security Act of 1935 introduced Federal Old Age Insurance in the United
States. Individuals over the age of 65 received benefits, and payments were based
on contributions people made across their work histories. To keep track of individual
contributions, the Social Security Administration (SSA) started recording individual earnings
data in 1937. Initially this covered all wage and salary workers (excluding railroad workers)
under age 65 who were employed in the private sector in the U.S. and Alaska and Hawaii,
which were then territories (Long, 1988). From the outset, the system thus covered a
substantial share of the U.S. workforce; in 1937 it was estimated that around 32 million
workers, or roughly 60% of the labor force, were covered (Wasserman and Arnold, 1939).
Workers not excluded from the system included certain non-covered occupations (e.g. the
self-employed), workers aged 65-74, and the unemployed or workers in unemployment relief
programs. Coverage was expanded over the following decades, with major expansions in
1951, 1954 and 1956. The expansions broadly affected workers in four categories: government
employees, the self-employed, military personal, and agricultural workers. To work with a
consistent sample, we drop occupations that first receive coverage during this period.6 Since
6This excludes 3,714 individuals. We exclude workers in occupation groups: 42, 43, 44, 36, 10, 11, 7;
in occupations: 821, 822, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 824; in major industry group: 11; industry group: 48,
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the data only report occupation and industry in 1977, we also exclude individuals that first
appear in the earnings records in one of the three extension years in the 1950’s and are older
than 30.7
At the beginning of the sample, the Social Security system excluded the following groups:
“agricultural employment, work for Federal, State and local governments, employment by
certain non profit organizations or institutions, railroad employment, domestic service in
private homes, and all types of self employment.” Moreover, workers over the age of 65
did not contribute to Social Security in 1937 and 1938 and their employment was not
recorded (Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2010), so we set employment to missing
for these cases. In 1951 the self-employed (except members of professional groups), farm
laborers and domestic workers were included in the system. Additionally, worker in nonprofit
organization could join the system if they received at least $100 in pay during the calendar
year. Reforms broadened coverage further in 1955. These reforms relaxed restrictions on
farm workers, the self-employed and expanded the scope for voluntary participation of state
and local government employees. Farm laborers were included if they passed a “cash-pay”
or “regularity-of-employment” test. This required a cash income over $150 from a single
employer, or employment on a time basis of at least 20 days with a single employer. Finally,
in 1956 soldiers on active duty, previously excluded self-employed professions and optionally
police and firefighters in state and local retirement systems became covered. To avoid
individuals dropping in and out of employment due to changes in the earning threshold,
we code all workers as employed if they earn over $50 and non-employed if earnings are
below $50.
C.2.2 Summary Statistics
Our baseline sample comprises of 325,130 person-year observation, 31,653 individuals
and spans 134 local areas. As described above, these areas split the mainland U.S. into
MSAs and rest of state areas. We present summary statistics of our sample in Table C.1.
A few observations are worth highlighting. First, the SSA employment measures are not
directly comparable with variables from the Census. The previous section describes how the
SSA defined employment and we use this definition. Also note that using SSA employment
definitions has become a common practice in a sizable literature that analysis the U.S. labor
market with administrative records. The picture is broadly consistent with Census data and
we discuss employment trends more below. Second, it is worth exploring the representativnes
49, 50, 51; industries: 927, 937, 769; and workers in areas with a farming to population ratio over 10%.
Additionally, we exclude veterans who appear in the data in 1957.
7This drops an additional 1,996 individuals.
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of the sample. While a representative sample is not necessary for the validity of the analysis,
understanding the sample helps understand the summary statistics. Our sample is based
on the 1978 CPS and thus becomes less representative of the U.S. population as we go
further back in time. In particular, groups with higher mortality or migration rates are
underrepresented. As a result, the sample includes somewhat fewer men (41% instead of
49%) and minority workers (9% instead of 10%) and is younger (38 instead of 44) than the
U.S. population of the time. All in all, the sample is reasonably close to the aggregate U.S.
population. A major strength of the experiment is that it touches broad range of society and
we can measure heterogeneous effects by sub-groups and strengthen the external validity of
our results. For instance, the effect of television may look differently in a population with
a different demographic make-up. Below we explore this formally and re-weight our sample
to obtain the average treatment effect for the U.S. society.
Fianlly, we provide additional detail on the variation from the television rollout. Figure
C.3 shows the time series aspect of the rollout. At the start of the license freeze in 1950
substantial differences existed across the U.S.. Multiple stations were already available in
a few early adopting locations but most Americans had only limited exposure to television.
This changes with the lift of the license freeze in 1952. In the following two years television
spread throughout the country. The figure illustrates that much of the variation in the
television rollout over time is down to the license freeze “accident,” which helps our
identification strategy. And we can explo
C.2.2.1 Retirement Trends
Retirement rates grew sharply in the 1950’s. Figure C.1 shows that the retirement rates
for over 65 year olds almost doubled from around 30% to nearly 60%. Our measure of
retirement differs somewhat from Census definitions of labor market activity. We define
retirement as a permanent with-drawl from the labor force, as measured by Social Security
contributions. Census measures typically focus on employment in one specific reference week.
These definitions make a difference to the level but not the trend in inactivity, both series
show a sharp decline in labor market activity among the over 65 year olds during the 1950’s.
A second striking feature of Figure C.1 is the rise in retirement among “younger” cohorts.
Retirement is less common among people aged between 50 and 65 but the trend in the 1950’s
clearly points upwards too. Retirement rates among these “younger” workers almost doubled
in the 1950’s. This trend is particularly remarkable because these age groups are typically
not eligible for Social Security, which suggests that other factors beyond social insurance
played a role in growing retirement trends.
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C.2.2.2 Employment over the Life-Cycle
Employment rates evolve over the life-cycle. This pattern during the 1950’s is familiar
from Census data and we show the results in the CPS-SSA data. The employment to
population rate for men follows a U-shaped patterns. The employment rate rises until age
30, then plateaus and starts declining from age 50. For women, employment rates start at
a lower level and decline during the child bearing years, then recover somewhat in the late
30s until they start declining later in life. These patterns are well known and are broadly
consistent with the Census data reported in McGrattan and Rogerson (2004). This shores
up our confidence that the SSA data paints a reasonable picture of labor market activity.
C.2.3 Robustness Checks
C.2.3.1 Leads and Lags
A popular method to check for pre-trends is to include leads and lags of the treatment
in the event study designs and analyze changes in labor supply in the lead up to an event.
The intiuition is that effects should arise after television launch events and not before. We
implement this through a dynamic DiD which replicates DiD 3.4.1 and additionally allows
for leads and lags of the treatment:
Ea,i,t = γt + δi +
3∑
j=−4
βt+j·TVa,t+j + π·Xa,i,t + εa,i,t,
these leads and lags capture the evolution of the treatment effect in the 4 years before and
after the launch of a new TV channel. Conventional event studies have to omit one lead
or lag regressor, because these regressors are otherwise co-linear with the year dummies.
In our case, we have one more degree of freedom because the television treatment varies
in intensity. More than one television station is launched in some years, which breaks the
perfect co-linearity of leads and lags and time FE. We could therefore estimate coefficients
for all lead and lag periods but since we are mainly interested in trends, we follow the
standard event-study design and normalise the effects in period t-1 to zero.8 This eases
the interpretation of the results, as coefficients then capture the deviation in employment
relative to the t-1 period. Table C.2 shows that treatment and control regions evolve in
parallel in the years leading up to the launch of a TV channel. And we see a sharp change
after the launch of a TV station. The clear change at the time of treatment indicates that the
8The effect in t-1 is typically positive around 0.1, reflecting that places with multiple simultaneous
launches have higher rates of employment. For display purposes, we purge the impact of this level effect and
subtract this value from all coefficients.
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difference-in-difference specification is capturing the effects of TV and we can rule out that
differences in trends are driving our results. The following columns control for alternative
aggregate and regional trends and find similar results.
C.2.3.2 LATE vs ATE: sample weights
Our SSA-CPS data follows the 1978 CPS cohort throughout their life. The sample is
representative of the 1978 population but becomes less representative as we go back in time.
The lack of representativeness does not cause problems for the internal validity of the results,
but it does limit the external validity. Specifically, the measured LATE in our sample may not
be representative of the ATE in the population. We can recover the ATE on the population
of interest by re-weighting our sample. To do this we obtain data from the U.S. population
Census on the target population. We linearly interpolate values in between the 1950 and
1960 Census and then construct weights to match those population totals. Specifically, we
target population aggregates in an MSA, as well as their education and age demographics.
Table C.3 shows the baseline results with the weighted sample. The main takeway is
that the results are broadly similar to those reported in our baseline results (see Table 3.1).
If we use weights for the steady-state estimates, we again find consistent results (see Figure
C.4). The impact of television increases with the first few stations and then steadies out.
The point estimate is a 3% decline in the employment to population ratio. This is somewhat
larger than the baseline 2% estimate but this difference is not significant. The weighted and
unweighted results thus show qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
C.2.3.3 Effect Heterogeneity
We here analyze heterogeneity in the response across demographic groups. The first
column allows for different effects among more mobile individuals. Mobile individuals are
more likely to leave the fixed MSA that we assign them to during the analysis and by testing
treatment effects on this sub-group, we can assess how much such moves may attenuate the
results. We define a dummy for high vs low mobility individuals and look at differences in
the effects. We do not have data on moves in the 1950’s and instead use the CPS migration
supplement to infer moving propensity. We classify people as mobile if the moved out of
MSA between 1975 and 1976 and test how much mobility attenuates results. The difference
in effects is insignificant and quantitatively small (Table C.4, column 1). This suggests that
the attenuation bias from mobility is relatively minor.
The next columns show heterogeneity cuts for other demographic groups. Column 2
looks at age differences and again highlights that the effect is much bigger among workers
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near retirement. Column 3 and 4 look at effects by schooling and marital status. The effect
on both groups is similar to the baseline estimates.
C.2.3.4 Migration and Intention to Treat
The baseline estimates treat place of residence as fixed and estimate intent-to-treat (ITT)
effects. This appendix explores how these ITT effect relate to the local average treatment
effect. Generally, migration could have two potential effects on the results. First, endogenous
moves towards television could lead to selection effects, second random moves will lead to
mis-measurement of television exposure. The first issue, selection effects, are taken care
of by the individual fixed effects in our analysis. The focus of this section is instead on
the second problem, which we call the imperfect compliance challenge, in the spirit of ITT
effects. The standard approach in the literature is to divide the ITT estimates by the rate
of compliance. In our setting, the denominator would be the fraction of people who migrate
outside the treatment area. We additionally require information on the treatment effect in
the non-complier population. In a set-up with a binary treatment non-compliers don’t access
the treatment and have a zero treatment effect. However, with multiple treatment dosages,
non-compliers may still experience some treatment effects. The relation of the ITT and
ATT can be expressed as: ITT = ATT × σ +NCTE × (1− σ). Where σ is the compliance
rate, or the share of people who lived in a different MSA than we observe, and NCTE is
the treatment effect experienced by these non-compliers. Note that with a binary treatment
NCTE = 0 and the ATT becomes the familiar IV estimate that scales the ITT up by the
compliance rate: ATT = ITT/σ.
We first calculate the approximate level of non-compliance in our sample (σ). This
requires data on migration patterns. The CPS-SSA linked data only includes imperfect
information on these rates and we use the matched 1978 CPS migration supplement to
estimate migration rates. Many people move every year, but only a small fraction of these
moves affects our results. In particular, only moves that cross MSA boundaries are relevant.
According to the 1978 CPS migration supplement, 5% of our sample left an MSA during
the three year window 1975-1978. This group are clearly non-compliers and we can use
this group for a benchmark exercise with σ = 0.95. To calculate the ATT we also need an
estimate of the NCTE and Table C.4 reports treatment effects for this non-complier group
in column 1. Using σ = 0.95 and NCTE = −0.301 in the ATT formula yields an ATT of
-0.397, very close to the ITT estimate of -0.392.
The previous estimate is likely a lower bound for the true ATT as it only takes migration
between 1975 and 1978 into account. The share of people who left the MSA in the 18 year
window from our sample period to the 1978 CPS is larger. If we assume stationary migration
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rates, we can extrapolate the 18 year rate as: σ = 0.05 +
∑5
t=1 0.05(1 − p)t, where p is the
rate of repeat migration. A high value of p implies that some people are intrinsically more
mobile and move frequently. We use panel data from the NLSY79 to get a sense of these
repeat migration rates and find rates around p = 0.3. This implies σ = 0.15 and together
with our previous NCTE estimate yields an ATT of -0.408, again similar to the baseline
estimates. To push this to an extreme, assume next that people only move ones (p = 0).
In this scenario the ATT=-0.431, and therefore still in the same ballpark as our baseline
estimates. This is of course an unrealistic assumption but illustrates that the results are
reasonably robust to alternative assumptions about migration patterns.
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C.3 Appendix Figures and Tables
















Notes: The figure shows retirement rates among older workers during the 1950’s. Retirement
is defined as no observed employment in the Social Security records until the end of our
sample (1978). Source: linked SSA-CPS data.
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Notes: The figure shows employment rates by age and gender. Each dot shows the average
for a five year age window, averaging employment rates over the full sample period. The first
and last bins respectively show averages for the age groups 21-24 years and 65+. Source:
linked SSA-CPS data.
123
Figure C.3: Number of Stations Available Over Time
Notes: The figure shows the number of television stations in the U.S. between 1950 and
1960. It shows this for a median person, as well as at the 90th and 10th percentile of the
distribution.
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Notes: The figure replicates Figure 3.6 while using sample weights. Weights are constructed
to make the sample representative of local population demographics at the annual level.
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Figure C.5: Coverage Maps and Designated Market Areas
(A) Kansas City coverage map ring (in blue) (B) Kansas City DMA ring (in red)
(C) Minneapolis coverage map ring (in blue) (D) Minneapolis DMA ring (in red)
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Figure C.6: TV Purchases Patterns




























































Notes: Panel (A) shows average TV ownership around Kansas City for counties in the groups
indicated in the legend. “Overlap Counties” refers to those highlighted in Figure . In Panel
(B), for Minneapolis-St. Paul, “Coverage Map Counties” refers to those ringed in Figure 4,
whose coverage exceeds 50 percent according to TV Factbook coverage maps. “Overreach
Counties” refers to those highlighted in Figure 5, which fall inside the Minneapolis-St. Paul
DMA but outside the TV Factbook broadcast range.
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Figure C.7: Broadcast Technology Improvements























































Notes: The figure shows the increases in broadcast tower height and power over time. Data
are digitized from the TV Factbook, as discussed in the main text.
Table C.1: Summary Statistics
Observation Average s.d. Min Max Men Women
Employed 325,130 54.54 49.79 0 100 78.29 38.28
Quarters worked 325,042 1.909 1.877 0 4 2.886 1.239
TV channels 325,130 6.904 4.697 0 16.65 6.910 6.899
Years of schooling 325,130 11.80 3.419 1 19 11.69 11.87
High school graduate 325,130 0.541 0.498 0 1 0.508 0.563
Age 325,130 38.16 11.38 21 79 38.54 37.91
Ever married 325,130 0.950 0.217 0 1 0.947 0.953
Female 325,130 0.594 0.491 0 1 0 1
Minority 325,130 0.0883 0.284 0 1 0.0922 0.0855
Recent move 321,196 0.0521 0.222 0 1 0.0526 0.0518
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the SSA-CPS sample. Employment and age
information is based on SSA records and spans the years 1937-1960. The data is annual from
1951 to 1960 and includes multi-year averages for the periods 1937-1946 and 1947-1950. We
restrict the sample to adults (over age 21 at the time). Data on gender, marriage, mobility, race
and schooling is based on linked 1978 CPS records. Data on TV channels is computed using
records from digitized Television Factbooks in an ITM signal propagation model.
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Table C.2: TV Effects on Employment – Leads and Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t-4 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.221 -0.0005
(0.122) (0.123) (0.125) (0.155) (0.141)
t-3 -0.1029 -0.109 -0.1076 -0.0964 -0.0961
(0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.145) (0.132)
t-2 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.037 0.0636
(0.0959) (0.0966) (0.0969) (0.115) (0.106)
t-1 0 0 0 0 0
t -0.273 -0.274 -0.268 -0.256 -0.2384
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.103) (0.112)
t+1 -0.247 -0.2399 -0.2382 -0.1769 -0.1767
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.117) (0.125)
t+2 -0.256 -0.26 -0.259 -0.1916 -0.1563
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.118)
t+3 -0.265 -0.253 -0.246 -0.0573 -0.2694
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.168) (0.135)
Observations 161,483 161,483 161,483 161,483 161,483
R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.902 0.782
cluster 134 134 134 134 134
Year × Sex FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Region × Year
Person FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends None None Demographics State None
Notes: The Table shows the timing of television effects by reporting coefficients
on the leads and lags of the television variable. Period t− 1 is normalised to 0 to
illustrate changes in the effect around the time of television launches. See Table
3.1 for variable definitions and additional specification details. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C.3: Individual-level Effects of TV on Employment - Weighted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(Men) × Stations 2.833*** -0.431*** -0.453*** -0.468*** -0.202 -0.369***
(0.165) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) (0.150) (0.125)
1(Women) × Stations -0.724*** -0.260* -0.254* -0.257* 0.00238 -0.0576
(0.102) (0.145) (0.143) (0.153) (0.134) (0.146)
Sum of Weights (thsd.) 531,307 530,603 530,603 530,603 530,603 530,603
R-squared 0.112 0.705 0.707 0.708 0.873 0.707
Year × Sex FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Region × Year
Person FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trends No No No Demographics State No
Mean DV Men 78.31 78.29 78.29 78.29 78.29 78.29
Mean DV Women 38.34 38.28 38.28 38.28 38.28 38.28
Notes: The table replicates Table 3.1 and additionally uses sample weights. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.4: Heterogeneous Effects of TV on Employment by Demographic Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stations -0.392*** -0.345*** -0.432*** -0.466***
(0.0977) (0.0966) (0.101) (0.144)
Stations × 1(Mobile person) 0.0878
(0.141)
Stations × 1(Age 60+) -0.584***
(0.133)
Stations × 1(High school dropout) 0.0874*
(0.0500)
Stations × 1(Married) 0.0849
(0.121)
Observations 322,139 326,089 326,089 326,089
R-squared 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680
Notes: The table shows regressions of employment on available TV stations with
interactions for the listed demographic groups. The specification is the baseline
specification in column 3 of Table 3.1. Mobile: person moved MSA between 1975
and 1976. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C.5: Proximal Market Areas
DMA 1 DMA 2 Miles Apart Years Apart
Pittsburgh (PA) [1949] Steubenville (OH) [1954] 32.79 5
Washington (DC) [1946] Harrisburg (PA) [1949] 35.86 3
Harrisonburg (VA) [1954] Charlottesville (VA) [1960] 36.04 6
Harrisburg (PA) [1949] Johnstown (PA) [1950] 42.47 1
Cleveland (OH) [1948] Youngstown (OH) [1953] 42.53 5
Grand Rapids (MI) [1949] Lansing (MI) [1950] 45.46 1
Binghamton (NY) [1950] Elmira (NY) [1953] 45.67 3
Syracuse (NY) [1949] Utica (NY) [1950] 46.36 1
Kansas City (MO) [1950] St. Joseph (MO) [1954] 48.35 4
Cincinnati (OH) [1948] Dayton (OH) [1949] 48.48 1
Lake Charles (LA) [1954] Beaumont (TX) [1955] 49.55 1
Youngstown (OH) [1953] Steubenville (OH) [1954] 50.28 1
Columbus (OH) [1949] Zanesville (OH) [1953] 52.28 4
Binghamton (NY) [1950] Wilkes Barre (PA) [1953] 52.39 3
Zanesville (OH) [1953] Parkersburg (WV) [1954] 52.44 1
Cleveland (OH) [1948] Steubenville (OH) [1954] 52.49 6
Detroit (MI) [1947] Toledo (OH) [1948] 53.08 1
San Francisco (CA) [1949] Sacremento (CA) [1954] 54.15 5
Baton Rouge (LA) [1953] Lafayette (LA) [1955] 54.94 2
Pittsburgh (PA) [1949] Youngstown (OH) [1953] 57.01 4
Hartford (CT) [1948] Springfield (MA) [1953] 57.39 5
Nashville (TN) [1951] Bowling Green (KY) [1960] 58.19 9
Grand Rapids (MI) [1949] South Bend (IN) [1953] 58.36 4
Indianapolis (IN) [1949] Lafayette (IN) [1953] 58.74 4
Lima (OH) [1953] Ft. Wayne (IN) [1954] 58.86 1
Kansas City (MO) [1950] Topeka (KS) [1954] 59.70 4
South Bend (IN) [1953] Ft. Wayne (IN) [1954] 60.10 1
Birmingham (AL) [1949] Montgomery (AL) [1953] 60.13 4
Memphis (TN) [1949] Jonesboro (AR) [1960] 60.48 11
Jacksonville (FL) [1950] Gainesville (FL) [1960] 61.83 10
Roanoke (VA) [1953] Charlottesville (VA) [1960] 62.10 7
Denver (CO) [1952] Colorado Springs (CO) [1953] 63.65 1
Rochester (MN) [1953] La Crosse (WI) [1954] 63.69 1
Richmond (VA) [1948] Norkfolk (VA) [1950] 63.88 2
Washington (DC) [1946] Baltimore (MD) [1948] 63.95 2
Champaign (IL) [1953] Terre Haute (IN) [1954] 64.67 1
Syracuse (NY) [1949] Watertown (NY) [1955] 65.18 6
Notes: In brackets is the year in which a broadcast began in each DMA. Some DMAs are
abbreviated for brevity. For example, the Birmingham (AL) - Anniston (AL) - Tuscaloosa (AL)
DMA is listed just as Birmingham (AL).
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Table C.6: Revisiting TV’s Effects on Voter Turnout (Gentzkow, 2006)
All Elections All Elections Presidential Non-presidential
DMA -0.416 -0.136 -0.067 -0.196
(0.0486) (0.0412) (0.0438) (0.0478)
ITM40 -0.468 -0.254 -0.171 -0.278
(0.0450) (0.0421) (0.0481) (0.0438)
ITM50 -0.513 -0.305 -0.223 -0.326
(0.0479) (0.0443) (0.0505) (0.0457)
Full controls X X X
Notes: The table replicates the Gentzkow (2006) results on TV’s influence on voter
turnout, with both the original DMA approximation and the new ITM data. ITM40
and ITM50 refer to measurements of TV access using -40 and -50 decibel cutoffs
for access, respectively. Column 2 is the preferred specification in the paper, which
shows effects on the order of 2-3 larger using the ITM. Column 3 shows results for
the sub-sample of presidential election years, column 4 for off-presidential mid-term
elections. See figure C.8 for a plot of the DMA and ITM50 coefficients and 90 percent
confidence intervals.
Figure C.8: Revisiting TV’s Effects on Voter Turnout (Gentzkow, 2006)
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Table C.7: Revisiting TV’s Effects on Children’s Test Scores (Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2008b)
First Stage Average General
F Stat. Score Verbal Reading Knowledge
DMA 16.58 0.0225 0.0294 0.0557 0.0672
(0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0302) (0.0410)
ITM40 36.69 0.0385 0.0511 0.0598 0.0384
(0.0200) (0.0214) (0.0247) (0.0310)
ITM50 23.87 0.0374 0.0485 0.0604 0.0338
(0.0231) (0.0238) (0.0276) (0.0376)
Full controls X X X X
Notes: The table revisits the Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008b) findings on
how TV affected children’s test scores. As before, ITM40 and ITM50 refer
to measurements of TV access using -40 and -50 decibel cutoffs for access,
respectively, while DMA refers to the DMA approximation to TV braodcast
reach. These are two-stage least squares estimates, where TV ownership is
instrumented with TV access; the first-stage F-statistic shows how strongly
the reported measures of TV access predict TV ownership. See figure C.9 for
a plot of the DMA and ITM50 coefficients and 90 percent confidence intervals.
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